23 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tinocogreen2 sentences2007"However, [if] a jury instruction is erroneous, 'we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case."" State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ¶ 22 , 52 P.3d 451 (quoting State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). 17 Second, Davis argues that the trial court erred by allowing his parole officer to testify that Davis's handling of the weapon *912 constituted possession under the statute. 5 " "The trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of ... testimony, and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of d 2002However, when a jury instruction is erroneous, "we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah Ct.App.1998). 123 Perez raises for the first time on appeal his claim that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on criminal attempt. "[JJury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct.App.1995), cert. denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2012If "a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ¶ 22 , 52 P.3d 451 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶ 6 , 155 P.3d 909 . 2012If "a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ¶ 22 , 52 P.3d 451 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶ 6 , 155 P.3d 909 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mohamudgreen2 sentences2019Although the threshold reasonable probability standard presents a low bar, a defendant must provide "more than speculation," Mohamud , 2017 UT 23 , ¶ 20, 395 P.3d 133 (quotation simplified), and present some evidence that would explain "both what the lost evidence might have shown and how that evidence could have benefitted [the defendant]," DeJesus , 2017 UT 22 , ¶¶ 39, 44, 395 P.3d 111 . 2019Although the threshold reasonable probability standard presents a low bar, a defendant must provide "more than speculation," Mohamud , 2017 UT 23 , ¶ 20, 395 P.3d 133 (quotation simplified), and present some evidence that would explain "both what the lost evidence might have shown and how that evidence could have benefitted [the defendant]," DeJesus , 2017 UT 22 , ¶¶ 39, 44, 395 P.3d 111 . | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Bagleygreen2 sentences2025And he also agreed that the reasonable probability standard was flexible enough “to cover all instances of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused.” Id. 1987In defining a similarly worded standard, the United States Supreme Court has stated: “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (,Strickland articulation of the reasonable probability standard applied in a case involving nondisclosure of impeachment evidence). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Malagagreen2 sentences2012ANALYSIS 1 16 In reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we determine that the trial court did not "fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law," see Malaga, 2006 UT App 103 , 1 18, 182 P.3d 703 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2012ANALYSIS ¶16 In reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we determine that the trial court did not “fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law,” see Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). 2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gibsongreen1 sentence2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 10856412green1 sentence2026See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, ¶ 52 , 366 P.3d 884 (“To reverse a trial verdict, we 20240381-CA 10 2026 UT App 74 State v. Paramoure must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result.”) (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 379 P.3d 1181 (Utah 2016). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nelsongreen2 sentences2026See State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 28 , 355 P.3d 1031 (explaining that the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial” (cleaned up)). _________________________________________________________ 4 We have previously applied a two-step process for determining whether an error in a jury instruction was prejudicial. 2026See State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, ¶ 28 , 355 P.3d 1031 (explaining that the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial” (cleaned up)). _________________________________________________________ 4 We have previously applied a two-step process for determining whether an error in a jury instruction was prejudicial. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Steelegreen2 sentences2025So long as that proffer is not pure speculation or wholly incredible, the standard will be satisfied.” Id. ¶ 39 (cleaned up); see also State v. Steele, 2019 UT App 71, ¶ 27 , 442 P.3d 1204 (“Although the threshold reasonable probability standard presents a low bar, a defendant must provide more than speculation . . . .” (cleaned up)). ¶37 Dew argues that he met this “minimum showing” by indicating to the district court that (1) “the dates of the files on the silver laptop occurred prior to his possession of the laptop” and (2) “Wife’s laptop showed downloads of . . . the [peer-to-peer filing s 2025So long as that proffer is not pure speculation or wholly incredible, the standard will be satisfied.” Id. ¶ 39 (cleaned up); see also State v. Steele, 2019 UT App 71, ¶ 27 , 442 P.3d 1204 (“Although the threshold reasonable probability standard presents a low bar, a defendant must provide more than speculation . . . .” (cleaned up)). ¶37 Dew argues that he met this “minimum showing” by indicating to the district court that (1) “the dates of the files on the silver laptop occurred prior to his possession of the laptop” and (2) “Wife’s laptop showed downloads of . . . the [peer-to-peer filing s | 1 | 1 |
Molina-Martinez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 1349 (concluding that the Guidelines range affects “most” federal sentences and that this probability “is all that is needed” to establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome in most cases); Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1139 (finding “a reasonable probability that allocution matters in the usual case” and concluding that this probability is enough to demonstrate prejudice absent extraordinary circumstances). ¶51 The Olano presumption, on the other hand, tends not to involve statistical probabilities of prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bustamante-Conchasgreen1 sentence2025See Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 1349 (concluding that the Guidelines range affects “most” federal sentences and that this probability “is all that is needed” to establish a reasonable probability of a different outcome in most cases); Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1139 (finding “a reasonable probability that allocution matters in the usual case” and concluding that this probability is enough to demonstrate prejudice absent extraordinary circumstances). ¶51 The Olano presumption, on the other hand, tends not to involve statistical probabilities of prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Horvathgreen2 sentences2019However, even if “an error is found in jury instructions, reversal is warranted only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 19 , 414 P.3d 1030 ; see also State v. Horvath, 2018 UT App 165, ¶ 22 , 436 P.3d 191 (explaining that an appellant challenging the failure to give an instruction must demonstrate that, had the instruction been 20180644-CA 6 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas given, “there is a reasonable likelihood that she would have enjoyed a more favorable trial result” (cleaned up)). ¶15 In the alternativ 2019However, even if “an error is found in jury instructions, reversal is warranted only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 19 , 414 P.3d 1030 ; see also State v. Horvath, 2018 UT App 165, ¶ 22 , 436 P.3d 191 (explaining that an appellant challenging the failure to give an instruction must demonstrate that, had the instruction been 20180644-CA 6 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas given, “there is a reasonable likelihood that she would have enjoyed a more favorable trial result” (cleaned up)). ¶15 In the alternativ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2019However, even if “an error is found in jury instructions, reversal is warranted only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 19 , 414 P.3d 1030 ; see also State v. Horvath, 2018 UT App 165, ¶ 22 , 436 P.3d 191 (explaining that an appellant challenging the failure to give an instruction must demonstrate that, had the instruction been 20180644-CA 6 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas given, “there is a reasonable likelihood that she would have enjoyed a more favorable trial result” (cleaned up)). ¶15 In the alternativ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrellgreen2 sentences2019However, even if “an error is found in jury instructions, reversal is warranted only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 19 , 414 P.3d 1030 ; see also State v. Horvath, 2018 UT App 165, ¶ 22 , 436 P.3d 191 (explaining that an appellant challenging the failure to give an instruction must demonstrate that, had the instruction been 20180644-CA 6 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas given, “there is a reasonable likelihood that she would have enjoyed a more favorable trial result” (cleaned up)). ¶15 In the alternativ 2019However, even if “an error is found in jury instructions, reversal is warranted only if there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case.” State v. Carrell, 2018 UT App 21, ¶ 19 , 414 P.3d 1030 ; see also State v. Horvath, 2018 UT App 165, ¶ 22 , 436 P.3d 191 (explaining that an appellant challenging the failure to give an instruction must demonstrate that, had the instruction been 20180644-CA 6 2019 UT App 177 State v. Thomas given, “there is a reasonable likelihood that she would have enjoyed a more favorable trial result” (cleaned up)). ¶15 In the alternativ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nielsengreen1 sentence2017State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986) (holding that in order to establish a due process violation resulting from the prosecution’s refusal to disclose the identity of a confidential informant, “a defendant must make some showing that disclosure of an informant’s identity is material and essential to his defense” (emphasis added)). 60 Cf. State v. Mohamud, 2017 UT 23, ¶¶ 24, 26 , --- P.3d --- (holding that a defendant failed to satisfy the reasonable probability standard when he provided only speculation as to what the lost evidence would have shown). 19 STATE v. DEJESUS Opinion of th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gibsongreen1 sentence2002However, when a jury instruction is erroneous, "we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah Ct.App.1998). 123 Perez raises for the first time on appeal his claim that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on criminal attempt. "[JJury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct.App.1995), cert. denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Knightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Garrettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2025Whereas the default plain error standard requires the defendant to show a reasonable probability that an error was harmful, the appellant’s preferred rule—derived from the Supreme Court’s test in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)—would have the State prove constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶63 In rejecting the defendant’s proposed application of Chapman’s “heightened standard of review,” Bond did no more than affirm that unpreserved federal constitutional claims are, like other unpreserved claims, “to be reviewed under our plain error doctrine.” Bond, 2015 U5 88, 2025But see id. ¶ 38 n.11 (noting that Bond’s holding does not necessarily extend to capital cases, “which may 19 STATE v. JAMES Opinion of the Court garner unique review under our case law”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. DeJesus
green
2 sentences2025We agree. ¶36 The Tiedemann analysis includes “a threshold reasonable probability requirement.” State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 2 , 395 P.3d 111 . 2025We agree. ¶36 The Tiedemann analysis includes “a threshold reasonable probability requirement.” State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, ¶ 2 , 395 P.3d 111 . | 4 | 2017–2025 |
State v. Perez
green
2 sentences2012If "a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ¶ 22 , 52 P.3d 451 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶ 6 , 155 P.3d 909 . 2012If "a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, ¶ 22 , 52 P.3d 451 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ¶ 6 , 155 P.3d 909 . | 3 | 2007–2012 |
State v. O'BANNON
green
2 sentences2026So while the second paragraph of the supplemental instruction explicitly allocated the burden to the State, the first paragraph effectively lowered it. ¶22 But even “if a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case.” State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71 , ¶ 15, 274 P.3d 992 (quotation simplified). 2026So while the second paragraph of the supplemental instruction explicitly allocated the burden to the State, the first paragraph effectively lowered it. ¶22 But even “if a jury instruction is erroneous, we will reverse only if the defendant shows a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of his case.” State v. O’Bannon, 2012 UT App 71 , ¶ 15, 274 P.3d 992 (quotation simplified). | 2 | 2022–2026 |
Gordon v. State
green
2 sentences2019The reasonable probability standard is “more akin to a ‘significant possibility’ of a different result.” Id. (quotation simplified). 2018The reasonable probability standard is “more akin to a ‘significant possibility’ of a different result.” Id. (citation omitted). | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Penn
green
2 sentences2012"An error is prejudicial if it tends to mislead the jury to _ the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[s] the jury on the law." State v. Penn, 2004 UT App 212, 128 , 94 P.3d 308 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 142 The State contends, even if we determine as we have, that O'Bannon could be convicted of second degree felony child abuse only if he intended to cause serious physical injury or acted knowing that his *1004 actions were reasonably certain to cause serious physical injury, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient 2012"An error is prejudicial if it tends to mislead the jury to _ the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[s] the jury on the law." State v. Penn, 2004 UT App 212, 128 , 94 P.3d 308 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 142 The State contends, even if we determine as we have, that O'Bannon could be convicted of second degree felony child abuse only if he intended to cause serious physical injury or acted knowing that his *1004 actions were reasonably certain to cause serious physical injury, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Dew
green
1 sentence2025Thus, for our analysis here, we rely on the undisputed proffers at the hearing against reaching constitutional questions if we can resolve the case on non-constitutional grounds,” State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 24 , 423 P.3d 1236 , we do not address whether the Tiedemann issue in this case can be resolved based on Dew’s phone being in State custody without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 20220463-CA 15 2025 UT App 22 State v. Dew on the motion to dismiss, the undisputed evidence admitted at trial, and the fact that certain evidence was never proffered or admitted. ¶39 Dew’s first assertio | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Goins
green
2 sentences2025Thus, for our analysis here, we rely on the undisputed proffers at the hearing against reaching constitutional questions if we can resolve the case on non-constitutional grounds,” State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 24 , 423 P.3d 1236 , we do not address whether the Tiedemann issue in this case can be resolved based on Dew’s phone being in State custody without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 20220463-CA 15 2025 UT App 22 State v. Dew on the motion to dismiss, the undisputed evidence admitted at trial, and the fact that certain evidence was never proffered or admitted. ¶39 Dew’s first assertio 2025Thus, for our analysis here, we rely on the undisputed proffers at the hearing against reaching constitutional questions if we can resolve the case on non-constitutional grounds,” State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, ¶ 24 , 423 P.3d 1236 , we do not address whether the Tiedemann issue in this case can be resolved based on Dew’s phone being in State custody without running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. 20220463-CA 15 2025 UT App 22 State v. Dew on the motion to dismiss, the undisputed evidence admitted at trial, and the fact that certain evidence was never proffered or admitted. ¶39 Dew’s first assertio | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Bonds
green
1 sentence2019There is a “reasonable probability of a different 20180238-CA 29 2019 UT App 156 State v. Bonds result” when a court’s “confidence in the outcome of the trial” is undermined. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tillman v. State
green
1 sentence2019The reasonable probability standard is “more akin to a significant possibility of a different result.” Tillman, 2005 UT 56 , ¶ 29 n.7 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Tiedemann
green
2 sentences2017See id. ¶¶29, 39; Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ¶ 44 , 162 P.3d 1106 . . 2017Courts have long recognized that “upon a showing of substantial tension between a defendant’s desire to testify in a hearing that adjudicates a claim of constitutional right in a criminal case and the right of that defendant not to give testimony _____________________________________________________________ 33 See id. ¶¶ 39, 44 (holding that the defendant’s proffer of testimony from a potentially unreliable witness and arguably contradictory testimony from a prison guard satisfied the reasonable probability standard because it supported her claim that the State had failed to prove the intent e | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Shepherd
green
1 sentence2016"For an error to be harmful, there must be a reasonable probability the error affected the outcome of the case." State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 805 , ¶ 23, 989 P.2d 503 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ‘ I. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Davis
neutral
1 sentence2012ANALYSIS 1 16 In reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we determine that the trial court did not "fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law," see Malaga, 2006 UT App 103 , 1 18, 182 P.3d 703 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.