5 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Newman v. Stategreen2 sentences2010This court has recognized that the reasonable-probability standard should be applied “ ‘collectively, not item by item,’ such that the ‘cumulative effect’ of the suppressed evidence, and not necessarily each piece separately, must be material.” Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539 , 354 S.W.3d 61 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). 2010This court has recognized that the reasonable-probability standard should be applied “ ‘collectively, not item by item,’ such that the ‘cumulative effect’ of the suppressed evidence, and not necessarily each piece separately, must be material.” Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539 , 354 S.W.3d 61 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). | 1 | 2 |
Leonard Noble v. State of Arkansasgreen2 sentences2022See also Noble v. State, 2022 Ark. 37, at 3 , 638 S.W.3d 844, 846 (stating that this court has extended the writ of error coram nobis under “the rule of reason” when the State presented repudiated governmental “expert scientific opinion at trial”). 2022See also Noble v. State, 2022 Ark. 37, at 3 , 638 S.W.3d 844, 846 (stating that this court has extended the writ of error coram nobis under “the rule of reason” when the State presented repudiated governmental “expert scientific opinion at trial”). | 1 | 1 |
Eugene Issac Pitts v. State of Arkansasgreen2 sentences2022See Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark. 7 , at 6–12, 591 S.W.3d 786 , 791–94 (holding that the circuit court properly found that Malone’s repudiated hair evidence was not material and that Pitts had not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ); Strawhacker, 2016 Ark. 348 , at 7–8, 500 S.W.3d at 720 (granting Strawhacker’s petition to reinvest jurisdiction with the circuit court and expanding on the rule of reason, materiality of Malone’s testimony, and the reasonable-probability standard); Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345 , at 4–5, 501 S.W.3d 803 , 805–06 (granting Pitts’s petition to reinve 2022See Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark. 7 , at 6–12, 591 S.W.3d 786 , 791–94 (holding that the circuit court properly found that Malone’s repudiated hair evidence was not material and that Pitts had not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ); Strawhacker, 2016 Ark. 348 , at 7–8, 500 S.W.3d at 720 (granting Strawhacker’s petition to reinvest jurisdiction with the circuit court and expanding on the rule of reason, materiality of Malone’s testimony, and the reasonable-probability standard); Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345 , at 4–5, 501 S.W.3d 803 , 805–06 (granting Pitts’s petition to reinve | 1 | 1 |
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen1 sentence2020To show prejudice under Strickland based on trial counsel’s failure to request a specific instruction, the United States Supreme Court has held that an appellant must establish that it was “reasonably likely that the instruction would have made any difference [in the outcome of the trial] in light of all the other evidence of guilt.” Douglas, 2019 Ark. 57, at 8 , 567 S.W.3d at 490 (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pitts v. State
green
2 sentences2022See Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark. 7 , at 6–12, 591 S.W.3d 786 , 791–94 (holding that the circuit court properly found that Malone’s repudiated hair evidence was not material and that Pitts had not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ); Strawhacker, 2016 Ark. 348 , at 7–8, 500 S.W.3d at 720 (granting Strawhacker’s petition to reinvest jurisdiction with the circuit court and expanding on the rule of reason, materiality of Malone’s testimony, and the reasonable-probability standard); Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345 , at 4–5, 501 S.W.3d 803 , 805–06 (granting Pitts’s petition to reinve 2022See Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark. 7 , at 6–12, 591 S.W.3d 786 , 791–94 (holding that the circuit court properly found that Malone’s repudiated hair evidence was not material and that Pitts had not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ); Strawhacker, 2016 Ark. 348 , at 7–8, 500 S.W.3d at 720 (granting Strawhacker’s petition to reinvest jurisdiction with the circuit court and expanding on the rule of reason, materiality of Malone’s testimony, and the reasonable-probability standard); Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345 , at 4–5, 501 S.W.3d 803 , 805–06 (granting Pitts’s petition to reinve | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Strawhacker v. State
green
2 sentences2022See Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark. 7 , at 6–12, 591 S.W.3d 786 , 791–94 (holding that the circuit court properly found that Malone’s repudiated hair evidence was not material and that Pitts had not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ); Strawhacker, 2016 Ark. 348 , at 7–8, 500 S.W.3d at 720 (granting Strawhacker’s petition to reinvest jurisdiction with the circuit court and expanding on the rule of reason, materiality of Malone’s testimony, and the reasonable-probability standard); Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345 , at 4–5, 501 S.W.3d 803 , 805–06 (granting Pitts’s petition to reinve 2022See Pitts v. State, 2020 Ark. 7 , at 6–12, 591 S.W.3d 786 , 791–94 (holding that the circuit court properly found that Malone’s repudiated hair evidence was not material and that Pitts had not shown an abuse of discretion in the denial of the writ); Strawhacker, 2016 Ark. 348 , at 7–8, 500 S.W.3d at 720 (granting Strawhacker’s petition to reinvest jurisdiction with the circuit court and expanding on the rule of reason, materiality of Malone’s testimony, and the reasonable-probability standard); Pitts v. State, 2016 Ark. 345 , at 4–5, 501 S.W.3d 803 , 805–06 (granting Pitts’s petition to reinve | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Duck v. State
green
1 sentence2020E.g., Duck, 2018 Ark. 267 , at 3, 555 S.W.3d at 874 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Douglas v. State
green
2 sentences2020To show prejudice under Strickland based on trial counsel’s failure to request a specific instruction, the United States Supreme Court has held that an appellant must establish that it was “reasonably likely that the instruction would have made any difference [in the outcome of the trial] in light of all the other evidence of guilt.” Douglas, 2019 Ark. 57, at 8 , 567 S.W.3d at 490 (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010)). 2020To show prejudice under Strickland based on trial counsel’s failure to request a specific instruction, the United States Supreme Court has held that an appellant must establish that it was “reasonably likely that the instruction would have made any difference [in the outcome of the trial] in light of all the other evidence of guilt.” Douglas, 2019 Ark. 57, at 8 , 567 S.W.3d at 490 (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 390 (2010)). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2010This court has recognized that the reasonable-probability standard should be applied “ ‘collectively, not item by item,’ such that the ‘cumulative effect’ of the suppressed evidence, and not necessarily each piece separately, must be material.” Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539 , 354 S.W.3d 61 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). 2010This court has recognized that the reasonable-probability standard should be applied “ ‘collectively, not item by item,’ such that the ‘cumulative effect’ of the suppressed evidence, and not necessarily each piece separately, must be material.” Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539 , 354 S.W.3d 61 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.