conditional privilege in Washington

2020A speaker abuses a qualified privilege or immunity when he knows his statements are false.68 Davidson alleges Glenny and Skerrett “intentionally omitted key information” and “each knew” they were spreading false impressions 65 CP at 7. 66 CP at 80. 67 RCW 28B.10.648(1). 68 Lillig v. Becton-Dickinson, 105 Wn.2d 653, 658 , 717 P.2d 1371 (1986) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 ). 17 No. 80062-1-I/18 when they spoke with the peer review committee.69 Because Davidson alleged Glenny and Skerrett did not act in good faith when speaking with the peer review committee, the conditional immunity conferred

2020A speaker abuses a qualified privilege or immunity when he knows his statements are false.68 Davidson alleges Glenny and Skerrett “intentionally omitted key information” and “each knew” they were spreading false impressions 65 CP at 7. 66 CP at 80. 67 RCW 28B.10.648(1). 68 Lillig v. Becton-Dickinson, 105 Wn.2d 653, 658 , 717 P.2d 1371 (1986) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 ). 17 No. 80062-1-I/18 when they spoke with the peer review committee.69 Because Davidson alleged Glenny and Skerrett did not act in good faith when speaking with the peer review committee, the conditional immunity conferred

2018The Fair Report Privileqe6 Washington recognizes the fair report privilege—a conditional privilege that protects a republisher of a statement "when the original defamatory statement was made in the course of an official public proceeding or contained in an official public record." Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 179 , 736 P.2d 249 (1987).

2018The Fair Report Privileqe6 Washington recognizes the fair report privilege—a conditional privilege that protects a republisher of a statement "when the original defamatory statement was made in the course of an official public proceeding or contained in an official public record." Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 108 Wn.2d 162, 179 , 736 P.2d 249 (1987).

1981Moreover, as we said in State v. Mark, 94 Wn.2d 520 , 618 P.2d 73 (1980), these actions were open to criticism under principle No. 7, Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines (see West's Washington Court Rules 1980). 5 Whiie we adhere to the negligence standard enunciated in Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956 , 603 P.2d 828 (1979), we note that the most recent revision to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, at 288 (1977) discusses abuse of the conditional privilege as follows: § 600.

1981Moreover, as we said in State v. Mark, 94 Wn.2d 520 , 618 P.2d 73 (1980), these actions were open to criticism under principle No. 7, Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines (see West's Washington Court Rules 1980). 5 Whiie we adhere to the negligence standard enunciated in Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956 , 603 P.2d 828 (1979), we note that the most recent revision to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, at 288 (1977) discusses abuse of the conditional privilege as follows: § 600.

1981Ed. 2d 789 , 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974)] is that mere negligence as to fal *493 sity, being required for all actions of defamation, is no longer treated as sufficient to amount to abuse of a conditional privilege.

1978Ed. 2d 789 , 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974), is that "mere negligence as to falsity, being required for all actions of defamation, is no longer treated as sufficient to amount to abuse of a conditional privilege." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, comment b (1977).

2026Haueter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 61 Wn.

2020App. 2d 708 , 715, 429 P.3d 6 (2018) (explaining an absolute privilege shields a speaker from “all liability,” whereas a qualified privilege can be lost if abused) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 ), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1021 , 433 P.3d 816 (2019); see also Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 -02 14 No. 80062-1-I/15 conferring only a conditional immunity upon faculty in hiring committees, the legislature implicitly rejected the possibility of an absolute privilege for the same conduct.59 If Davidson was a statutory employee and Glenny and Skerrett were serving on a “peer review committee” to decide on

2020App. 2d 708 , 715, 429 P.3d 6 (2018) (explaining an absolute privilege shields a speaker from “all liability,” whereas a qualified privilege can be lost if abused) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 ), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1021 , 433 P.3d 816 (2019); see also Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 -02 14 No. 80062-1-I/15 conferring only a conditional immunity upon faculty in hiring committees, the legislature implicitly rejected the possibility of an absolute privilege for the same conduct.59 If Davidson was a statutory employee and Glenny and Skerrett were serving on a “peer review committee” to decide on

2020App. 2d 708 , 715, 429 P.3d 6 (2018) (explaining an absolute privilege shields a speaker from “all liability,” whereas a qualified privilege can be lost if abused) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 ), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1021 , 433 P.3d 816 (2019); see also Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 -02 14 No. 80062-1-I/15 conferring only a conditional immunity upon faculty in hiring committees, the legislature implicitly rejected the possibility of an absolute privilege for the same conduct.59 If Davidson was a statutory employee and Glenny and Skerrett were serving on a “peer review committee” to decide on

2020App. 2d 708 , 715, 429 P.3d 6 (2018) (explaining an absolute privilege shields a speaker from “all liability,” whereas a qualified privilege can be lost if abused) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 ), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1021 , 433 P.3d 816 (2019); see also Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 -02 14 No. 80062-1-I/15 conferring only a conditional immunity upon faculty in hiring committees, the legislature implicitly rejected the possibility of an absolute privilege for the same conduct.59 If Davidson was a statutory employee and Glenny and Skerrett were serving on a “peer review committee” to decide on

2020App. 2d 708 , 715, 429 P.3d 6 (2018) (explaining an absolute privilege shields a speaker from “all liability,” whereas a qualified privilege can be lost if abused) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 ), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1021 , 433 P.3d 816 (2019); see also Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 -02 14 No. 80062-1-I/15 conferring only a conditional immunity upon faculty in hiring committees, the legislature implicitly rejected the possibility of an absolute privilege for the same conduct.59 If Davidson was a statutory employee and Glenny and Skerrett were serving on a “peer review committee” to decide on

2020App. 2d 708 , 715, 429 P.3d 6 (2018) (explaining an absolute privilege shields a speaker from “all liability,” whereas a qualified privilege can be lost if abused) (citing Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 600 ), review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1021 , 433 P.3d 816 (2019); see also Bender, 99 Wn.2d at 601 -02 14 No. 80062-1-I/15 conferring only a conditional immunity upon faculty in hiring committees, the legislature implicitly rejected the possibility of an absolute privilege for the same conduct.59 If Davidson was a statutory employee and Glenny and Skerrett were serving on a “peer review committee” to decide on

1991Chicago, Inc., 120 Ill.

1991App. 807, 810-11 , 521 P.2d 49 (1974), this court held that where the State unnecessarily inquires on direct examination into the substance of the communication made by an unidentified informant, the conditional privilege against disclosure may be waived. *692 Relying on McCoy , Sarinana and Sanchez contend that the State waived the privilege by eliciting Navarrete's testimony pertaining to the communication received from the informant.

1987O'Brien v. Tribune Pub'g Co., 7 Wn.

1987Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 487-88 , 635 P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); see also Note, supra-, Restatement § 611.

1987Turngren v. King Cy., 104 Wn.2d 293, 310 , 705 P.2d 258 (1985); see Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 88 Wn.2d 473, 478 , 564 P.2d 1131 (1977); see also Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d at 492 ; Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956, 960 , 603 P.2d 828 (1979).

1987Turngren v. King Cy., 104 Wn.2d 293, 310 , 705 P.2d 258 (1985); see Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc., 88 Wn.2d 473, 478 , 564 P.2d 1131 (1977); see also Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d at 492 ; Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956, 960 , 603 P.2d 828 (1979).

1984Confidential communications to a public officer are privileged only when the public interest would suffer by their disclosure." Cook v. King Cy., 9 Wn.

1981Moreover, as we said in State v. Mark, 94 Wn.2d 520 , 618 P.2d 73 (1980), these actions were open to criticism under principle No. 7, Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines (see West's Washington Court Rules 1980). 5 Whiie we adhere to the negligence standard enunciated in Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956 , 603 P.2d 828 (1979), we note that the most recent revision to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, at 288 (1977) discusses abuse of the conditional privilege as follows: § 600.

1981Moreover, as we said in State v. Mark, 94 Wn.2d 520 , 618 P.2d 73 (1980), these actions were open to criticism under principle No. 7, Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines (see West's Washington Court Rules 1980). 5 Whiie we adhere to the negligence standard enunciated in Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 92 Wn.2d 956 , 603 P.2d 828 (1979), we note that the most recent revision to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600, at 288 (1977) discusses abuse of the conditional privilege as follows: § 600.

1979Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 43 Del.

1979Shellburne, Inc. v. Roberts, 43 Del.

1978We remanded for a determination on the question of whether the "Hughes letter"—the fourth issue—was published with actual malice. 2 Although we did not directly address the issue, we inferentially affirmed Judge Johnsen's ruling that Robert O'Brien was a "public figure" and therefore unable to recover damages for defamation without a showing that the defendants acted with "knowledge that it [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was *192 false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 , 11 L.

1978We remanded for a determination on the question of whether the "Hughes letter"—the fourth issue—was published with actual malice. 2 Although we did not directly address the issue, we inferentially affirmed Judge Johnsen's ruling that Robert O'Brien was a "public figure" and therefore unable to recover damages for defamation without a showing that the defendants acted with "knowledge that it [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was *192 false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 , 11 L.