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22 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green Acres Trust v. Londongreen2 sentences2015See Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (“Once a defendant demonstrates that a conditional privilege may apply, the plaintiff may then prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.”). 2015See Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (“Once a defendant demonstrates that a conditional privilege may apply, the plaintiff may then prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.”). | 4 | 7 |
Selby v. Savardgreen2 sentences2009See Moe v. Wise, 97 Wash.App. 950 , 989 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1999); see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (“[A]n abuse of qualified privilege must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). “[T]he plaintiff may ... prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” 7 Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (quoting Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225 , 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982); see Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092 , 1096 *388 (App.1986 2009See Moe v. Wise, 97 Wash.App. 950 , 989 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1999); see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (“[A]n abuse of qualified privilege must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). “[T]he plaintiff may ... prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” 7 Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (quoting Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225 , 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982); see Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092 , 1096 *388 (App.1986 | 3 | 6 |
Portonova v. Wilkinsongreen2 sentences2022We agree. ¶15 Police officers enjoy “limited protection from liability when performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.” Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119, 123, ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (cleaned up); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 (1981) (“[A] police officer acting within the scope of [her] authority has at least a conditional immunity from civil liability.”). 2018Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196, 203, ¶ 27 (2001) (acknowledging that common law immunity principles apply in the absence of statutory direction) (citations omitted). ¶9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when “performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.”4 Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 558 (1986) (applying the Ryan principles in concluding a state employee is protected by qualified immunity for discretionary acts); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 ( | 2 | 2 |
Hirsch v. Coopergreen2 sentences2015“A conditional privilege is abused and forfeited when a defendant acts with malice in fact.” Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092, 1096 (App.1986) (citation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 339 n. 1, 783 P.2d at 785 n. 1. 2015“A conditional privilege is abused and forfeited when a defendant acts with malice in fact.” Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092, 1096 (App.1986) (citation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 339 n. 1, 783 P.2d at 785 n. 1. | 2 | 2 |
Supry v. Bolducgreen2 sentences2006“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘ “those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 212 Ariz. 315, ¶ 12 , 131 P.3d at 490 , quoting Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 11 , 993 P.2d 1119, 1124 (App.1999), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274 , 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972). ¶ 5 The Ledvinas rely on Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222 , 655 P.2d 342 (1982), in support of their argument that only a conditional privilege should apply to statements made i 2006“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘ “those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 212 Ariz. 315, ¶ 12 , 131 P.3d at 490 , quoting Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 11 , 993 P.2d 1119, 1124 (App.1999), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274 , 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972). ¶ 5 The Ledvinas rely on Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222 , 655 P.2d 342 (1982), in support of their argument that only a conditional privilege should apply to statements made i | 2 | 2 |
Burns v. Davisgreen2 sentences2006“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘ “those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 212 Ariz. 315, ¶ 12 , 131 P.3d at 490 , quoting Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 11 , 993 P.2d 1119, 1124 (App.1999), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274 , 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972). ¶ 5 The Ledvinas rely on Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222 , 655 P.2d 342 (1982), in support of their argument that only a conditional privilege should apply to statements made i 2006“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘ “those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 212 Ariz. 315, ¶ 12 , 131 P.3d at 490 , quoting Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 11 , 993 P.2d 1119, 1124 (App.1999), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274 , 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972). ¶ 5 The Ledvinas rely on Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222 , 655 P.2d 342 (1982), in support of their argument that only a conditional privilege should apply to statements made i | 2 | 2 |
Lewis v. Olivergreen2 sentences1999Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (Supreme Court); Lewis, 178 Ariz. at 335 , 873 P.2d at 673 (Court of Appeals). 1999Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (Supreme Court); Lewis, 178 Ariz. at 335 , 873 P.2d at 673 (Court of Appeals). | 2 | 2 |
Patterson v. City of Phoenixgreen2 sentences2018Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196, 203, ¶ 27 (2001) (acknowledging that common law immunity principles apply in the absence of statutory direction) (citations omitted). ¶9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when “performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.”4 Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 558 (1986) (applying the Ryan principles in concluding a state employee is protected by qualified immunity for discretionary acts); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 ( 1981Patterson v. City of Phoenix, 103 Ariz. 64 , 436 P.2d 613 (1968). | 1 | 2 |
Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences2015“A conditional privilege is abused and forfeited when a defendant acts with malice in fact.” Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092, 1096 (App.1986) (citation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 339 n. 1, 783 P.2d at 785 n. 1. 2015“A conditional privilege is abused and forfeited when a defendant acts with malice in fact.” Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092, 1096 (App.1986) (citation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 339 n. 1, 783 P.2d at 785 n. 1. | 1 | 2 |
Spooner v. Phoenixgreen2 sentences2022We agree. ¶15 Police officers enjoy “limited protection from liability when performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.” Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119, 123, ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (cleaned up); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 (1981) (“[A] police officer acting within the scope of [her] authority has at least a conditional immunity from civil liability.”). 2022The purpose of discretionary act immunity is to preserve the “independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits.” Spooner, 246 Ariz. at 124 , ¶ 9 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D cmt. b). | 1 | 1 |
Clouse Ex Rel. Clouse v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196, 203, ¶ 27 (2001) (acknowledging that common law immunity principles apply in the absence of statutory direction) (citations omitted). ¶9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when “performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.”4 Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 558 (1986) (applying the Ryan principles in concluding a state employee is protected by qualified immunity for discretionary acts); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 ( | 1 | 1 |
Chamberlain v. Mathisgreen1 sentence2018Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196, 203, ¶ 27 (2001) (acknowledging that common law immunity principles apply in the absence of statutory direction) (citations omitted). ¶9 Common law qualified immunity generally provides public officials, including police officers, limited protection from liability when “performing an act that inherently requires judgment or discretion.”4 Chamberlain v. Mathis, 151 Ariz. 551, 555, 558 (1986) (applying the Ryan principles in concluding a state employee is protected by qualified immunity for discretionary acts); see also Portonova v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 503 ( | 1 | 1 |
Advanced Cardiac Specialists, Chartered v. Tri-City Cardiology Consultants, P.C.green2 sentences2015“An abuse through ‘actual malice’ occurs when the defendant makes a statement knowing its falsity or actually entertaining doubts about its truth.” Advanced Cardiac Specialists, 222 Ariz. at 388, ¶ 14 , 214 P.3d at 1029 . 2015“An abuse through ‘actual malice’ occurs when the defendant makes a statement knowing its falsity or actually entertaining doubts about its truth.” Advanced Cardiac Specialists, 222 Ariz. at 388, ¶ 14 , 214 P.3d at 1029 . | 1 | 1 |
Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Moe v. Wise, 97 Wash.App. 950 , 989 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1999); see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (“[A]n abuse of qualified privilege must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). “[T]he plaintiff may ... prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” 7 Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (quoting Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225 , 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982); see Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092 , 1096 *388 (App.1986 2009See Moe v. Wise, 97 Wash.App. 950 , 989 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1999); see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (“[A]n abuse of qualified privilege must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). “[T]he plaintiff may ... prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” 7 Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (quoting Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225 , 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982); see Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092 , 1096 *388 (App.1986 | 1 | 1 |
Moe v. Wisegreen2 sentences2009See Moe v. Wise, 97 Wash.App. 950 , 989 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1999); see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (“[A]n abuse of qualified privilege must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). “[T]he plaintiff may ... prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” 7 Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (quoting Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225 , 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982); see Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092 , 1096 *388 (App.1986 2009See Moe v. Wise, 97 Wash.App. 950 , 989 P.2d 1148, 1157 (1999); see also Kass v. Great Coastal Express, Inc., 152 N.J. 353 , 704 A.2d 1293, 1294 (1998) (“[A]n abuse of qualified privilege must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). “[T]he plaintiff may ... prove an abuse of that privilege either by proving publication with ‘actual malice’ or by demonstrating excessive publication.” 7 Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 (quoting Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 225 , 655 P.2d 342, 345 (1982); see Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 458 , 737 P.2d 1092 , 1096 *388 (App.1986 | 1 | 1 |
Kraemer v. Hardinggreen2 sentences2000See id. at 1172. 2000The court’s conclusion in Kraemer that a conditional privilege existed for parents of children who rode together on the same bus was not fully explained. 976 P.2d at 1172 . | 1 | 1 |
MacConnell v. Mittengreen2 sentences2000See MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 23 , 638 P.2d 689, 690 (1981). 2000See MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 23 , 638 P.2d 689, 690 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
John H. Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corporationgreen2 sentences1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor’s complaint against a civil servant because “presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition” granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029,1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U 1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor's complaint against a civil servant because "presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition" granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 | 1 | 1 |
Sherwin S. Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc.green2 sentences1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor’s complaint against a civil servant because “presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition” granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029,1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U 1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor's complaint against a civil servant because "presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition" granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Servicemaster by Reesgreen2 sentences1993Id. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 ; Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees, 174 Ariz. 518, 520 , 851 P.2d 143, 145 (App. 1992). 1993Id. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 ; Miller v. Servicemaster by Rees, 174 Ariz. 518, 520 , 851 P.2d 143, 145 (App. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Orme School v. Reevesgreen2 sentences1992See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). 1992See Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 , 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| New York Times Co. v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Drummond v. Stahl
green
2 sentences2006This would permit a civil action against anyone who has complained to the State Bar and subject such complainant to the full, expensive scope of discovery and litigation, thus “chilling” the motivation of those who believe they have knowledge of improper legal behavior. 127 Ariz. at 126 , 618 P.2d at 620 . 2006This would permit a civil action against anyone who has complained to the State Bar and subject such complainant to the full, expensive scope of discovery and litigation, thus “chilling” the motivation of those who believe they have knowledge of improper legal behavior. 127 Ariz. at 126 , 618 P.2d at 620 . | 3 | 1996–2006 |
Sobol v. Alarcon
green
2 sentences2006“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘ “those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 212 Ariz. 315, ¶ 12 , 131 P.3d at 490 , quoting Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 11 , 993 P.2d 1119, 1124 (App.1999), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274 , 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972). ¶ 5 The Ledvinas rely on Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222 , 655 P.2d 342 (1982), in support of their argument that only a conditional privilege should apply to statements made i 2006“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘ “those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 212 Ariz. 315, ¶ 12 , 131 P.3d at 490 , quoting Burns v. Davis, 196 Ariz. 155, ¶ 11 , 993 P.2d 1119, 1124 (App.1999), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 112 N.H. 274 , 293 A.2d 767, 769 (1972). ¶ 5 The Ledvinas rely on Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222 , 655 P.2d 342 (1982), in support of their argument that only a conditional privilege should apply to statements made i | 2 | 2006–2006 |
SH Kress and Company v. Self
green
2 sentences2006Kress, 22 Ariz. App. at 232 , 526 P.2d at 756 . 2006Kress, 22 Ariz. App. at 232 , 526 P.2d at 756 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Roscoe v. Schoolitz
green
2 sentences1979Roscoe v. Schoolitz, 105 Ariz. 310 , 464 P.2d 333 (1970). 1979Roscoe v. Schoolitz, 105 Ariz. 310 , 464 P.2d 333 (1970). | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Melton v. Slonsky
green
2 sentences1993Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 ; Melton v. Slonsky, 19 Ariz. App. at 68 , 504 P.2d at 1291 . 1993Green Acres Trust, 141 Ariz. at 616 , 688 P.2d at 624 ; Melton v. Slonsky, 19 Ariz. App. at 68 , 504 P.2d at 1291 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
West v. United States
green
2 sentences1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor’s complaint against a civil servant because “presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition” granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029,1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U 1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor's complaint against a civil servant because "presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition" granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Union Camp Corp. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
green
2 sentences1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor’s complaint against a civil servant because “presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition” granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029,1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U 1993A similar case is Bradley v. Computer Sciences Corp., where the Fourth Circuit granted a conditional privilege to a defense contractor's complaint against a civil servant because "presenting complaints to responsible government officials about the conduct of their subordinates with whom the complainer has had official dealings is analogously central to the protections of the right to petition" granted under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 643 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir.1981) (quoting Stern v. United States Gypsum, Inc., 547 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986Now on appeal, relying on our supreme court’s decision in Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309 , 560 P.2d 1216 (1977), Molever contends that in a libel action between a private individual and a party entitled to a conditional privilege, the private individual may recover upon a mere showing of negligence. 1986Now on appeal, relying on our supreme court’s decision in Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309 , 560 P.2d 1216 (1977), Molever contends that in a libel action between a private individual and a party entitled to a conditional privilege, the private individual may recover upon a mere showing of negligence. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Antwerp Diamond Exchange of America, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Maricopa County, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983Bur. of Maricopa Co., *27 Inc., 130 Ariz. 523 , 637 P.2d 733 (1981), the Arizona Supreme Court adopted, as the standard for abuse of a conditional privilege, the test of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600: § 600. 1983Bur. of Maricopa Co., *27 Inc., 130 Ariz. 523 , 637 P.2d 733 (1981), the Arizona Supreme Court adopted, as the standard for abuse of a conditional privilege, the test of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600: § 600. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Long v. Mertz green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.