conditional clause in Colorado

2023This separate conditional clause describes the 2 In Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 , ___, 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 2111 (2023), the United States Supreme Court addressed a Colorado stalking statute identical to the one at issue in People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71 (Colo. 2006), and decided that the First Amendment requires proof that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.

2023This separate conditional clause describes the 2 In Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 , ___, 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 2111 (2023), the United States Supreme Court addressed a Colorado stalking statute identical to the one at issue in People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71 (Colo. 2006), and decided that the First Amendment requires proof that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.

2023This separate conditional clause describes the 2 In Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 , ___, 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 2111 (2023), the United States Supreme Court addressed a Colorado stalking statute identical to the one at issue in People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71 (Colo. 2006), and decided that the First Amendment requires proof that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.

2023This separate conditional clause describes the 2 In Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 , ___, 143 S. Ct. 2106 , 2111 (2023), the United States Supreme Court addressed a Colorado stalking statute identical to the one at issue in People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71 (Colo. 2006), and decided that the First Amendment requires proof that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the threatening nature of his statements.

2015In Blanpied’s Estate , 3 the Colorado Supreme Court held that when a creditor’s debt is secured by a valid lien on property in the decedent’s estate, he or she has three alternatives to collect on the debt: (1) the creditor may disregard the estate and proceed against the security; (2) the creditor may file a conditional claim in the estate so that, in the event of a deficiency after proceeding against the security, he or she may share in the assets of the estate as an unsecured creditor; or (3) the creditor may file a claim in the estate proceeding for the entire debt if he or she surre

2015In Blanpied’s Estate , 3 the Colorado Supreme Court held that when a creditor’s debt is secured by a valid lien on property in the decedent’s estate, he or she has three alternatives to collect on the debt: (1) the creditor may disregard the estate and proceed against the security; (2) the creditor may file a conditional claim in the estate so that, in the event of a deficiency after proceeding against the security, he or she may share in the assets of the estate as an unsecured creditor; or (3) the creditor may file a claim in the estate proceeding for the entire debt if he or she surre

1990Ezekiel, 374 Mass. at 389 , 372 N.E.2d at 1286 .

1990Ezekiel, 374 Mass. at 389 , 372 N.E.2d at 1286 .

1986We acknowledge that in several cases we have held that the legislature, consistent with due process of law, may employ a standard of objective reasonableness with respect to the conduct element of a crime, see, e.g., People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689 (Colo.1985), (statutory definition of indecent exposure in terms of "likely to cause affront or alarm to the other person” sets forth "a readily identifiable objective standard for measuring the conduct proscribed by its terms”); People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (1980) (statutory language describing nonconsensual sexual penetration as "by any means of su

1986We acknowledge that in several cases we have held that the legislature, consistent with due process of law, may employ a standard of objective reasonableness with respect to the conduct element of a crime, see, e.g., People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689 (Colo.1985), (statutory definition of indecent exposure in terms of "likely to cause affront or alarm to the other person” sets forth "a readily identifiable objective standard for measuring the conduct proscribed by its terms”); People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (1980) (statutory language describing nonconsensual sexual penetration as "by any means of su

1986We acknowledge that in several cases we have held that the legislature, consistent with due process of law, may employ a standard of objective reasonableness with respect to the conduct element of a crime, see, e.g., People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689 (Colo.1985), (statutory definition of indecent exposure in terms of "likely to cause affront or alarm to the other person” sets forth "a readily identifiable objective standard for measuring the conduct proscribed by its terms”); People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (1980) (statutory language describing nonconsensual sexual penetration as "by any means of su

1986We acknowledge that in several cases we have held that the legislature, consistent with due process of law, may employ a standard of objective reasonableness with respect to the conduct element of a crime, see, e.g., People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689 (Colo.1985), (statutory definition of indecent exposure in terms of "likely to cause affront or alarm to the other person” sets forth "a readily identifiable objective standard for measuring the conduct proscribed by its terms”); People v. Smith, 638 P.2d 1 (1980) (statutory language describing nonconsensual sexual penetration as "by any means of su

1971The Church presents the argument that application of this ordinance to it is violative of the First Amend - ment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, citing Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind., Co. of Jehovaha’s Wit *173 nesses, 233 Ind. 83 , 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954), and 70 Harv.

1971The Church presents the argument that application of this ordinance to it is violative of the First Amend - ment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, citing Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind., Co. of Jehovaha’s Wit *173 nesses, 233 Ind. 83 , 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954), and 70 Harv.

1925J. 492; Heistand v. Bateman, 41 Colo. 20, 23 , 91 Pac. 1111 ), and that it necessarily follows that the right to mine, reserved in the deed, meant the right to mine ac cording to the usage, and that this interpretation is strengthened by the facts above stated, especially the fact that there could be no mining at all except under that interpretation and the conditional clause would have no meaning otherwise, and the fact that if we interpret it otherwise, we should see the grantor, in effect, selling his coal with the surface, value say §4,000, for two or three hundred.