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8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1945–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hicks v. Earlygreen1 sentence1996Northland’s lien filings carry a conditional privilege and to overcome it Haan must show they were false and not filed in good faith See Restatement (Second) ToRts § 650A cmts b, d (1977); see also Hicks, 357 S.W.2d at 649 ; Forman v. Cheltenham Nat. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. First State Bank of Rothsaygreen2 sentences1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). 1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). | 1 | 1 |
Joyce Forman v. Cheltenham National Bankgreen2 sentences1996Bank, 348 Pa.Super. 559 , 502 A.2d 686, 688 (1985). [¶ 15] The circuit court incorrectly dismissed Haan’s disparagement of title counterclaim ruling the filing of the lien statements were absolutely privileged, when in fact a conditional privilege applied. 1996Bank, 348 Pa.Super. 559 , 502 A.2d 686, 688 (1985). [¶ 15] The circuit court incorrectly dismissed Haan’s disparagement of title counterclaim ruling the filing of the lien statements were absolutely privileged, when in fact a conditional privilege applied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gregory's, Inc. v. Haan
green
2 sentences2025The Court then observed that “[t]he privilege is subsumed in the requirement that the person suing for disparagement of title must show malice or that the lien filer had an illegitimate purpose.” Id. ¶ 14, 545 N.W.2d at 494 . [¶25.] Following this observation, the Court’s further explanation of what would or would not be sufficient to either prove the disparagement of title claim or to overcome the conditional privilege has resulted in a not-so-clear standard to be applied in future cases. 2025Id. (referring to whether a lien filer acted “in the reasonable belief that the filing was valid[,]” whether the lien was “not filed in good faith[,]” and whether there was “knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity[.]”) (emphasis added). 5 4F [¶26.] Ultimately, the Court in Gregory’s did not have to grapple with the various iterations of what constitutes a conditional privilege or with how the conditional privilege relates to the Court’s four-part test to prove a disparagement 5. | 2 | 2011–2025 |
United States v. Knights
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 116-18 , 122 S.Ct. at 590 , 151 L.Ed.2d 497 . 2005Id. at 116-18 , 122 S.Ct. at 590 , 151 L.Ed.2d 497 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Ashley
green
2 sentences2005Thus, the mere fact the officers searched Kottman’s home without a warrant or exigent circumstances does not mean his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. [¶ 11.] Nevertheless, Kottman insists that the existence of this conditional waiver does not negate the officers’ violation of the stalking horse doctrine, which “prevents law enforcement officers from unfairly exploiting search and seizure waivers in probation and parole agreements to skirt Fourth Amendment rights.” Kottman cites Ashley , where we adopted the stalking horse doctrine. 459 N.W.2d at 830 . 2005Thus, the mere fact the officers searched Kottman’s home without a warrant or exigent circumstances does not mean his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. [¶ 11.] Nevertheless, Kottman insists that the existence of this conditional waiver does not negate the officers’ violation of the stalking horse doctrine, which “prevents law enforcement officers from unfairly exploiting search and seizure waivers in probation and parole agreements to skirt Fourth Amendment rights.” Kottman cites Ashley , where we adopted the stalking horse doctrine. 459 N.W.2d at 830 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Flugge v. Wagner
green
2 sentences2004Subsections (3) and (4) provide for a conditional privilege and is "`qualified' because the communication is only `privileged' if it is made `without malice.'" Flugge, 532 NW2d at 421 (quoting Peterson, 499 NW2d at 915 ). 2004Subsections (3) and (4) provide for a conditional privilege and is “‘qualified’ because the communication is only ‘privileged’ if it is made ‘without malice.’ ” Flugge, 532 N.W.2d at 421 (quoting Peterson, 499 N.W.2d at 915 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Peterson v. City of Mitchell
green
2 sentences2004Subsections (3) and (4) provide for a conditional privilege and is "`qualified' because the communication is only `privileged' if it is made `without malice.'" Flugge, 532 NW2d at 421 (quoting Peterson, 499 NW2d at 915 ). 2004Subsections (3) and (4) provide for a conditional privilege and is “‘qualified’ because the communication is only ‘privileged’ if it is made ‘without malice.’ ” Flugge, 532 N.W.2d at 421 (quoting Peterson, 499 N.W.2d at 915 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Continental Supply Co. v. Price
green
2 sentences1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). 1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Barquin v. Hall Oil Co.
green
1 sentence1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Briggs v. Coykendall
green
2 sentences1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). 1996See, for example, Kelly v. First State Bank, 145 Minn. 331 , 177 N.W. 347 (1920); Continental Supply Co. v. Price, 126 Mont. 363 , 251 P.2d 553 (1952); Briggs v. Coykendall, 57 N.D. 785 , 224 N.W. 202 (1929); Barquin v. Hall Oil Co., 28 Wyo. 164 , 202 P. 1107 (1922). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bego v. Gordon
green
2 sentences1992A "qualified or conditional privilege may be lost when the speaker, on an otherwise privileged occasion, publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another which either (a) he in fact does not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true." Bego v. Gordon, supra, 407 N.W.2d at 811 . 1992A “qualified or conditional privilege may be lost when the speaker, on an otherwise privileged occasion, publishes false and defamatory matter concerning another which either (a) he in fact does not believe to be true or (b) has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.” Bego v. Gordon, supra, 407 N.W.2d at 811 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gardner v. Hollifield
green
2 sentences1987In so holding, the court pointed out that the superintendent's privilege to make defamatory statements in the performance of official duties was only a conditional privilege. 549 P.2d at 269 . [16] SDCL 15-8-17 provides: A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if 1987In so holding, the court pointed out that the superintendent’s privilege to make defamatory statements in the performance of official duties was only a conditional privilege. 549 P.2d at 269 . 16. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Moore v. Littel
green
1 sentence1945See SDC 51.0217; Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66 ; Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Iowa 948 , 162 N. W. 253 , L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Fulton v. Fulton
green
1 sentence1945See SDC 51.0217; Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66 ; Fulton v. Fulton, 179 Iowa 948 , 162 N. W. 253 , L. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.