conditional privilege in Nevada

2020See Jacobs v. Adelson, 130 Nev. 408, 418, 325 P.3d 1282, 1288 (2014) (vacating after determining that the absolute privilege did not apply in a defamation case and remanding for the district court to determine the applicability of the conditional privilege). 14 Spencer challenges both awards of attorney fees, which we review for abuse of discretion.

2020See Jacobs v. Adelson, 130 Nev. 408, 418, 325 P.3d 1282, 1288 (2014) (vacating after determining that the absolute privilege did not apply in a defamation case and remanding for the district court to determine the applicability of the conditional privilege). 14 Spencer challenges both awards of attorney fees, which we review for abuse of discretion.

2018The existence of a conditional privilege "is a question of law for the court." Lubin, 117 Nev. at 115 , 17 P.3d at 428 .

2018The existence of a conditional privilege "is a question of law for the court." Lubin, 117 Nev. at 115 , 17 P.3d at 428 .

2020Finally, the State argues that Nevada caselaw precludes the application of NRS 175.101 to the post-trial motions and cites Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 440 (2007).

2020Finally, the State argues that Nevada caselaw precludes the application of NRS 175.101 to the post-trial motions and cites Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 440 (2007).

2008Maupin and Cherry, JJ., concur. 2 99 Nev. 284, 292 , 662 P.2d 610, 615 (1983). 3 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515 (Ct. App. 1996). 4 See Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 63 n.3, 657 P.2d 101 , 105 n.3 (1983) (concluding that a conditional privilege allows “[a] former employer ... to make otherwise defamatory communications about the character or conduct of former employees to present or prospective employers, as they have a common interest in the subject matter of the statements”). 5 Respondents argue that Whitemaine waived her right to argue the arbitrability of the disputes with BAIS an

2008Maupin and Cherry, JJ., concur. 2 99 Nev. 284, 292 , 662 P.2d 610, 615 (1983). 3 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515 (Ct. App. 1996). 4 See Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 63 n.3, 657 P.2d 101 , 105 n.3 (1983) (concluding that a conditional privilege allows “[a] former employer ... to make otherwise defamatory communications about the character or conduct of former employees to present or prospective employers, as they have a common interest in the subject matter of the statements”). 5 Respondents argue that Whitemaine waived her right to argue the arbitrability of the disputes with BAIS an

2022The unless clause therefore necessarily refers back to the closest (and only) independent clause in the sentence—qhe State Engineer shall order that withdrawals . . . be restricted in that basin to conform to priority rights . . . ." See id. at §§ 5.225, 5.228; see also Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. 2018) (noting that "properly placed commas" usually signal that a conditional clause applies to the entire series that precedes it).

2022The unless clause therefore necessarily refers back to the closest (and only) independent clause in the sentence—qhe State Engineer shall order that withdrawals . . . be restricted in that basin to conform to priority rights . . . ." See id. at §§ 5.225, 5.228; see also Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 690 (Tex. 2018) (noting that "properly placed commas" usually signal that a conditional clause applies to the entire series that precedes it).

2014To illustrate the conditional privilege of reply, this court has previously explained that "[iljf I am attacked in a newspaper, I may write to that paper to rebut the charges, and I may at the same time retort SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 11 (D) 1947A e upon my assailant, when such retort is a necessary part of my defense, or fairly arises out of the charges he has made against me.' Id. at 149 , 42 P.3d at 239 (quoting Foretich v. Capital Cities I ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 , 1559 (4th Cir. 1994)).

2014To illustrate the conditional privilege of reply, this court has previously explained that "[iljf I am attacked in a newspaper, I may write to that paper to rebut the charges, and I may at the same time retort SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 11 (D) 1947A e upon my assailant, when such retort is a necessary part of my defense, or fairly arises out of the charges he has made against me.' Id. at 149 , 42 P.3d at 239 (quoting Foretich v. Capital Cities I ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 , 1559 (4th Cir. 1994)).

2014To illustrate the conditional privilege of reply, this court has previously explained that "[iljf I am attacked in a newspaper, I may write to that paper to rebut the charges, and I may at the same time retort SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 11 (D) 1947A e upon my assailant, when such retort is a necessary part of my defense, or fairly arises out of the charges he has made against me.' Id. at 149, 42 P.3d at 239 (quoting Foretich v. Capital Cities I ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1559 (4th Cir. 1994)).

2014To illustrate the conditional privilege of reply, this court has previously explained that "[iljf I am attacked in a newspaper, I may write to that paper to rebut the charges, and I may at the same time retort SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 11 (D) 1947A e upon my assailant, when such retort is a necessary part of my defense, or fairly arises out of the charges he has made against me.' Id. at 149 , 42 P.3d at 239 (quoting Foretich v. Capital Cities I ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 , 1559 (4th Cir. 1994)).

2008Maupin and Cherry, JJ., concur. 2 99 Nev. 284, 292 , 662 P.2d 610, 615 (1983). 3 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515 (Ct. App. 1996). 4 See Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 63 n.3, 657 P.2d 101 , 105 n.3 (1983) (concluding that a conditional privilege allows “[a] former employer ... to make otherwise defamatory communications about the character or conduct of former employees to present or prospective employers, as they have a common interest in the subject matter of the statements”). 5 Respondents argue that Whitemaine waived her right to argue the arbitrability of the disputes with BAIS an

2008Maupin and Cherry, JJ., concur. 2 99 Nev. 284, 292 , 662 P.2d 610, 615 (1983). 3 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515 (Ct. App. 1996). 4 See Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56 , 63 n.3, 657 P.2d 101 , 105 n.3 (1983) (concluding that a conditional privilege allows “[a] former employer ... to make otherwise defamatory communications about the character or conduct of former employees to present or prospective employers, as they have a common interest in the subject matter of the statements”). 5 Respondents argue that Whitemaine waived her right to argue the arbitrability of the disputes with BAIS an

2002See id. (setting forth the burden-shifting approach used in applying the conditional privilege and the standard for establishing abuse of the privilege). 24 Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 453 , 851 P.2d 438, 442 (1993). 25 See Ornatek v. Nevada State Bank, 93 Nev. 17, 20 , 558 P.2d 1145, 1147 (1977) (noting that a statement may convey a defamatory meaning when viewed in light of the “extrinsic circumstances,” even though “the defamation does not appear from the words themselves”).

2002See id. (setting forth the burden-shifting approach used in applying the conditional privilege and the standard for establishing abuse of the privilege). 24 Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 453 , 851 P.2d 438, 442 (1993). 25 See Ornatek v. Nevada State Bank, 93 Nev. 17, 20 , 558 P.2d 1145, 1147 (1977) (noting that a statement may convey a defamatory meaning when viewed in light of the “extrinsic circumstances,” even though “the defamation does not appear from the words themselves”).

2002See id. (setting forth the burden-shifting approach used in applying the conditional privilege and the standard for establishing abuse of the privilege). 24 Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 453 , 851 P.2d 438, 442 (1993). 25 See Ornatek v. Nevada State Bank, 93 Nev. 17, 20 , 558 P.2d 1145, 1147 (1977) (noting that a statement may convey a defamatory meaning when viewed in light of the “extrinsic circumstances,” even though “the defamation does not appear from the words themselves”).

2002See id. (setting forth the burden-shifting approach used in applying the conditional privilege and the standard for establishing abuse of the privilege). 24 Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 453 , 851 P.2d 438, 442 (1993). 25 See Ornatek v. Nevada State Bank, 93 Nev. 17, 20 , 558 P.2d 1145, 1147 (1977) (noting that a statement may convey a defamatory meaning when viewed in light of the “extrinsic circumstances,” even though “the defamation does not appear from the words themselves”).

1999This court, as early as 1880, in Thompson v. Powning, 15 Nev. 195, 203 (1880), recognized a conditional privilege for republication of a “fair, full, and true report of judicial proceedings.” The reason for the privilege was the same in 1880 as it is now, namely, “that the public have a right to know what takes place in a court of justice ...” Id.

1999This court, as early as 1880, in Thompson v. Powning, 15 Nev. 195, 203 (1880), recognized a conditional privilege for republication of a “fair, full, and true report of judicial proceedings.” The reason for the privilege was the same in 1880 as it is now, namely, “that the public have a right to know what takes place in a court of justice ...” Id.

1983See Gallues v. Harrah’s Club, 87 Nev. 624, 627 , 491 P.2d 1276, 1277 (1971).

1983See Gallues v. Harrah’s Club, 87 Nev. 624, 627 , 491 P.2d 1276, 1277 (1971).