conditional privilege in Maine

2024Any situation in which an important interest of the recipient will be furthered by frank communication may give rise to a conditional privilege.” Lester, 596 A.2d at 70 (citation omitted).

2024See Lester, 596 A.2d at 69 n.7 (“Loss of a conditional privilege through abuse may also occur when the statement is made, not for the purpose of protecting the interest giving rise to the privilege, but out of other motives entirely, such as spite or ill-will.”). [¶20] Hence, again, at this early stage of litigation, Garey’s claims for defamation and false light remain actionable and should not have been dismissed based on Stanford’s assertion of a potentially viable but yet-to-be-established affirmative defense.

2024When a defendant establishes the existence of a conditional privilege, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to come forward with evidence that could go to a jury that [the defendant] abused the privilege.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gautschi v. Maisel, 565 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Me. 1989)). 13 [¶19] In her complaint, Garey was not required to overcome, or even anticipate, Stanford’s assertion of a conditional privilege, and Stanford has not established that the privilege applies merely by including it in its motion to dismiss.

2013Thomsen argues that ADA Ellis was not acting in his official capacity during his conversation with William Darling because ADA Ellis was not assigned to Portland cases. 12 In this connection there is language in a number of Law Court decisions stating that a conditional privilege may be abused if the communication is made "outside normal channels." Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43 CJI 23. 13 As far as the court can tell, that language was first used in Gautschi v. Maisel, 565 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Me. 1989), as part of a recitation of the general principles relating to the abuse of a conditional privilege

2021The unprivileged publication element of a defamation cause of action "requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s statement to a third person is not subject to a conditional privilege." Waugh v. Genesis Healthcare LLC, 2019 ME 179, ¶ 13 , 222 A.3d 1063 ; see also Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 86-7 (Me. 1996); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558(b) (1977).

2019See Rippett, 672 A.2d at 86 ; see also Plante v. Long, 2017 ME 189 , ¶ 9, 170 A.3d 243 . [¶13] The unprivileged publication element requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s statement to a third person is not subject to a conditional privilege.

2007Thus, "it is for the court to determine whether the occasion upon which the defendant published defamatory matter gives rise to a conditional privilege." Saunders v. VanPelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Me. 1985).

1998“It is for the court to determine whether the occasion upon which the defendant published defamatory matter gives rise to a conditional privilege.” Saunders v. Van-Pelt, 497 A.2d 1121, 1125 (Me.1985). [¶ 6] The facts of the occasion in this case are not disputed.

2024Conditional privilege is an affirmative defense to claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy that “arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech.” Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 22 , 791 A.2d 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 57 , 177 A.2d 665, 667 (1962) (evaluating the application of the privilege to a defamation claim); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he same privileges are applicable to the false-light tort as to the defamation tort.

2024Conditional privilege is an affirmative defense to claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy that “arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech.” Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 22 , 791 A.2d 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 57 , 177 A.2d 665, 667 (1962) (evaluating the application of the privilege to a defamation claim); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he same privileges are applicable to the false-light tort as to the defamation tort.

2019Dismjss 1-3.) "Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concem , . , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege' -that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity." Lester v. Powers, 596 A .2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (citing New York Times v. Sultiva.n., 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2019See Roche v, Egan, 433 A .2d 757 ,·762 (Me. 1981). 11 Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concern .. , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege'-that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity.'' Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (cit!ng New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2024When a defendant establishes the existence of a conditional privilege, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff ‘to come forward with evidence that could go to a jury that [the defendant] abused the privilege.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gautschi v. Maisel, 565 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Me. 1989)). 13 [¶19] In her complaint, Garey was not required to overcome, or even anticipate, Stanford’s assertion of a conditional privilege, and Stanford has not established that the privilege applies merely by including it in its motion to dismiss.

2017"A conditional privilege against liability for defamation anses m settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered, speech." Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104 , ! 6, 752 A.2d 1189 .

2021"A conditional privilege protects against liability for defamation when 'society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered, speech."' Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26 , ~ 32, 941 A.2d 447 .

2021"A conditional privilege protects against liability for defamation when 'society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered, speech."' Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26 , ~ 32, 941 A.2d 447 .

2019Genesis enjoys a conditional privilege concerning the statements of the human resources manager and the director of nursing as “[s]tatements made 8 in the course of an investigation into an employee’s actions for disciplinary purposes.” Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 35 , 941 A.2d 447 . [¶14] When a conditional privilege does exist, the defendant loses the privilege—and subjects itself to liability for defamation—only if it abuses the privilege by making the statement when it either knows the statement to be false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity (also known as “actual

2017Staples v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., 629 A.2d 601, 603-04 (Me. 1993). 1 At the same time the Law Court has also held that an employer is entitled to a conditional privilege for statements made in the course of disciplinary proceedings resulting in an employee's termination.

2013The only decision cited in Gautschi that contains the phrase "outside normal channels" is Greenya v. George Washington University, 512 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C.

1989See Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 563 (D.C.Cir.), ce rt. denied, 423 U.S. 995 , 96 S.Ct. 422 , 46 L.Ed.2d 369 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 comment d (1977).

2023Due to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, when a published statement discusses a public figure’s official conduct regarding a matter of public concern—a type of discussion that “deserves special favor in a democratic society”—the statement is “subject to a conditional privilege . . . that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of [actual malice, i.e.,] knowledge or disregard of falsity.”6 Plante v. Long, 2017 ME 189 , ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 243 (quotation marks omitted); see N.Y.

2023Due to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, when a published statement discusses a public figure’s official conduct regarding a matter of public concern—a type of discussion that “deserves special favor in a democratic society”—the statement is “subject to a conditional privilege . . . that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of [actual malice, i.e.,] knowledge or disregard of falsity.”6 Plante v. Long, 2017 ME 189 , ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 243 (quotation marks omitted); see N.Y.

2019See Roche v, Egan, 433 A .2d 757 ,·762 (Me. 1981). 11 Discussion of public officials and public figures on matters of public concern .. , deserves special favor in a democratic society, and thus such discussion is subject to a conditional privilege-the 'First Amendment privilege'-that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of knowledge or disregard of falsity.'' Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991) (cit!ng New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 285-86 (1964)).

2010A conditional privilege for a defamatory statement can be lost if the statements claimed to be privileged "were not published with an honest belief in their truth," if they were published wi th reckless disregard for the tru th, Rocllc, 433 A.2d at 765 , or if the statements were made "outside the normal channels or with malice." Morgall, ([ 34, 941 A.2d at 456 .

2017Under the MHRA, unlawful employment discrimination includes an employer discriminating "with respect to hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment" because of a protected activity. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(l)(A) (2016); (see Def.'s Ex. 28.) "A conditional privilege protects against liability for defamation when 'society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered, speech."' Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26 , ~ 32, 941 A.2d 447 ; see McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Serv.,

2017Under the MHRA, unlawful employment discrimination includes an employer discriminating "with respect to hire, tenure, promotion, transfer, compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment or any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment" because of a protected activity. 5 M.R.S. § 4572(l)(A) (2016); (see Def.'s Ex. 28.) "A conditional privilege protects against liability for defamation when 'society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered, speech."' Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26 , ~ 32, 941 A.2d 447 ; see McCullough v. Visiting Nurse Serv.,

2024Conditional privilege is an affirmative defense to claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy that “arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech.” Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 22 , 791 A.2d 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 57 , 177 A.2d 665, 667 (1962) (evaluating the application of the privilege to a defamation claim); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he same privileges are applicable to the false-light tort as to the defamation tort.

2024Conditional privilege is an affirmative defense to claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy that “arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech.” Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 22 , 791 A.2d 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 57 , 177 A.2d 665, 667 (1962) (evaluating the application of the privilege to a defamation claim); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he same privileges are applicable to the false-light tort as to the defamation tort.

2024Conditional privilege is an affirmative defense to claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy that “arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech.” Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 22 , 791 A.2d 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 57 , 177 A.2d 665, 667 (1962) (evaluating the application of the privilege to a defamation claim); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he same privileges are applicable to the false-light tort as to the defamation tort.

2024Conditional privilege is an affirmative defense to claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy that “arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech.” Rice v. Alley, 2002 ME 43, ¶ 22 , 791 A.2d 932 (quotation marks omitted); see also Boulet v. Beals, 158 Me. 53, 57 , 177 A.2d 665, 667 (1962) (evaluating the application of the privilege to a defamation claim); Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he same privileges are applicable to the false-light tort as to the defamation tort.

2012Corp. v. Israel, 139 Wis. 2d 159 , 407 N.W.2d 269 (Wis. App. 1987) (reconciling conflicting statutory requirements to favor a conditional privilege); Warren v. Bank of Marion, 618 F. Supp. 317, 325 (W.D.

2009See Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 106,112-13 (Me. 1972); Lavin v. Trezza, 2002 U.S. Dist.

1997The trial court did not err in finding that the defendants were entitled to an absolute privilege for statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, Dineen v. Daughan, 381 A.2d 663, 664-65 (Me.1978), *962 and a conditional privilege which was not abused for statements made outside the judicial proceeding, Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 87 (Me.1996).

1991Although malice (in its ordinary sense of ill will or deliberately outrageous misconduct) must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to support an award of punitive damages, Ramirez, 540 A.2d at 478 ; Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Me.1985), this standard of proof has nothing to do with the "actual malice”—that is, knowledge or disregard of falsity—required to overcome a conditional privilege in defamation. 9 .