conditional privilege (Alabama) · Go Syfert
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conditional privilege in Alabama

15 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1968–2004 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Willis v. Demopolis Nursing Home, Inc.green
ala · 1976 · cited in 8 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1980–2001
2 sentences

1991In Gore , this Court held that any publication made between a previous employer and a prospective employer is protected by a conditional privilege, pursuant to the following test: " ' "Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and without actual malice. * * * The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication need n

1990Ms. Gore contends that she was required to publicize to potential employers that she had been terminated from her job at Health-Tex for "falsifying company records." In addition, she argues that a statement made to a prospective employer by an employee at Health-Tex also constituted "publication." First, we note that both parties agree that any publication made between a previous employer and a prospective employer is protected by a conditional privilege, pursuant to the following test: "The test for determining whether a communicating party has a conditional or a qualified privilege is as fol

18
Berry v. City of New York Ins. Co.green
ala · 1923 · cited in 8 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1980–2001
2 sentences

1988In Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 (Ala. 1986), we stated that "[w]hether a communication is privileged by reason of its character or the occasion on which it was made is a question of law for the judge." The test for determining whether a conditional privilege exists is as follows: " ' " 'Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and w

1986The test in this jurisdiction for determining whether a conditional privilege exists is as follows: "`"Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and without actual malice. * * * The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication need not be one having the force of legal obligation, but it is sufficient if it is soci

18

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (24)

CaseCitedYears
Ex Parte Corbin green
ala · 1923
2 sentences

1988In Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 (Ala. 1986), we stated that "[w]hether a communication is privileged by reason of its character or the occasion on which it was made is a question of law for the judge." The test for determining whether a conditional privilege exists is as follows: " ' " 'Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and w

1986The test in this jurisdiction for determining whether a conditional privilege exists is as follows: "`"Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and without actual malice. * * * The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication need not be one having the force of legal obligation, but it is sufficient if it is soci

81980–2001
Fulton v. Advertiser Co. green
ala · 1980
2 sentences

1987This Court discussed the scope of the conditional privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 , 537 (Ala. 1980): "'"Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and without actual malice. * * * The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication need not be one having the force of legal obligation, but it is s

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

41986–1989
Webster v. Byrd green
ala · 1986
2 sentences

2001In Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 (Ala. 1986), our Supreme Court stated that "[w]hether a communication is privileged by reason of its character or the occasion on which it was made is a question of law for the judge." The test for determining whether a conditional privilege exists is as follows: "`Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good f

1988In Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 (Ala. 1986), we stated that "[w]hether a communication is privileged by reason of its character or the occasion on which it was made is a question of law for the judge." The test for determining whether a conditional privilege exists is as follows: " ' " 'Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and w

31988–2001
Sullivan v. Perini North River Associates green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1989Nelson, supra; Webster, supra; Willis, supra; Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981); and O'Barr v. Feist , 292 Ala. 440 , 296 So.2d 152 (1974).

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

31986–1989
Advertiser Co. v. Fulton green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1989Nelson, supra; Webster, supra; Willis, supra; Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981); and O'Barr v. Feist , 292 Ala. 440 , 296 So.2d 152 (1974).

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

31986–1989
Marin County Democratic Central Committee v. Unger green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1989Nelson, supra; Webster, supra; Willis, supra; Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981); and O'Barr v. Feist , 292 Ala. 440 , 296 So.2d 152 (1974).

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

31986–1989
Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp. green
ala · 1988
2 sentences

2001If the declarants are deemed to possess a conditional privilege, the privilege is lost only if the privileged declarant "makes the communication in bad faith and with actual malice." Nelson , 534 So.2d at 1095 .

2001The plaintiff carries the burden of proving common law actual malice by presenting "`evidence of "previous ill will, hostility, threats, rivalry, other actions, former libels or slanders, and the like . . . or . . . violence of the defendant's language, [and] the mode and extent of publication, and the like." Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 626 , 95 So. 34 , 37 (1923).'" Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corporation , 534 So.2d at 1095 .

21989–2001
Elder v. Holland green
va · 1967
2 sentences

1986Gardner v. Hollifield , 97 Idaho 607 , 549 P.2d 266 (1976); Elder v. Holland , 208 Va. 15 , 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

1986Gardner v. Hollifield , 97 Idaho 607 , 549 P.2d 266 (1976); Elder v. Holland , 208 Va. 15 , 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

21986–1986
Gardner v. Hollifield green
idaho · 1976
2 sentences

1986Gardner v. Hollifield , 97 Idaho 607 , 549 P.2d 266 (1976); Elder v. Holland , 208 Va. 15 , 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

1986Gardner v. Hollifield , 97 Idaho 607 , 549 P.2d 266 (1976); Elder v. Holland , 208 Va. 15 , 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967).

21986–1986
City of Birmingham v. Sutherland green
ala · 2002
1 sentence

2004As this Court recognized in City of Birmingham v. Sutherland , 834 So.2d 755 (Ala. 2002): "Our review of the grant or denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law is governed by the following standard: "`"The standard of review applicable to a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict [now referred to as preverdict and postverdict motions for a judgment as a matter of law] is identical to the standard used by the trial court in granting or denying the motions initially.

12004–2004
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays green
ala · 1989
1 sentence

2003"Whether a statement is protected by a conditional privilege is a question of law for the court." Reynolds Metals Co. v. Mays , 547 So.2d 518 , 524 (Ala. 1989). 25 Ayres claims that her alleged publications of the petition, her discussions of the matter with numerous individuals, and her communications with news reporters were all prompted by a duty, as a city-council member, to the citizens of the Town of Argo to inform them of what Ayres believed to be Mayor Jennings's illegal activities and to prompt an investigation concerning the dismissal of various speeding tickets in the Town of Argo.

12003–2003
Russell v. Hayden green
ala · 1923
1 sentence

2001The plaintiff carries the burden of proving common law actual malice by presenting "`evidence of "previous ill will, hostility, threats, rivalry, other actions, former libels or slanders, and the like . . . or . . . violence of the defendant's language, [and] the mode and extent of publication, and the like." Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 626 , 95 So. 34 , 37 (1923).'" Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corporation , 534 So.2d at 1095 .

12001–2001
Kenney v. Gurley green
ala · 1923
1 sentence

2001The plaintiff carries the burden of proving common law actual malice by presenting "`evidence of "previous ill will, hostility, threats, rivalry, other actions, former libels or slanders, and the like . . . or . . . violence of the defendant's language, [and] the mode and extent of publication, and the like." Kenney v. Gurley , 208 Ala. 623 , 626 , 95 So. 34 , 37 (1923).'" Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corporation , 534 So.2d at 1095 .

12001–2001
Cantrell v. North River Homes, Inc. green
ala · 1993
2 sentences

1995Cantrell v. North River Homes, Inc. , 628 So.2d 551 (Ala. 1993).

1995Cantrell v. North River Homes, Inc., 628 So.2d 551 (Ala.1993).

11995–1995
Gore v. Health-Tex, Inc. green
ala · 1990
1 sentence

1991In Gore , this Court held that any publication made between a previous employer and a prospective employer is protected by a conditional privilege, pursuant to the following test: " ' "Where a party makes a communication, and such communication is prompted by duty owed either to the public or to a third party, or the communication is one in which the party has an interest, and it is made to another having a corresponding interest, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith and without actual malice. * * * The duty under which the party is privileged to make the communication need n

11991–1991
Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co. green
ala · 1987
1 sentence

1990Co. , 210 Ala. 369 , 371 , 98 So. 290 , 292 (1923)." Kirby v. Williamson Oil Co. , 510 So.2d 176 , 179 (Ala. 1987).

11990–1990
O'BARR v. Feist green
ala · 1974
2 sentences

1989Nelson, supra; Webster, supra; Willis, supra; Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981); and O'Barr v. Feist , 292 Ala. 440 , 296 So.2d 152 (1974).

1989Nelson, supra; Webster, supra; Willis, supra; Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981); and O'Barr v. Feist , 292 Ala. 440 , 296 So.2d 152 (1974).

11989–1989
Montgomery v. Big B, Inc. green
ala · 1984
1 sentence

1988In Montgomery v. Big B, Inc. , 460 So.2d 1286 (Ala. 1984), the Court found that an allegedly defamatory communication made by corporate employees to a polygraph test operator concerning the plaintiff's alleged complicity in a misappropriation of corporate funds fell within this definition.

11988–1988
Tidwell v. Winn-Dixie, Inc. green
ala · 1987
1 sentence

1987The plaintiff does not challenge the general proposition that a store employee has a conditional privilege to report a shoplifting *Page 906 suspect to the appropriate third parties, and any doubt regarding this issue has been resolved by the recent case of Tidwell v. Winn-Dixie, Inc. , 502 So.2d 747 (Ala. 1987).

11987–1987
Jefferson Trucking Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No. 135 green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

11987–1987
Bellingham Frozen Foods, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

11987–1987
Bronner v. Fulton green
scotus · 1981
2 sentences

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

1987In that case we approved the trial court's apparent finding that a conditional privilege attached to a store employee's report of a shoplifting suspect under the principles established for such a privilege in Fulton v. Advertiser Co. , 388 So.2d 533 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1125 , 101 S.Ct. 942 , 67 L.Ed.2d 111 and 449 U.S. 1131 , 101 S.Ct. 954 , 67 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981).

11987–1987
Pierson v. Ray green
scotus · 1967
2 sentences

1983Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547 , 557 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 1219 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).

1983Pierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547 , 557 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 1219 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967).

11983–1983
Merkle v. State green
· 1861
1 sentence

1968Merkle v. State, 37 Ala. 139 (from Reporter’s statement of the ease) : “ * * * The State afterwards read in evidence to the jury an extract from the ‘United States Dispensatory,’ by Wood & Burke, on the subject of vinous and fermented liquors; having first proved, by the testimony of a' practicing physician, ‘that said book was recognized by the medical profession as good authority on all subjects therein treated of; ’ * * * » .

11968–1968

Where else courts name it

CA 110 (1942–2026) MA 71 (1938–2025) LA 52 (1958–2021) PA 52 (1964–2024) TX 50 (1943–2022) ME 49 (1917–2024) IL 48 (1968–2022) MD 46 (1957–2026) NY 45 (1876–2025) GA 35 (1950–2025) WI 35 (1914–2025) AZ 22 (1968–2022) WA 21 (1975–2026) CT 19 (1972–2025) VA 19 (1941–2026) MI 17 (1959–2020) NJ 16 (1956–2017) AL 15 (1968–2004) UT 14 (1951–2025) AK 13 (1978–2014) NC 12 (1954–2026) OR 12 (1896–2000) OH 12 (1927–2026) NV 11 (1983–2022) MN 10 (1980–2010) NM 10 (1961–2024) KS 10 (1915–2022) OK 9 (1990–2018) DE 9 (1965–2019) CO 8 (1925–2026) SD 8 (1945–2025) IN 6 (1881–1997) FL 5 (1962–2002) MO 5 (1964–2007) VT 5 (1990–2026) NH 4 (1979–1998) WV 4 (1914–2022) SC 4 (1981–2023) ID 4 (1933–1990) WY 4 (1937–2018) HI 4 (1972–2016) NE 3 (1920–2001) ND 2 (1993–1995) AR 2 (1958–1964) TN 2 (2002–2020) MT 2 (1966–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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