conditional privilege in California

2021(Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 (Taus).) Libel is a type of defamation based on written statements or other visual depictions. (§ 45.) The “common-interest privilege” provides a conditional privilege to a defendant who makes a statement to others on a matter of common interest if the statement is made without malice. (§ 47, subd. (c); Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1196 (Lundquist).) B.

2016Code, § 44; Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 723 .) "Slander is defined as including 'a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, . . . [¶] . . . [tending] directly to injure [any person] in respect to his office, profession, trade or business. . . .' " (Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1203 .) Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) "extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests." (Hawran 7 v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 287 .)4 This privilege, often referred to as the common

2022General Principles “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a 11 natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 (Taus).) Section 47(c)9 “ ‘extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests. [Citation.]’ ” (Hui v. Sturbaum (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1118 (Hui).) The existence of the privilege is ordinarily a question of law for the court.

2021(Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 (Taus).) Libel is a type of defamation based on written statements or other visual depictions. (§ 45.) The “common-interest privilege” provides a conditional privilege to a defendant who makes a statement to others on a matter of common interest if the statement is made without malice. (§ 47, subd. (c); Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1196 (Lundquist).) B.

2014The Common-Interest Privilege of Section 47, Subdivision (c) Section 47, subdivision (c) provides that a privileged publication or broadcast is one made "[i]n a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information." This provision "extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice

2004The defendant has the initial burden of showing the allegedly defamatory statement was made on a privileged occasion, whereupon the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the defendant made the statement with malice. [Citation.] The existence of the privilege is ordinarily a question of law for the court. [Citation.]” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 915 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 576 ].) The conditional privilege “is recognized where the communicator and the recipient have a common interest and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further that interest.” (D

2024He also asserts her retention of counsel a week after she sent the HR letter does not show an intention to litigate “imminently” because she does not specifically state the purpose for which she retained him, and that the litigation hold letter her attorney sent to HAG’s counsel was sent to try to resolve the 13 In the third case Slap relies on, Cruey v. Gannett Co., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 356 , the court discussed the privileges for statements in “an official proceeding authorized by law” under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)(3) (Cruey, at p. 368) and the conditional privilege for commu

2015Code, § 47, subd. (c) is consistently applied in the employment context]; Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 369 [applying the conditional privilege to a manager's complaint to department of human resources about workplace harassment]; Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Federal Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 (Cuenca).) " 'Clearly, an employer is privileged in pursuing its own economic interests and that of its employees to ascertain whether an employee has breached his responsibilities of employment and if so, to communicate, in good faith, that fact to others

2015Code, § 47, subd. (c) is consistently applied in the employment context]; Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 369 [applying the conditional privilege to a manager's complaint to department of human resources about workplace harassment]; Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Federal Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 (Cuenca).) " 'Clearly, an employer is privileged in pursuing its own economic interests and that of its employees to ascertain whether an employee has breached his responsibilities of employment and if so, to communicate, in good faith, that fact to others

2014Accordingly, we determine whether Dr. Hui has carried his burden to establish the probability of prevailing on his slander claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 , 151 P.3d 1185 ] (Taus).) Civil Code section 47 “extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests. [Citation.]

2020Code, § 47, subd. (c); Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1363 [malice required for application of conditional privilege]; Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 871, 877 [“It is well established that a former employer may properly respond to an inquiry from a prospective employer concerning an individual’s fitness for employment, and if it is not done maliciously, such 24 response is privileged”].) This conditional privilege helps protect the free flow of reference information.

2020Code, § 47, subd. (c); Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1363 [malice required for application of conditional privilege]; Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 871, 877 ["It is well established that a former employer may properly respond to an inquiry from a prospective employer concerning an individual's fitness for employment, and if it is not done maliciously, such response is privileged"].) This conditional privilege helps protect the free flow of reference information.

2016Code, § 44; Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 723 .) "Slander is defined as including 'a false and unprivileged publication, orally uttered, . . . [¶] . . . [tending] directly to injure [any person] in respect to his office, profession, trade or business. . . .' " (Lundquist v. Reusser (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1193, 1203 .) Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) "extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests." (Hawran 7 v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 287 .)4 This privilege, often referred to as the common

2015Code, § 47, subd. (c) is consistently applied in the employment context]; Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 369 [applying the conditional privilege to a manager's complaint to department of human resources about workplace harassment]; Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Federal Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 (Cuenca).) " 'Clearly, an employer is privileged in pursuing its own economic interests and that of its employees to ascertain whether an employee has breached his responsibilities of employment and if so, to communicate, in good faith, that fact to others

2015(See Hawran, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 286 .) Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) provides a conditional privilege for communications made “without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.” (See Mann, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 108 .) The “interest” must be something other than mere general or idle curiosity, such as

2015Code, § 47, subd. (c).) 22 “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) provides a conditional privilege for communications made ‘without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information.’ ” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 108 .) To defeat the privilege Tucker had to make a prima facie showing of defendan

1986(Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531 ; Shepherd v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 107 .) Since we have determined, by finding section 1157.7 inapplicable, that the absolute statutory privilege (§ 1040, subd. (b)(1)) does not apply here, County’s claim must rest on section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), the conditional privilege.

1984Preliminarily, we note section 1040 of the Evidence Code “represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], italics added.) “It essentially establishes two different privileges—an absolute privilege if disclosure is forbidden by a federal or state statute (subd. (b)(1)), and a conditional privilege in all other cases pursuant to which privilege attaches when the court determines, in accordance with precise statutory

2001(Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107 ,. 123-124 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ].) Of the privileges asserted, only the conditional privilege contained in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2) (hereafter section 1040(b)(2)) may be applicable.

2001(Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107 ,. 123-124 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ].) Of the privileges asserted, only the conditional privilege contained in Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2) (hereafter section 1040(b)(2)) may be applicable.

2006(See, e.g., Mann[, supra,] 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 109 [noting, in the context of a [section] 425.16 analysis, that defendants had failed to carry their burden of establishing their allegedly defamatory statements were protected under the conditional privilege of Civil Code [section] 47, [subdivision] c].)” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ].) Plaintiffs argue that because their complaint is not directed at protected activity, defendants cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of their affir

2006(See, e.g., Mann[, supra,] 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 109 [noting, in the context of a [section] 425.16 analysis, that defendants had failed to carry their burden of establishing their allegedly defamatory statements were protected under the conditional privilege of Civil Code [section] 47, [subdivision] c].)” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ].) Plaintiffs argue that because their complaint is not directed at protected activity, defendants cannot demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of their affir

2017(See People v. Carter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 666 , 670, 58 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ["waiver of counsel which is made conditional by a defendant cannot be effective unless the condition is accepted by the court"].) But Daniels's statement does not divulge a conditional waiver, such as one contingent upon the receipt of some undisclosed benefit.

2017(See People v. Carter (1967) 66 Cal.2d 666 , 670, 58 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 427 P.2d 214 ["waiver of counsel which is made conditional by a defendant cannot be effective unless the condition is accepted by the court"].) But Daniels's statement does not divulge a conditional waiver, such as one contingent upon the receipt of some undisclosed benefit.

2004(Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 646, 664-665 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 347 ].) Defendants assert that the conditional privilege applies to all of their alleged defamatory statements because the governmental agencies and WSSI customers that they contacted were interested in their statements, and WSSI presented no evidence of malice.

2004(Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 646, 664-665 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 347 ].) Defendants assert that the conditional privilege applies to all of their alleged defamatory statements because the governmental agencies and WSSI customers that they contacted were interested in their statements, and WSSI presented no evidence of malice.

1973A trial judge is not required to correct requested instructions which are incomplete or erroneous [citations], and the refusal of the instruction did not constitute error.” (56 Cal.2d at pp. 470-471.) That analysis indicates that a conditional instruction would have been proper, and does not overrule Barrera v. De La Torre , where the court stated that under similar circumstances “an appropriate instruction concerning the doctrine would have been proper.” ( 48 Cal.2d at p. 170 .) The instruction offered proposed to advise the jury that before it could draw any inference of the negligence of th

1965(See Barrera v. De La Torre (1957) 48 Cal.2d 166, 170 [ 308 P.2d 724 ] which suggests a conditional instruction where defendant asserts that he lost control because of the negligence of a third person.) Finally, although the fact that an issue is raised as to contributory negligence does not preclude the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, (Shahinian v, McCormick, supra, 59 Cal.2d 554, 560-561 ), it would be improper to apply the doctrine unconditionally if there were any evidence to show that plaintiff contributed to the accident.

2020Code, § 47, subd. (c); Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1363 [malice required for application of conditional privilege]; Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 871, 877 [“It is well established that a former employer may properly respond to an inquiry from a prospective employer concerning an individual’s fitness for employment, and if it is not done maliciously, such 24 response is privileged”].) This conditional privilege helps protect the free flow of reference information.

2020Code, § 47, subd. (c); Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1363 [malice required for application of conditional privilege]; Neal v. Gatlin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 871, 877 ["It is well established that a former employer may properly respond to an inquiry from a prospective employer concerning an individual's fitness for employment, and if it is not done maliciously, such response is privileged"].) This conditional privilege helps protect the free flow of reference information.

1948Code, § 47, subd. 3; 3 Rest., Torts, § 596; Prosser on Torts, § 94, p. 837; see also 3 Rest., Torts, §§ 594, 595.) For this conditional privilege extends to false statements of fact, although the occasion may be abused and the protection of the privilege lost, by the publisher’s lack of belief, or of reasonable grounds for belief, in the truth of the defamatory matter, by excessive publication, by a publication of defamatory matter for an improper purpose, or if the defamation goes beyond the group interest.” Thus the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will' tow

1948Code, § 47, subd. 3; 3 Rest., Torts, § 596; Prosser on Torts, § 94, p. 837; see also 3 Rest., Torts, §§ 594, 595.) For this conditional privilege extends to false statements of fact, although the occasion may be abused and the protection of the privilege lost, by the publisher’s lack of belief, or of reasonable grounds for belief, in the truth of the defamatory matter, by excessive publication, by a publication of defamatory matter for an improper purpose, or if the defamation goes beyond the group interest.” Thus the privilege is lost if the publication is motivated by hatred or ill will' tow

2026“Section 47, subdivision (c) extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests.” (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 287 .) “This privilege applies to communications between church members on church matters.” (Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1556 .) Plaintiffs argue the common interest privilege is inapplicable here because the recipients of the e-mail were affiliated with different dioceses.

2022We do not reach the issue of malice because defendants failed to produce or identify evidence showing the privilege applies in the first instance. [Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c)(1) extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interests. 12 [Citations.] [It] is ‘recognized where the communicator and the recipient have a common interest and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further that interest.’ [Citation.] The ‘interest’ must be something other than mere general or idle curiosity, such as w

2023New York Times malice is actual falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 .) He has also confused punitive damages malice with the malice necessary to defeat the conditional privilege of Civil Code section 47, which is ill-will or lack of reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the publication.

2003Moreover, Witkin explained “[t]his rule is, however, subject to the New York Times v. *1372 Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 686 , 84 S.Ct. 710 ] requirement of proof of actual malice where the defamatory statement is directed at public officials or public figures . . . , and to the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 [ 41 L.Ed.2d 789 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 ] requirement of negligence where it is directed at a private individual.” (5 Witkin, supra, Torts, § 554, p. 651.) 8 Accordingly, when a conditional privilege applies, as here, malice must be shown.

2016Further, Fritts's alleged statements to Edward Don about Darulis are, on their face, " 'reasonably calculated to protect or further a common interest' " (Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745, 752 ), since the 4 Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c) provides for a conditional privilege for communications made "without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the p

1990In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested . . . .” (Williams v. Taylor (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 745, 752 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 423 ] [employer described former employee as “a thief’ to persons who referred business to employer].) To defeat this conditional privilege, a plaintiff must specifically allege malice.

2025The court examined Penal Code section 832.7 and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 and concluded that although a peace officer has a conditional privilege in the officer’s personnel records, the statutory scheme does not 14 provide a remedy or penalty for violation of its disclosure provisions. ( Rosales, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at pp. 426–427.) The statutory scheme, the court concluded, was comprehensive, and “the Legislature could have easily provided a remedy if one was intended.” (Id. at p. 428.) Accordingly, the court held that “violation of the statutory procedures for disclosure of poli

2003(Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1121, fn. 5 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 ] [in employment discrimination action, attendance sheets are confidential peace officer personnel records that cannot be disclosed without a court order]; see also City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1459 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 296 ].) In a personal injury action against a police officer, the court in Hackett v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 96, 100-101 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 405 ] recognized that Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 were a reaction to Pitchess, but found that “the legislat

2015Code, § 47, subd. (c) is consistently applied in the employment context]; Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 369 [applying the conditional privilege to a manager's complaint to department of human resources about workplace harassment]; Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Federal Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 (Cuenca).) " 'Clearly, an employer is privileged in pursuing its own economic interests and that of its employees to ascertain whether an employee has breached his responsibilities of employment and if so, to communicate, in good faith, that fact to others

2015Code, § 47, subd. (c) is consistently applied in the employment context]; Cruey v. Gannett Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 356, 369 [applying the conditional privilege to a manager's complaint to department of human resources about workplace harassment]; Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Federal Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 985, 990 (Cuenca).) " 'Clearly, an employer is privileged in pursuing its own economic interests and that of its employees to ascertain whether an employee has breached his responsibilities of employment and if so, to communicate, in good faith, that fact to others

2015The Common Interest Privilege Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), provides a privilege for "a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information." This provision "extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice on subjects of mutual interest[]. [Citations.] This privilege i

2014The Common-Interest Privilege of Section 47, Subdivision (c) Section 47, subdivision (c) provides that a privileged publication or broadcast is one made "[i]n a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information." This provision "extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice

2014The Common-Interest Privilege of Section 47, Subdivision (c) Section 47, subdivision (c) provides that a privileged publication or broadcast is one made "[i]n a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information." This provision "extends a conditional privilege against defamation to statements made without malice

2013(Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 574, 580-581 ; see also King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 426, 440-441 [privilege applies to an employer’s statements to employees regarding the reasons for terminating another employee]; Deaile v. General Telephone Co. of California (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 841, 845-846, 847 [privilege applies to statements by management to supervisors who repeated statements to employee explaining why an employer disciplined an employee].) Malice is not inferred from the communication in statements falling within the condit

2013In such case, the jury must first determine that each of the three conditions exists—or, as the case may be, some or one of them, to whatever extent none exists as a matter of law—before the trial court can direct that the inference of negligence be drawn. [Citation.]‖ (McFarland v. Booker (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 402 , 411–412, fn. omitted.) ―In order to justify the conditional res ipsa loquitur instruction, a plaintiff need not demonstrate all the facts necessary to the res ipsa loquitur inference, but need only produce evidence sufficient to support findings that the requisite conditions are p

1973(Cf. McFarland v. Booker (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 402, 412 [ 58 Cal. Rptr. 417 ].) 9 The instructions of the court do not follow the law as extant at the time of trial, or currently, March 4, 1972, and include some phraseology changed by amendment, but these variances do not affect the substance of what was read to the jury.

2003(Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1121, fn. 5 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 ] [in employment discrimination action, attendance sheets are confidential peace officer personnel records that cannot be disclosed without a court order]; see also City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1459 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 296 ].) In a personal injury action against a police officer, the court in Hackett v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 96, 100-101 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 405 ] recognized that Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 were a reaction to Pitchess, but found that “the legislat

2003(Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1121, fn. 5 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 27 ] [in employment discrimination action, attendance sheets are confidential peace officer personnel records that cannot be disclosed without a court order]; see also City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1459 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 296 ].) In a personal injury action against a police officer, the court in Hackett v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 96, 100-101 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 405 ] recognized that Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 were a reaction to Pitchess, but found that “the legislat

1990Co. (1932) 122 Cal. App. 205, 210-211 [ 9 P.2d 562 ].) Thus, the legislative history, like a plain reading of the statute, confirms the absolute nature of the privilege in the nondissolution context. 4.

1987Co. (1932) 122 CaLApp. 205 [ 9 P.2d 562 ] stated “[A]s far as the legislature could enact, the privilege was made absolute, limited only by the proviso____Obviously, if it had been the legislative intent to extend only a conditional privilege in all cases, the proviso would be meaningless and needless.” (Id. at pp. 210-211.) This statutory history becomes even more compelling in light of the policy which underlies the privilege.