right to present defense in District of Columbia

2006“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense ... [and] a fundamental element of due process of law.” Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141 , 159-60 (D.C.2004) (citing Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 716 (D.C.1986)) (quoting Washington, supra, 388 U.S. at 18 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2004Bassil v. United States, 517 A.2d 714, 716 (D.C.1986). “ ‘The right to *160 offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense ... [and] a fundamental element of due process of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)).

1993See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) C'[t]he right of an accused ... to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations"); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) ("[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of

1993See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) C'[t]he right of an accused ... to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations"); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) ("[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of

2015The trial court should grant severance “ ‘only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ” Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1056 (D.C.2007) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 , 113 S.Ct. 933 , 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993)). “[A]mong the specific trial rights that a motion for severance is intended to secure is the right to present a defense and call witnesses on one’s own behalf.” Williams v. United States, 884 A.2d 587, 593 (D.C.

2007Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]mong the specific trial rights that a motion for severance is intended to secure is the right to present a defense and call witnesses on one’s own behalf.” Williams, 884 A.2d at 593 . “[T]he fundamental character of that right is a major factor to be considered” in evaluating a defendant’s request for severance.

2007Id. at 594 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 127 (D.C.1991).

2005See Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 127 (D.C.1991) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)).

1979See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense); United States v. Haldeman, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 306 , 559 F.2d 31, 83 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 , 97 S.Ct. 2641 , 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977) (defendant’s interest in presenting witnesses “implicates constitutional values, since the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is ‘in plain terms the right to present a defense’ ” (footnote omitted).

1979Counsel must have therefore had at least an inkling of the importance the trial judge placed on being ready to present witnesses and thus have been able to anticipate the judge's reaction to any request for continuance. [1] The fourth was Officer Paul James, who had been present for the government and then dismissed. [2] A defendant's interest in presenting the testimony of witnesses "implicates constitutional values, since the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is `in plain terms the right to present a defense.'" United States v. Haldeman, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 306 , 559 F.2d 31, 83

1993See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) C'[t]he right of an accused ... to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations"); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) ("[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of

1993See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 , 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) C'[t]he right of an accused ... to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations"); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967) ("[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of

2015The trial court should grant severance “ ‘only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ” Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1056 (D.C.2007) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 , 113 S.Ct. 933 , 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993)). “[A]mong the specific trial rights that a motion for severance is intended to secure is the right to present a defense and call witnesses on one’s own behalf.” Williams v. United States, 884 A.2d 587, 593 (D.C.

2012There we noted that “[t]he Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to call witnesses in order to present a complete defense.” Heath v. United States, 26 A.3d 266, 275 (D.C.2011).

2009Ingram I, supra, 885 A.2d at 266 ; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 40 (2d Cir.1983) ("The corroboration requirement ... should be construed to effectuate its purpose of 'circumventing fabrication.’ ”) (where corroboration came from a defendant's own statements, "more reliable corroboration is required.”). 24 .Based on the exclusion of Mr. Aleem’s confession, Mr. Ingram presents a Fifth and Sixth Amendment constitutional deprivation of the right to present a defense contention on appeal.

2007See Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 258 (D.C.1997) ("Because [defendant's] proffer of extrinsic evidence ... to show a reasonable possibility that someone else committed the crime implicated both the right of confrontation and the right to present a defense, ... we are satisfied that the constitutional harmless error standard applies here.

2006Under Brady, supra, “[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused ... violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith *777 or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 . “[I]t is now well settled that the prosecution must disclose exculpatory material at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case .... ” Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 970 (D.C.1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitte

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

2002See, e.g., Rhynes, supra, 218 F.3d at 321 (“exclusion of a defense witness impinges upon the right to present a defense” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 325 (Wilkins, J. concurring) (“the exclusion of a defense witness implicates the defendant’s due process right to present testimony in his own defense”); United States v. Hobbs, 31 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1994) (describing the right to call a defense witness who had violated rule on witnesses as a “constitutionally based right of the defendant to present evidence in his favor”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78 , 436 A.2d 161, 163 (1981)

1979Counsel must have therefore had at least an inkling of the importance the trial judge placed on being ready to present witnesses and thus have been able to anticipate the judge's reaction to any request for continuance. [1] The fourth was Officer Paul James, who had been present for the government and then dismissed. [2] A defendant's interest in presenting the testimony of witnesses "implicates constitutional values, since the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is `in plain terms the right to present a defense.'" United States v. Haldeman, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 306 , 559 F.2d 31, 83

1979Counsel must have therefore had at least an inkling of the importance the trial judge placed on being ready to present witnesses and thus have been able to anticipate the judge's reaction to any request for continuance. [1] The fourth was Officer Paul James, who had been present for the government and then dismissed. [2] A defendant's interest in presenting the testimony of witnesses "implicates constitutional values, since the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is `in plain terms the right to present a defense.'" United States v. Haldeman, 181 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 306 , 559 F.2d 31, 83