right to present defense in Colorado

2013People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221 , 227 (Colo.2002) ; see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 410, 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ("The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."). ¶ 11 We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.

2013People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221 , 227 (Colo.2002) ; see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 410, 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ("The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."). ¶ 11 We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.

2013People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221 , 227 (Colo.2002) ; see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 410, 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ("The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."). ¶ 11 We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.

2013People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221, 227 (Colo.2002); see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 , 108 S.Ct. 646, 653 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ("The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."). {13 Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

2026See People v. Scearce, 87 P.3d 228, 233 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that “the right to present a defense 21 does not guarantee a defendant a right to question witnesses in violation of the rules of evidence”); People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 449 (Colo. 2001) (While constitutional rights “inform and shape the limits of a trial court’s discretion to control cross-examination and exclude evidence offered by a criminal defendant, they do not eliminate that discretion or guarantee that a defendant be permitted to present all the evidence he wishes or do so in the manner he chooses.”). ¶ 43 Finally, the

2025“Thus, the right to present a defense does not guarantee a defendant a right to question witnesses in violation of the rules of evidence or to produce inadmissible hearsay.” Id. ¶ 38 Xia relies on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), in support of his constitutional argument.

2021While the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense , see Krutsinger v. People , 219 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2009) , the right to present a defense is not absolute as the Constitution requires only that the accus ed be permitted to introduce relevant and admissible evidenc e. People v. Rodriguez , 209 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing Peopl e v. Harris , 43 P.3d 221, 227 (Colo. 2002)). ¶ 13 A s pertinent here, self-defense justifies the use of deadly physical force if the actor is defending himself or a third pers on from what he

2011The right to present a defense is violated "only where the defendant was denied virtually his only means of effectively testing significant prosecution evidence." Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo.2009).

2025This privilege applies to nondefendant witnesses “who are not required to answer questions ‘where the answers might incriminate [them] in future criminal proceedings.’” Rios-Vargas, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Ruch, 2016 CO 35 , ¶ 20). ¶ 15 “On the other hand, ‘[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense.’” People v. Smith, 275 P.3d 715, 720 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).

2011On the other hand, "[the right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).

2021While the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense , see Krutsinger v. People , 219 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2009) , the right to present a defense is not absolute as the Constitution requires only that the accus ed be permitted to introduce relevant and admissible evidenc e. People v. Rodriguez , 209 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing Peopl e v. Harris , 43 P.3d 221, 227 (Colo. 2002)). ¶ 13 A s pertinent here, self-defense justifies the use of deadly physical force if the actor is defending himself or a third pers on from what he

2013People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221 , 227 (Colo.2002) ; see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 410, 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) ("The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."). ¶ 11 We review a trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.

2021First, " [w] hile fundamental, the right to present defense evidence is not absolute." People v. Melendez , 102 P.3d 315, 320 ( Colo. 2004 ) .

2021First, “[w]hile fundamental, the right to present defense evidence is not absolute.” People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 320 (Colo. 2004).

2025But “[t]he right to present a defense is not absolute, . . . and it ‘does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.’” Id. (quoting People v. Coit, 50 P.3d 936, 938 (Colo. App. 2002)). 4.

2011The right to present a defense is not absolute, however, and it "does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege." People v. Coit, 50 P.3d 936, 938 (Colo.App.2002) (citing United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.1978)).

2007“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses ... is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the [fact finder] so it may decide where the truth lies.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); see People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Colo.1987) (noting that a defendant’s right to offer testimony at trial is a “fundamental element of due process of law”).

2004See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967)("The right to offer the testimony of witnesses ... is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [fact finder] so it may decide where the truth lies."); People v. Chastain, 733 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Colo.1987)(noting that a defendant's right to offer testimony at trial is a "fundamental clement of due process of law")(internal citations omitted).

2026However, this right is not absolute; it guarantees “only that the accused be permitted to introduce all relevant and admissible evidence.” Id.; see also People v. Cline, 2022 COA 135 , ¶ 77 (explaining that the right to present a defense is subject to the rules of evidence). ¶ 26 In People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 22 , the supreme court held that “the admissibility of alternate suspect evidence ultimately depends on the strength of the connection between the alternate suspect and the charged crime.” To be admissible, the alternate suspect evidence must be relevant, and its probative value must

2025Id. ¶ 91 Although a criminal defendant is “entitled to all reasonable opportunities to present evidence that might tend to create doubt as 42 to the defendant’s guilt,” the right to present a defense “is generally subject to, and constrained by, familiar and well-established limits on the admissibility of evidence.” People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶¶ 26-27 . ¶ 92 Under CRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.

2026See, e.g., Krutsinger, 219 P.3d at 1062 (“[T]he standard or test for assessing whether a defendant’s right to confront or present a defense has been violated by evidentiary rulings is clearly dependent upon the extent to which he was permitted to subject the prosecutor’s case to ‘meaningful adversarial testing.’” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986))). ¶ 44 The defense mounted a self-defense case by presenting evidence that the victim was holding a large, sharp, serrated hunting knife when Spain shot him and by extensively 22 cross-examining Spain’s cellmate, who testified for

2021Thus, the right to present a defense is violated only when a defendant “was denied virtually his only means of effectively testing significant prosecution evidence.” Id.

2021Second, under the Fourth Amendment , " [e] xclusion [of illegally obtained evidence] is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search." Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 ( 2011 ) ( quoting Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 , 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 ( 1976 ) ) .

2021Second, under the Fourth Amendment, “[e]xclusion [of illegally obtained evidence] is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).

2021Second, under the Fourth Amendment , " [e] xclusion [of illegally obtained evidence] is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search." Davis v. United States , 564 U.S. 229 , 236 , 131 S.Ct. 2419 , 180 L.Ed.2d 285 ( 2011 ) ( quoting Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 , 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 ( 1976 ) ) .

2021Second, under the Fourth Amendment, “[e]xclusion [of illegally obtained evidence] is ‘not a personal constitutional right,’ nor is it designed to ‘redress the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)).

2026See People v. Scearce, 87 P.3d 228, 233 (Colo. App. 2003) (noting that “the right to present a defense 21 does not guarantee a defendant a right to question witnesses in violation of the rules of evidence”); People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 449 (Colo. 2001) (While constitutional rights “inform and shape the limits of a trial court’s discretion to control cross-examination and exclude evidence offered by a criminal defendant, they do not eliminate that discretion or guarantee that a defendant be permitted to present all the evidence he wishes or do so in the manner he chooses.”). ¶ 43 Finally, the

2026People v. Cordova, 293 P.3d 114, 118 (Colo. App. 2011).

2026Laws Ann. § 780.951(1) (West 2026) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 24 ¶49 The holding in Hoven is inapplicable here, however, given the limited extent of the Michigan statute and Michigan's prohibition on using constitutional provisions as a source of public policy. 751 F.3d at 784-85 ("The right, if any, that is conferred is simply the right to present a defense in a criminal case.").

2026Laws Ann. § 780.951 (1) (West 2026 ) ( emphasis added ) ( footnote omitted ) . ¶49 The holding in Hoven is inapplicable here, however, given the limited extent of the Michigan statute and Michigan's prohibition on using constitutional provisions as a source of public policy. 751 F.3d at 784-85 ( "The right, if any, that is conferred is simply the right to present a defense in a criminal case." ) .

2025Application ¶ 56 During voir dire, “[a] prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct . . . when she misstates the law or ‘intentionally uses[s] the voir dire to present factual matter which the prosecutor knows will not be admissible at trial or to argue the prosecution’s case to the jury.’” People v. Krueger, 2012 COA 80, ¶ 50 (quoting People v. Adams, 708 P.2d 813, 815 (Colo. App. 1985)).

2025Application ¶ 56 During voir dire, “[a] prosecutor engages in prosecutorial misconduct . . . when she misstates the law or ‘intentionally uses[s] the voir dire to present factual matter which the prosecutor knows will not be admissible at trial or to argue the prosecution’s case to the jury.’” People v. Krueger, 2012 COA 80, ¶ 50 (quoting People v. Adams, 708 P.2d 813, 815 (Colo. App. 1985)).

2025“Thus, the right to present a defense does not guarantee a defendant a right to question witnesses in violation of the rules of evidence or to produce inadmissible hearsay.” Id. ¶ 38 Xia relies on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973), in support of his constitutional argument.

2025This privilege applies to nondefendant witnesses “who are not required to answer questions ‘where the answers might incriminate [them] in future criminal proceedings.’” Rios-Vargas, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Ruch, 2016 CO 35 , ¶ 20). ¶ 15 “On the other hand, ‘[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense.’” People v. Smith, 275 P.3d 715, 720 (Colo. App. 2011) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)).

2021CRE 404( a)(2) ; People v. Jones , 675 P.2d 9, 17 (Colo. 1984) (when asserting self-defense, a defendant may use prior acts of violence of the victim, of wh ich the defendant had knowledge, as direct evidence of the reasonabl eness of the defendant’s belief in the imminent use of unlawf ul physical force against him or her).

2021While the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense , see Krutsinger v. People , 219 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2009) , the right to present a defense is not absolute as the Constitution requires only that the accus ed be permitted to introduce relevant and admissible evidenc e. People v. Rodriguez , 209 P.3d 1151, 1160 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing Peopl e v. Harris , 43 P.3d 221, 227 (Colo. 2002)). ¶ 13 A s pertinent here, self-defense justifies the use of deadly physical force if the actor is defending himself or a third pers on from what he

2015Id. at 248 ; see also People v. Bondurant , 2012 COA 50 , ¶¶41-47 (following Herrera ). ¶202        Accordingly, we reject Marko’s arguments that the statutory scheme governing NGRI pleas is unconstitutional.

2015See People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Colo.App.1981). 127 However, the right to present a defense is generally subject to, and constrained by, familiar and well-established limits on the admissibility of evidence.

2011The right to present a defense is not absolute, however, and it "does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege." People v. Coit, 50 P.3d 936, 938 (Colo.App.2002) (citing United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.1978)).

2011The right to present a defense is not absolute, however, and it "does not include the right to compel a witness to waive his or her Fifth Amendment privilege." People v. Coit, 50 P.3d 936, 938 (Colo.App.2002) (citing United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.1978)).