right to present defense in Tennessee

2026“Principles of due process require that a defendant in a criminal trial have the right to present a defense and to offer testimony.” Id. at 316 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000)).

2025Our supreme court has recognized that “[t]he Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly guarantee -9- a criminal defendant the right to present a defense.” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000).

2026“Principles of due process require that a defendant in a criminal trial have the right to present a defense and to offer testimony.” Id. at 316 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000)).

2025“Principles of due process require that a defendant in a criminal trial ha[s] the right to present a defense and to offer testimony.” Id. at 316 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000)).

2026“Principles of due process require that a defendant in a criminal trial have the right to present a defense and to offer testimony.” Id. at 316 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000)).

2025“Principles of due process require that a defendant in a criminal trial ha[s] the right to present a defense and to offer testimony.” Id. at 316 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000)).

2020“The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a defense which includes the right to present witnesses favorable to the defense.” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 119 (1967).

2020“The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a defense which includes the right to present witnesses favorable to the defense.” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000); see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 119 (1967).

2009Due Process and the Right to Present a Defense “The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a defense which includes the right to present witnesses favorable to the defense.” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000); see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 652 (1988); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 , 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1976).

2009Due Process and the Right to Present a Defense “The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly guarantee a criminal defendant the right to present a defense which includes the right to present witnesses favorable to the defense.” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000); see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 , 108 S. Ct. 646, 652 (1988); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 , 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1976).

2024See id. at 432 (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1976); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tenn. 1997)).

2013In other words, the right to present a defense “does not mean that a defendant has a right to present irrelevant evidence.” State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tenn. 1997).

2024See id. at 432 (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1976); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tenn. 1997)).

2023See id. at 432 (first citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988); then citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1976); then citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); and then citing State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 47 (1997)).

2015“A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn.. 2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of third-party guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. 'Power’s, 101 S'.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn. 2003) (recognizing that' “kn accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. 694 , 695 188

2015“A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn.2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of third-party guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn.2003) (recognizing that “an accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 694, 695 (1

2015“A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn.2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of third-party guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn.2003) (recognizing that “an accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 694, 695 (1

2015“A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn.2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of third-party guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn.2003) (recognizing that “an accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 694, 695 (1

2015“A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn.2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of third-party guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn.2003) (recognizing that “an accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 694, 695 (1

2015“A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn. 2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of third- party guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn. 2003) (recognizing that “an accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 694, 695 (1885)).

2013The Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “‘clearly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to present a defense which includes the right to present witnesses favorable to the defense.’” State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751, 770 (Tenn. Crim.

2007State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751, 770 (Tenn. Crim.

2025We are mindful that parties must “endeavor to specifically state the issues raised so as to avoid any potential for future waiver.” Fahey v. Eldridge, 46 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tenn. 2001).

2022See Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d at 630 (“Unlike the federal writ of habeas corpus which reaches as far as allowed by the Constitution, the scope of the writ within Tennessee does not permit relief from convictions that are merely voidable for want of due process of law.”); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a claim regarding a violation of due process is not properly brought in a habeas corpus petition); see also Fredrick B.

2022See Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d at 630 (“Unlike the federal writ of habeas corpus which reaches as far as allowed by the Constitution, the scope of the writ within Tennessee does not permit relief from convictions that are merely voidable for want of due process of law.”); Smith v. Hesson, 63 S.W.3d 725, 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a claim regarding a violation of due process is not properly brought in a habeas corpus petition); see also Fredrick B.

2019Principles of due process require that a defendant in a criminal trial have the right to present a defense and to offer testimony” (citing Flood, 219 S.W.3d at 316-17 ; Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294 ; State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000))); State v. Burns, 29 S.W.3d 40, 48 (Tenn. Crim.

2019App. 1999) (“We recognize the longstanding rule in Tennessee that once a confession is admitted into evidence, a jury may hear evidence concerning the circumstances under which the confession was procured in order to determine whether the defendant made the confession and whether it is true.” (citing Pursley, 550 S.W.2d at 950, 952 ; Wynn v. State, 181 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tenn. 1944))); cf. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 256 (N. J. 2003) (recognizing that “when the mechanistic application of a state’s rules of evidence or procedure would undermine the truth-finding function by excluding relevant

2019App. 1999) (“We recognize the longstanding rule in Tennessee that once a confession is admitted into evidence, a jury may hear evidence concerning the circumstances under which the confession was procured in order to determine whether the defendant made the confession and whether it is true.” (citing Pursley, 550 S.W.2d at 950, 952 ; Wynn v. State, 181 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tenn. 1944))); cf. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 256 (N. J. 2003) (recognizing that “when the mechanistic application of a state’s rules of evidence or procedure would undermine the truth-finding function by excluding relevant

2019App. 1999) (“We recognize the longstanding rule in Tennessee that once a confession is admitted into evidence, a jury may hear evidence concerning the circumstances under which the confession was procured in order to determine whether the defendant made the confession and whether it is true.” (citing Pursley, 550 S.W.2d at 950, 952 ; Wynn v. State, 181 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tenn. 1944))); cf. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 256 (N. J. 2003) (recognizing that “when the mechanistic application of a state’s rules of evidence or procedure would undermine the truth-finding function by excluding relevant

2017The United States Constitution “guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).

2017The United States Constitution “guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).

2014“Questions regarding the qualifications, admissibility, relevancy, and competency of expert testimony are matters left within the broad discretion of the trial court.” State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn. 2002) (citing McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264-65 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993)). -27- A panel of this Court recently addressed a similar question regarding the exclusion of certain expert testimony pertaining to false confessions and articulated the standard for determining whether the decision to exclude ceratain evidence vi

2014“Questions regarding the qualifications, admissibility, relevancy, and competency of expert testimony are matters left within the broad discretion of the trial court.” State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn. 2002) (citing McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264-65 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993)). -27- A panel of this Court recently addressed a similar question regarding the exclusion of certain expert testimony pertaining to false confessions and articulated the standard for determining whether the decision to exclude ceratain evidence vi

2014“Questions regarding the qualifications, admissibility, relevancy, and competency of expert testimony are matters left within the broad discretion of the trial court.” State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 832 (Tenn. 2002) (citing McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 264-65 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993)). -27- A panel of this Court recently addressed a similar question regarding the exclusion of certain expert testimony pertaining to false confessions and articulated the standard for determining whether the decision to exclude ceratain evidence vi