right to present defense in New York

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661 , quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19 ), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294 ; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583 , 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it ma

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583, 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may de

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583, 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may de

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583, 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may de

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661 , quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19 ), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294 ; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583 , 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it ma

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583, 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may de

2025While the right to present a defense is fundamental ( see Crane v Kentucky , 476 US 683, 690 [1986]; People v Dixon , 42 NY3d 609 , 616 [2024]), it is "not absolute" ( People v Williams , 81 NY2d 303, 313 [1993]; see People v Hayes , 17 NY3d 46, 53 [2011]), and is subject to "the legitimate demands of the adversarial system" ( People v Williams , 81 NY2d at 313 [internal quotation marks omitted]). " 'It is well established that the trial courts have broad discretion to keep the proceedings within manageable limits' " ( People v Spencer , 20 NY3d 954 , 956 [2012], quoting People v Hudy , 73 NY2

2020Alternatively, even if the infringement of the defendant's right to present a defense could somehow be construed as something less than a deprivation of his right to a fair trial—a difficult conclusion to reach in light of prior cases describing the right to present a defense as "one of the minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583 , 585, quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294 ; see People v Hall , 160 AD3d 210 , 213; People v Bradley , 99 AD3d at 936 )—the error is, at the very least, subject to constitutional harmless error analysis ( see Crane v Kentucky

2025While the right to present a defense is fundamental ( see Crane v Kentucky , 476 US 683, 690 [1986]; People v Dixon , 42 NY3d 609 , 616 [2024]), it is "not absolute" ( People v Williams , 81 NY2d 303, 313 [1993]; see People v Hayes , 17 NY3d 46, 53 [2011]), and is subject to "the legitimate demands of the adversarial system" ( People v Williams , 81 NY2d at 313 [internal quotation marks omitted]). " 'It is well established that the trial courts have broad discretion to keep the proceedings within manageable limits' " ( People v Spencer , 20 NY3d 954 , 956 [2012], quoting People v Hudy , 73 NY2

2021However, "the right to present a defense does not give criminal defendants carte blanche to circumvent the rules of evidence" ( People v Hayes , 17 NY3d 46, 53 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Bittrolff , 165 AD3d 690 , 692).

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661 , quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19 ), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294 ; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583 , 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it ma

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583, 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may de

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661 , quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19 ), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294 ; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583 , 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it ma

2025"The right to present a defense constitutes 'a fundamental element of due process of law'" ( People v Butts , 184 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Washington v Texas , 388 US 14, 19), "and it is one of the 'minimum essentials of a fair trial'" ( id. , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US 284, 294; see People v Gibian , 76 AD3d 583, 585). "'The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the [trier of fact] so it may de

2013The court did not deprive defendant of the right to present a defense by precluding questions about matters not directly involving the victim, which would have had little or no relevance and would have invited speculation (see Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 678-679 [1986]).

2013The court did not deprive defendant of the right to present a defense by precluding questions about matters not directly involving the victim, which would have had little or no relevance and would have invited speculation (see Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 678-679 [1986]).

2020"Indeed where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice'" ( People v Bradley , 99 AD3d at 937 , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US at 302 ; see People v Robinson , 89 NY2d 648, 650 ; People v Abdul , 76 AD3d 563 , 565; People v Oxley , 64 AD3d 1078, 1083-1084 ).

2012Indeed “where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice” (Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US at 302 ; see People v Robinson, 89 NY2d 648, 650 [1997]; People v Abdul, 76 AD3d 563 , 565 [2010]; People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1083-1084 [2009]).

2020Under such circumstances, the right to present a defense may "encompass[ ] the right to place before the [trier of fact] secondary forms of evidence, such as hearsay" ( People v Gibian , 76 AD3d at 585, citing Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US at 294 ; see People v Esteves , 152 AD2d 406, 413-414 ).

2012Under such circumstances, the right to present a defense may “encompass [ ] the right to place before the [trier of fact] secondary forms of evidence, such as hearsay” (People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 585 [2010], citing Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US at 294 ; see People v Esteves, 152 AD2d 406, 413-414 [1989]).

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017The defendant’s contention that he was denied the right to present a defense by the Supreme Court’s denial of his request to. charge the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Lane, 7 NY3d at 889 ).

2015We note that defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that he was denied the right to present a defense because “[he] did not raise th[at] constitutional claim [ ] in the trial court” (People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]; see People v Norcutt, 115 AD3d 1306, 1309 [2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 966 [2014]), and we decline to exercise our power to review defendant’s contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

2025"A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to produce witnesses, and 'absent a showing of bad faith, an application to produce witnesses whose testimony would be relevant to the defense should not be denied'" ( People v Bryant , 211 AD3d 848, 849 , quoting People v Murray , 79 AD2d 993, 994 ).

2013A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to produce witnesses, and “absent a showing of bad faith, an application to produce witnesses whose testimony would be relevant to the defense should not be denied” (People v Murray, 79 AD2d 993, 994 [1981]; see People v Taylor, 40 AD3d 782, 783-784 [2007]).

2024Thus, the record as a whole establishes defendant's understanding and waiver of his constitutional rights, despite the absence of a full enumeration of all the rights waived ( see People v Sougou , 26 NY3d 1052, 1054 [2015]; People v Simmons , 138 AD3d 520 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1139 [2016]).

2024Thus, the record as a whole establishes defendant's understanding and waiver of his constitutional rights, despite the absence of a full enumeration of all the rights waived ( see People v Sougou , 26 NY3d 1052, 1054 [2015]; People v Simmons , 138 AD3d 520 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1139 [2016]).

2020"Indeed where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice'" ( People v Bradley , 99 AD3d at 937 , quoting Chambers v Mississippi , 410 US at 302 ; see People v Robinson , 89 NY2d 648, 650 ; People v Abdul , 76 AD3d 563 , 565; People v Oxley , 64 AD3d 1078, 1083-1084 ).

2012Indeed “where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice” (Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US at 302 ; see People v Robinson, 89 NY2d 648, 650 [1997]; People v Abdul, 76 AD3d 563 , 565 [2010]; People v Oxley, 64 AD3d 1078, 1083-1084 [2009]).

2018Under well-established evidentiary principles, "all relevant evidence is admissible unless its admission violates some exclusionary rule" ( People v Scarola , 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]; accord People v Nicholson , 26 NY3d 813, 829 [2016]; People v Harris , 26 NY3d 1, 5 [2015]). "[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to prove the existence or non-existence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly at issue in the case" ( People v Primo , 96 NY2d 351, 355 [2001]; see People v Nicholson , 26 NY3d at 829).

2017The court providently exercised its discretion in ruling that defendant could not, in the absence of additional evidence, argue that the person initially identified by the witness was the actual perpetrator (see generally People v Primo, 96 NY2d 351 [2001]), and this ruling did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or the right to present a defense.

2017Contrary to the People’s contention, defendant’s state of mind at the time of the calls was relevant to his defense, and his statements were not mere assertions of past facts irrevelant unless offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (cf. People v Reynoso, 73 NY2d 816, 818-819 [1988]).

2017Contrary to the People’s contention, defendant’s state of mind at the time of the calls was relevant to his defense, and his statements were not mere assertions of past facts irrevelant unless offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted (cf. People v Reynoso, 73 NY2d 816, 818-819 [1988]).

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).

2017Notably, defendant and his witnesses testified that defendant called his cousin from jail and that his cousin and uncle attempted to pick him up in response to that call, and the jury thus heard other evidence of defendant’s state of mind (see People v Starostin, 265 AD2d 267 , 268 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 885 [2000]; People v Robles, 201 AD2d 591, 592 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 876 [1994]).

2017Notably, defendant and his witnesses testified that defendant called his cousin from jail and that his cousin and uncle attempted to pick him up in response to that call, and the jury thus heard other evidence of defendant’s state of mind (see People v Starostin, 265 AD2d 267 , 268 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 885 [2000]; People v Robles, 201 AD2d 591, 592 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 876 [1994]).

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017Defendant contends that the calls were nonhearsay evidence of his state of mind, that they were relevant to his claim that the police coerced his confession by promising him that he would be released if he confessed, and that the court’s ruling denied him the right to present a defense. “ ‘The mere utterance of a statement, without regard to its truth, may indicate circumstantially the state of mind of the hearer or of the declarant’ ” (People v Cromwell, 71 AD3d 414, 415 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 803 [2010]; see People v Gibian, 76 AD3d 583 , 584-585 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 920 [2010]), and

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).

2017We apply the standard for constitutional error to defendant’s preserved contention that the error denied him the right to present a defense (see People v Powell, 27 NY3d 523, 529 [2016]; cf. People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 743-744 [2001]), and we conclude that the error is harmless under that standard, inasmuch as the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to defendant’s conviction (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237 [1975]; Barr, 60 AD3d at 864-865 ).