right to present defense in California

2025“A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ‘When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is “captain of the ship” and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.’ ” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701 , 728–729, overruled on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 91 ; accord, People v. Rod

2024(See, e.g., People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729 [“A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and compete defense [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ ”].) Particularly where the defendant is himself the source of the conflict.

2025There is no indication that any argument or evidence was presented at the court trial that these prior serious felony convictions had been reduced to misdemeanors. 5 (Mickel).) But the Sixth Amendment also “grants to the accused personally the right to present a defense”; thus, “a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 .) Thus, “[a] trial court must grant a defendant’s request for self-representation if three conditions are met.

2013A defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has held that because the Sixth Amendment grants to the accused personally the right to present a defense, a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 (Marshall), citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 .) When a defendant knowingly and intelligently makes an unequivocal request to represent himself after being apprised of the dangers of doing so, the trial cour

2016A defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has held that because the Sixth Amendment grants to the accused personally the right to present a defense, a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. James (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 323, 328-329 .) Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta) “holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent himself upon

2013A defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution. [Citations.] At the same time, the United States Supreme Court has held that because the Sixth Amendment grants to the accused personally the right to present a defense, a defendant possesses the right to represent himself or herself.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 (Marshall), citing Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819 .) When a defendant knowingly and intelligently makes an unequivocal request to represent himself after being apprised of the dangers of doing so, the trial cour

2021Generally, “a party may forfeit a right to present a claim of error to the appellate court if he did not do enough to ‘prevent[]’ or ‘correct[]’ the claimed error in the trial court [citation] . . . .” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161-162, fn. 6 .) In his brief, defendant concedes that he “did not request a hearing on [his] eligibility for mental health diversion, even though [section 1001.36] was effective as of the date of [his] sentencing.” His failure to raise the issue of mental health diversion has forfeited the issue on appeal.

2021(See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [“[A] party may forfeit a right to present a claim of error to the appellate court if he did not do enough to ‘prevent[]’ or ‘correct[]’ the claimed error in the trial court . . . .”], quoting Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353 ; Scott, at p. 353 [“[C]ounsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing.”]; Trujillo, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 856-859.) Accordingly, we conclude that Rhodes’s mental health diversion claim has been forfeited.

2016(See People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617 [―The defendant has the right to present no defense and to take the stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death penalty‖].) In sum, defendant‘s conduct demonstrated he was capable of performing the basic tasks of self-representation.

2002We have previously declined the invitation. "`Notwithstanding the state's significant interest in a reliable penalty determination, a determination best made by a fully informed sentencer, a defendant's fundamental constitutional right to control his defense governs. [Citation.] The defendant has the right to present no defense and to take the stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death penalty. [Citations.] It follows that the state's interest in ensuring a reliable penalty determination may not be urged as a basis for denying a capital defendant his fundamental right to

2016(See, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that restricted cross-examination violated rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense evidence on a subsidiary point is not a deprivation of due process]). 2.

2015Code, § 352.) Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352, and no violation of Rizvi’s constitutional rights (see, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that restricted cross-examination violated rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense

2016(See, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that restricted cross-examination violated rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense evidence on a subsidiary point is not a deprivation of due process]). 2.

2015Code, § 352.) Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352, and no violation of Rizvi’s constitutional rights (see, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that restricted cross-examination violated rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense

2023(In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 472 [a defendant represented by counsel “ ‘surrenders all but a handful of “fundamental” personal rights to counsel’s complete control of defense strategies and tactics’ ”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 96 [“ ‘counsel is “captain of the ship” and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant’ ”].) “ ‘A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.’ ” (Valdez, at p. 95.) Thus, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Honse did not provid

2022(People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 623 ; see Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123 .) “If the court holds an adequate hearing, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 623 .) “ ‘A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.’ ” (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 95 .) The denial of a Marsden motion is therefore “ ‘ “not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would ‘substantially impair’ the defendant’s ri

2021The court’s minutes indicate that counsel “stipulate[d]” to the court’s proposed response. 26 process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317 (Jones), quoting U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) As our Supreme Court explained, this right to defend oneself “has two related components, namely, the right to notice of the charges, and the right to present a defense to those charges.” (Ibid.) In this

2021The court’s minutes indicate that counsel “stipulate[d]” to the court’s proposed response. 26 process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317 (Jones), quoting U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) As our Supreme Court explained, this right to defend oneself “has two related components, namely, the right to notice of the charges, and the right to present a defense to those charges.” (Ibid.) In this

2024(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 ; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [disallowing defense evidence is not also the denial of the right to present a defense].) Thus, the standard under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 , is the appropriate method to analyze any alleged harm from evidentiary error.

2024(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 ; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [disallowing defense evidence is not also the denial of the right to present a defense].) Thus, the standard under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 , is the appropriate method to analyze any alleged harm from evidentiary error.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that restricted cross-examination violated rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense evidence on a subsidiary point is not a deprivation of due process]). 2.

2015Code, § 352.) Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352, and no violation of Rizvi’s constitutional rights (see, e.g., People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 503 [discretionary evidentiary ruling did not violate right to present a defense]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 620 [ordinary rules of evidence generally do not infringe on the right to present a defense; rejecting argument that restricted cross-examination violated rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 999 [exclusion of defense

2020“Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent [herself] upon a timely and unequivocal request. [Citation.] The right to self- representation . . . may be asserted by any defendant competent to stand trial—one’s technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether [she] knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right.” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908 , overruled on another point in 7 People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; see also People v. Poplawski (1994) 25 Cal.App.4t

2013“Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent himself upon a timely and unequivocal request. [Citation.]” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “A defendant seeking self-representation „ “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that „he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‟ ” ‟ [Citation.] As long as the record as a whole shows

2021The court’s minutes indicate that counsel “stipulate[d]” to the court’s proposed response. 26 process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317 (Jones), quoting U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) As our Supreme Court explained, this right to defend oneself “has two related components, namely, the right to notice of the charges, and the right to present a defense to those charges.” (Ibid.) In this

2021The court’s minutes indicate that counsel “stipulate[d]” to the court’s proposed response. 26 process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 317 (Jones), quoting U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) As our Supreme Court explained, this right to defend oneself “has two related components, namely, the right to notice of the charges, and the right to present a defense to those charges.” (Ibid.) In this

2024Defendant argues that the trial court’s exclusion of her statements deprived her of the right to present a defense, relying on Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 (Chambers).

2023Analysis “Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. [Citations.] In the exercise of this right, [however], the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 .) Defendant claims he was denied the right to present a defense because the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance to allow him time to prepare to questi

2024(Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 ; People v. Ahmed (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 .) A defendant is denied the right to present a defense if the trial court excludes evidence that is vital to that defense.

2023“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [citation], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ [Citations.]” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 .) “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it m

2020“Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent [herself] upon a timely and unequivocal request. [Citation.] The right to self- representation . . . may be asserted by any defendant competent to stand trial—one’s technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether [she] knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right.” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908 , overruled on another point in 7 People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 ; see also People v. Poplawski (1994) 25 Cal.App.4t

2013“Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment grants an accused personally the right to present a defense and thus to represent himself upon a timely and unequivocal request. [Citation.]” (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 908 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 .) “A defendant seeking self-representation „ “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self- representation, so that the record will establish that „he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.‟ ” ‟ [Citation.] As long as the record as a whole shows

2024(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 ; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [disallowing defense evidence is not also the denial of the right to present a defense].) Thus, the standard under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 , is the appropriate method to analyze any alleged harm from evidentiary error.

2023(People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611 ; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [disallowing defense evidence is not also the denial of the right to present a defense].) Thus, the standard under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 , is the appropriate method to analyze any alleged harm from evidentiary error.

2015(People v. Marshall [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [1,] 20-21.) The right to self-representation obtains in capital cases as in other criminal cases (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 399 , 789 P.2d 127 ]), and may be asserted 16 by any defendant competent to stand trial—one’s technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether he knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 ]; People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943-944 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 339 , 671 P.2d 843 ]).

2015(People v. Marshall [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [1,] 20-21.) The right to self-representation obtains in capital cases as in other criminal cases (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 399 , 789 P.2d 127 ]), and may be asserted 16 by any defendant competent to stand trial—one’s technical legal knowledge, as such, being irrelevant to the question whether he knowingly and voluntarily exercises the right (Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 321 , 113 S.Ct. 2680 ]; People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943-944 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 339 , 671 P.2d 843 ]).

2019I, § 15.) The federal compulsory process right is "so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," making it applicable to the states. *97 ( Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 , 17-18, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ( Washington ).) Under federal law, a denial of the right to present a defense occurs when the exclusion of the evidence infringes "upon a weighty interest of the accused." ( United States v. Scheffer (1988) 523 U.S. 303 , 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 .) A weighty interest of the defendant is

2019I, § 15.) The federal compulsory process right is "so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that it is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," making it applicable to the states. *97 ( Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 , 17-18, 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ( Washington ).) Under federal law, a denial of the right to present a defense occurs when the exclusion of the evidence infringes "upon a weighty interest of the accused." ( United States v. Scheffer (1988) 523 U.S. 303 , 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 .) A weighty interest of the defendant is

2021(See Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 913 .) Furthermore, except for his distrust of public defenders, defendant’s repeated complaints “were essentially tactical disagreements, which do not by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ [Citation] Indeed, a ‘defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.’” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1192 .) Relying on People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308 , 317- 318, defendant argues that “[t]he court failed in its duty of inquiry”; and citing People v

2015(People v. Bills (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 953, 961 .) “A defendant may not effectively veto an appointment of counsel by claiming a lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, the appointed attorney.” (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606 .) A defendant “may not force the substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 .) “A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his a

2015Defendant contends the proper standard for harmless error is the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , because the error denied him the right to present a defense.

1994First, we reject this latter claim: by sustaining the People's hearsay objections in these instances, the trial court's alleged error, if error, did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to present a defense. (8), (7b) As a general matter, the "[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence ... does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant's right *1103 to present a defense." ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 440; see People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [ 226 Cal. Rptr. 112 , 718 P.2d 99 ].) Although completely excluding evidence of an accused's

2025(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 , 427–428.) A violation of this right by an evidentiary ruling must amount to a complete preclusion of a defense.

2022(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 , 427–428 [the application of the ordinary rules of evidence does not impermissibly infringe on the right to present a defense].) Defendant also argues the court violated her right to a fair trial by prohibiting her from arguing that K.V. had engaged in criminal conduct by falsely imprisoning her.

2023(See People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 .) However, defense counsel explained how his questions regarding Jane Doe 6 were part of his defense strategy. “ ‘A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an “irreconcilable conflict.” ’ ” (People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 688 .) When the court reminded defendant that his tape-recorded confession was coming in and he was going to have to

2015(People v. Bills (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 953, 961 .) “A defendant may not effectively veto an appointment of counsel by claiming a lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, the appointed attorney.” (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 606 .) A defendant “may not force the substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 .) “A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his a

2023We exercise our discretion to reach the issue. “[T]he fact that a party may forfeit a right to present a claim of error to the appellate court if he or she did not raise the issue in the trial court does not mean the appellate court is deprived of authority to reach the 37 merits of the issue.” (People v. Young (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 451, 463 ; see People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [“neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic,” and “[c]ompeting concerns . . . may also cause an appellate court to refrain from applying the forfeiture bar”].) Plaintiffs ar

2023(People v. Young (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 451, 463 [fact that a party may forfeit a right to present a claim does not mean the appellate court is deprived 11. of authority to reach the merits of the issue].) This matter is being remanded back to the lower court for resentencing based upon the unauthorized sentence imposed on count 4.

2022(People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 623 ; see Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123 .) “If the court holds an adequate hearing, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 623 .) “ ‘A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.’ ” (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 95 .) The denial of a Marsden motion is therefore “ ‘ “not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would ‘substantially impair’ the defendant’s ri

2022(People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 623 ; see Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123 .) “If the court holds an adequate hearing, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 623 .) “ ‘A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.’ ” (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 95 .) The denial of a Marsden motion is therefore “ ‘ “not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would ‘substantially impair’ the defendant’s ri