46 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Washington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2025“This right ‘is in plain terms the right to present a defense’ and is ‘a fundamental element of due process of law.’” State v. McIntosh, 2003-Ohio-3824 , ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 2023The right to compulsory process has been described as “the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. * * * This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.E.2d 1090 (1967). | 5 | 21 |
City of Lakewood v. Papadelisgreen2 sentences2025We disagree. {¶ 22} In support of its contention that the trial court’s warning that Phillips was giving up the right to present any defenses informed Phillips that he was giving up the right to compulsory process, the state cites Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1 (1987), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lie 2024Compare Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d at 4 (observing that the effect of the sanction of excluding Papadelis’s defense witnesses was to deny Papadelis the right to present a defense). {¶ 74} Lathan emphasizes that the video would have bolstered his defense because it was independent evidence that he had reason to fear imminent death or serious bodily harm by A.R. | 2 | 7 |
Taylor v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2023Wayne No. 18AP0031, 2019-Ohio-4305, ¶ 18 . {¶24} While a defendant does have a constitutional right to present a defense, he does not have an unfettered right to present evidence that is “incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). “[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. 2020A defendant does not have an “unfettered right” to present evidence that is “incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Swanngreen2 sentences2020See also State v. Swann, 119 Ohio St.3d 552, 555 , 2008-Ohio-4837 , ¶ 13 (noting that the right to present a defense “is not absolute and does not require the admission of all evidence favorable to the defendant.”) (Emphasis in original). “[S]tates have a legitimate interest in ensuring that triers of fact are presented with reliable evidence and have ‘broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials’ to further that goal.” Wesson at ¶ 59 , quoting Scheffer at 308. 2014Washington at 19-21; State v. Swann, 119 Ohio St.3d 552 , 2008-Ohio-4837 , 895 N.E.2d 821, ¶ 13 . | 1 | 3 |
Chambers v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2025As the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, “The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 2025Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Olivergreen2 sentences2013It observed that: “A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court — are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.” 333 U.S. at 273 . (footnote omitted.) The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the pro 2011Discovery in this case, however, was 1 conducted pursuant to the former rule and was completed by July 1, 2010. 12 {¶ 34} “‘A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court — are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.’ 333 U.S. at 273 [ 68 S.Ct. 499 , 92 L.Ed. 682 ], (footnote omitted). {¶ 35} “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attend | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wolfegreen1 sentence2026This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.’” State v. Wolfe, 2025-Ohio-866, ¶ 100 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Santibanez, 2023-Ohio- 3404, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Willie Bell, (Two Cases)green1 sentence2025“Accordingly, ‘governmental impairment of the accused’s ability to call witnesses on his behalf cannot be tolerated.’” Jackson at ¶ 18, quoting United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 222 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rosenberg, Unpublished Decision (1-13-2005)green1 sentence2025For example, it has concluded that a trial court does not sufficiently advise a defendant of the right to compulsory process by advising the defendant that he has “ ‘the right to bring in witnesses to this courtroom to testify for your defense[.]’ ” State v. Senich, 2003-Ohio-5082 , ¶ 33 (8th Dist.); State v. Rosenberg, 2005-Ohio-101, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bodegreen2 sentences2023See State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155 , 2015-Ohio-1519 , 41 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 23-27 . {¶37} Ohio’s constitutional text plainly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to present a defense with counsel. 2023See State v. Bode, 144 Ohio St.3d 155 , 2015-Ohio-1519 , 41 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 23-27 . {¶37} Ohio’s constitutional text plainly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to present a defense with counsel. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Antonio Santiago-Godinezgreen1 sentence2019Entrapment is a defense which is inextricably “intertwined with the issue of intent and is often based on credibility determinations, which are traditionally reserved for jury resolution.” United States v. Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir.1993). {¶ 28} By requiring Graham to respond on the merits to the State’s motion in limine before trial began, the court’s action effectively compromised Graham’s rights to be free from self-incrimination, to remain silent, and to the presumption of innocence. {¶ 29} It is talismanic that both the accused and the prosecution have the right to prese | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Juan Manuel Contento-Pachongreen1 sentence2019The trial court ruled “to limit [any statements regarding entrapment] until such evidence has been provided sufficient to satisfy the requisite burden.” Graham had a right to present the defense for the fact-finder’s determination of whether or not the burden had been met. {¶ 27} Whether a defense is “viable” is a jury question and the trial court “rarely rules on a defense as a matter of law.” United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F. 2d 691, 639 (9th Cir.1984). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bautistagreen2 sentences2008Id. at 1145, 1151 . {¶ 48} The court of appeals affirmed, noting that “the right to present defense witnesses is not absolute. 2008A defendant must abide [by] the rules of evidence and procedure.” Id. at 1151-1152 . | 1 | 1 |
United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Ruben Fuentes-Cariaga,opiniongreen1 sentence2002Accord United States v. Fuentes-Cariaga (C.A.9, 2000), 209 F.3d 1140 , 1143 (the right to present a defense is fundamental, but exclusion of evidence only reaches constitutional proportions if it significantly undermines the fundamental elements of the accused's defense); United States v. Begay (10th Cir. 1991), 937 F.2d 515 , 523 (the Constitution only requires that a criminal defendant be given the opportunity to present evidence that is relevant, material and favorable to his defense). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2019Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); State v. Brown, 64 Ohio St.3d 649 , 597 N.E.2d 510 (1992). {¶ 57} In the instant case, the State was not required to call the store clerk to testify at trial. 2019Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); State v. Brown, 64 Ohio St.3d 649 , 597 N.E.2d 510 (1992). {¶ 57} In the instant case, the State was not required to call the store clerk to testify at trial. | 3 | 2002–2019 |
State v. Brown
neutral
2 sentences2007Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14 , 87 S.Ct. 1920 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 ; State v. Brown , 64 Ohio St.3d 649 , 597 N.E.2d 510 , 1992-Ohio-19 ." State v. Brock , Montgomery App. No. 19291, 2002-Ohio-7292 , at ¶ 11. {¶ 28} Beginning with D.H.'s siblings, Mullins' counsel informed the court at the conclusion of the state's case that the children were served through their mother, Larissa Waggoner, who had appeared that day to testify for the state. 2002Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14 ; State v. Brown, 64 Ohio St.3d 649 , 1992-Ohio-19 . {¶ 12} When a subpoena is left at a witness' usual place of residence, or business location, or place of employment, and the witness has actual knowledge of the subpoena, service of summons has been completed. | 2 | 2002–2007 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2025Justice responded: I understand that under Faretta [v.] California, 422 U.S. 806 , that I have a right to present a defense. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Buell
green
2 sentences2024Appellant explains that many cases involve only eyewitness identification testimony, jurors tend to believe such testimony, and jurors are generally unaware that such identification has weaknesses. {¶113} Appellant notes that the court followed State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124 , 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986), but that case was decided before the 1994 amendment to Ohio Evidence Rule 702 which requires expert testimony to be reliable before it can be rendered admissible. 2024Appellant explains that many cases involve only eyewitness identification testimony, jurors tend to believe such testimony, and jurors are generally unaware that such identification has weaknesses. {¶113} Appellant notes that the court followed State v. Buell, 22 Ohio St.3d 124 , 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986), but that case was decided before the 1994 amendment to Ohio Evidence Rule 702 which requires expert testimony to be reliable before it can be rendered admissible. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ferensic v. Birkett
green
1 sentence2024Please refer to case law Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469 (6th Cir.2007). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Pieronek
green
1 sentence2023Wayne No. 18AP0031, 2019-Ohio-4305, ¶ 18 . {¶24} While a defendant does have a constitutional right to present a defense, he does not have an unfettered right to present evidence that is “incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988). “[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Gardner
green
2 sentences2021ABOUT WHETHER SHE PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN A PROSTITUTE. -17- {¶ 26} Quoting Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14 , 391 N.E.2d 337 , the State asserts that the “objective of the rape-shield law is to discourage the tendency in rape cases to ‘try the victim rather than the defendant’ by ‘guarding the complainant’s sexual privacy and protecting her from undue harassment’ and ‘encourag[ing] the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime prevention.’ ” The State acknowledges that application of the rape-shield statute, R.C. 2907.02(D), may not unduly infringe upon a defendant’s constitutional rights, such as the right 2021ABOUT WHETHER SHE PREVIOUSLY HAD BEEN A PROSTITUTE. -17- {¶ 26} Quoting Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14 , 391 N.E.2d 337 , the State asserts that the “objective of the rape-shield law is to discourage the tendency in rape cases to ‘try the victim rather than the defendant’ by ‘guarding the complainant’s sexual privacy and protecting her from undue harassment’ and ‘encourag[ing] the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime prevention.’ ” The State acknowledges that application of the rape-shield statute, R.C. 2907.02(D), may not unduly infringe upon a defendant’s constitutional rights, such as the right | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Harcourt
green
1 sentence2007Accordingly, Barrios'"constitutional rights were not infringed by the trial court's refusal to accept the surprise witnesses]." Id., citing State v. Harcourt (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 52 , 54-55 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Moon
green
1 sentence2007Accordingly, Barrios'"constitutional rights were not infringed by the trial court's refusal to accept the surprise witnesses]." Id., citing State v. Harcourt (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 52 , 54-55 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Fitzpatrick
green
1 sentence2005The judge explained that there was no discretion in the sentence in this case. (5/4/2000 Tr., pp. 3, 12.) The judge explained how a jury trial works, and that Appellant was giving up his right to a jury trial. (5/4/2000 Tr., pp. 6-7.) The judge reviewed the right not to incriminate oneself, the right to present a defense, the right to use subpoenas to compel witnesses in his defense, and the right of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (5/4/2000 Tr., pp. 6-8.) {¶ 39} Furthermore, the trial judge confirmed with Appellant that he reviewed the written guilty plea form with his attorney, that it was | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.
green
1 sentence2004Civ.R. 56(C); Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Carl S. Begay
green
1 sentence2002Accord United States v. Fuentes-Cariaga (C.A.9, 2000), 209 F.3d 1140 , 1143 (the right to present a defense is fundamental, but exclusion of evidence only reaches constitutional proportions if it significantly undermines the fundamental elements of the accused's defense); United States v. Begay (10th Cir. 1991), 937 F.2d 515 , 523 (the Constitution only requires that a criminal defendant be given the opportunity to present evidence that is relevant, material and favorable to his defense). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
David Arthur Buie v. James E. Sullivan, Superintendent of Ossining Correctional Facility
green
1 sentence1999Id. at 11-12 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
2 sentences1979The United States Supreme Court, in Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14 , stated, at page 19, that: “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. ***This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.” (Emphasis added.) The United States Supreme Court, in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra ( 418 U.S. 539 ), at page 568, also noted the “high risk of reprisal wi 1979The United States Supreme Court, in Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14 , stated, at page 19, that: “The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. ***This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.” (Emphasis added.) The United States Supreme Court, in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra ( 418 U.S. 539 ), at page 568, also noted the “high risk of reprisal wi | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.