practical requirement in Michigan

2016Instead, it is a practical requirement that gives effect to a defendant’s right to know and respond to the charges against him.” Darden, 230 Mich App at 601 .

2015Instead, it is a practical requirement that gives effect to a defendant's right to know and respond to the charges against him.” Id. at 601 .

2017The right to notice “is a practical requirement that gives effect to a defendant’s right to know and respond to the charges against him” and to prepare a defense, People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 364 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

2017The right to notice “is a practical requirement that gives effect to a defendant’s right to know and respond to the charges against him” and to prepare a defense, People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 364 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

2017See, e.g., Fox v. Martin , 287 Mich. 147 , 151, 283 N.W. 9 (1938) ("Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but upon the allegations."); Zimmerman v. Miller , 206 Mich. 599 , 604-605, 173 N.W. 364 (1919) (stating that the "jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount demanded in the plaintiff's pleadings, not by the sum actually recoverable or that found by the judge or jury on the trial."); Inkster v. Carver , 16 Mich. 484 , 487 (1868) (stating that the only practical rule is "that the damages claimed in the declaration or process, and not the amount *898 found by the court or j

2014So, according to these early cases, determining a court’s jurisdiction at the outset on the basis of what the plaintiff believed he or she could prove was “the only practical rule . ...” Id. at 488 .

2017See, e.g., Fox v. Martin , 287 Mich. 147 , 151, 283 N.W. 9 (1938) ("Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but upon the allegations."); Zimmerman v. Miller , 206 Mich. 599 , 604-605, 173 N.W. 364 (1919) (stating that the "jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount demanded in the plaintiff's pleadings, not by the sum actually recoverable or that found by the judge or jury on the trial."); Inkster v. Carver , 16 Mich. 484 , 487 (1868) (stating that the only practical rule is "that the damages claimed in the declaration or process, and not the amount *898 found by the court or j

2017See, e.g., Fox v. Martin , 287 Mich. 147 , 151, 283 N.W. 9 (1938) ("Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but upon the allegations."); Zimmerman v. Miller , 206 Mich. 599 , 604-605, 173 N.W. 364 (1919) (stating that the "jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount demanded in the plaintiff's pleadings, not by the sum actually recoverable or that found by the judge or jury on the trial."); Inkster v. Carver , 16 Mich. 484 , 487 (1868) (stating that the only practical rule is "that the damages claimed in the declaration or process, and not the amount *898 found by the court or j

2017See, e.g., Fox v. Martin , 287 Mich. 147 , 151, 283 N.W. 9 (1938) ("Jurisdiction does not depend upon the facts, but upon the allegations."); Zimmerman v. Miller , 206 Mich. 599 , 604-605, 173 N.W. 364 (1919) (stating that the "jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount demanded in the plaintiff's pleadings, not by the sum actually recoverable or that found by the judge or jury on the trial."); Inkster v. Carver , 16 Mich. 484 , 487 (1868) (stating that the only practical rule is "that the damages claimed in the declaration or process, and not the amount *898 found by the court or j

2016It has been said that “[i]n prohibiting age discrimination, the act contemplates only that ‘similarly -4- situated people’ be treated equally,” Cheeseman v American Multi-Cinema Inc, 108 Mich App 428, 440 ; 310 NW2d 408 (1981), lv den 413 Mich 890 (1982).

2016It has been said that “[i]n prohibiting age discrimination, the act contemplates only that ‘similarly -4- situated people’ be treated equally,” Cheeseman v American Multi-Cinema Inc, 108 Mich App 428, 440 ; 310 NW2d 408 (1981), lv den 413 Mich 890 (1982).

2006Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492, 496 , 275 P.2d 899 ([1954])).] See also, Cal. Gov't Code § 66498.1 (b) (2006); Tex. Local Gov't Code § 245.002 (2006).

2006Ogden v. City of Bellevue, 45 Wash.2d 492, 496 , 275 P.2d 899 ([1954])).] See also, Cal. Gov't Code § 66498.1 (b) (2006); Tex. Local Gov't Code § 245.002 (2006).

2006The more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that the right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies for his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued. [ Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash.2d 125, 130 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958) (quoting State ex rel.

2006The more practical rule to administer, we feel, is that the right vests when the party, property owner or not, applies for his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued. [ Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash.2d 125, 130 , 331 P.2d 856 (1958) (quoting State ex rel.

2005See, e.g., State v Korrer, 127 Minn 60, 76; 148 NW 617 (1914) (Even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low water mark, his title is absolute only to the ordinary high water mark and the intervening shore space between high and low water mark remains subject to the rights of the public.); see also North Shore, Inc v Wakefield, 530 NW2d 297, 301 (ND, 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute interests between high and low water mark); Shaffer v Baylor’s Lake Ass’n, Inc, 392 Pa 493, 496; 141 A2d 583 (1958) (subjecting private title held to low water m

2005See, e.g., State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 76 , 148 N.W. 617 (1914) (Even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low water mark, his title is absolute only to the ordinary high water mark and the intervening shore space between high and low water mark remains subject to the rights of the public.); see also North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 301 (N.D., 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute interests between high and low water mark); Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, Inc., 392 Pa. 493, 496 , 141 A.2d 583 (1958) (subjecting private title hel

2005See, e.g., State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 76 , 148 N.W. 617 (1914) (Even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low water mark, his title is absolute only to the ordinary high water mark and the intervening shore space between high and low water mark remains subject to the rights of the public.); see also North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 301 (N.D., 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute interests between high and low water mark); Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, Inc., 392 Pa. 493, 496 , 141 A.2d 583 (1958) (subjecting private title hel

2005See, e.g., State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 76 , 148 N.W. 617 (1914) (Even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low water mark, his title is absolute only to the ordinary high water mark and the intervening shore space between high and low water mark remains subject to the rights of the public.); see also North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 301 (N.D., 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute interests between high and low water mark); Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, Inc., 392 Pa. 493, 496 , 141 A.2d 583 (1958) (subjecting private title hel

2005See, e.g., State v Korrer, 127 Minn 60, 76; 148 NW 617 (1914) (Even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low water mark, his title is absolute only to the ordinary high water mark and the intervening shore space between high and low water mark remains subject to the rights of the public.); see also North Shore, Inc v Wakefield, 530 NW2d 297, 301 (ND, 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute interests between high and low water mark); Shaffer v Baylor’s Lake Ass’n, Inc, 392 Pa 493, 496; 141 A2d 583 (1958) (subjecting private title held to low water m

2005See, e.g., State v. Korrer, 127 Minn. 60, 76 , 148 N.W. 617 (1914) (Even if a riparian owner holds title to the ordinary low water mark, his title is absolute only to the ordinary high water mark and the intervening shore space between high and low water mark remains subject to the rights of the public.); see also North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 301 (N.D., 1995) (stating that neither the state nor the riparian owner held absolute interests between high and low water mark); Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, Inc., 392 Pa. 493, 496 , 141 A.2d 583 (1958) (subjecting private title hel

1913In Smedley v. Soule, 125 Mich. 192 ( 84 N. W. 63 ), a case in which plaintiff was an attorney at law and in which the trial court instructed the jury that: “The declaration avers an injury to plaintiff’s fame and character as an attorney. * * * The publication complained of tends, upon the face of it, to the injury of plaintiff in respect to his profession and business”— It was said by this court that: “All charges of disreputable or criminal conduct tend to injure every man in his profession, trade, or occupation; but the law does not permit recovery therefor unless the words be spoken of him

1913In Smedley v. Soule, 125 Mich. 192 ( 84 N. W. 63 ), a case in which plaintiff was an attorney at law and in which the trial court instructed the jury that: “The declaration avers an injury to plaintiff’s fame and character as an attorney. * * * The publication complained of tends, upon the face of it, to the injury of plaintiff in respect to his profession and business”— It was said by this court that: “All charges of disreputable or criminal conduct tend to injure every man in his profession, trade, or occupation; but the law does not permit recovery therefor unless the words be spoken of him

1905It was said by Justice Campbell, in Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27 , 35: “ Experience has shown that many cases exist in which it is impossible, by any description, however graphic, to explain things so as to enable any one but the witness himself to see or comprehend them as they would have been seen or comprehended, could the jury have occupied his position of observation.