practical rule (Washington) · Go Syfert
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practical rule in Washington

9 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

CaseFollowedCited
Charles Kreck v. James Spaldinggreen
ca9 · 1983 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012Kreck v. Spalding, 721 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th.

2012Kreck v. Spalding, 721 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir.1983) (citation omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

2024The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 9 58230-9-II State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 208 , 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2024The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 9 58230-9-II State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 208 , 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

12024–2024
State v. Templeton green
wash · 2002
1 sentence

2024The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 9 58230-9-II State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 208 , 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

12024–2024
State v. Templeton green
wash · 2002
1 sentence

2024The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 9 58230-9-II State v. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 208 , 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

12024–2024
Worthington v. WestNET green
wash · 2015
2 sentences

2016“In determining whether a particular entity is subject to the PRA, courts engage in a practical analysis.” Worthington v. WestNET, 182 Wn.2d 500, 508 , 341 P.3d 995 (2015). ¶14 Thus, our analysis under Telford must be grounded in the unique factual circumstances present in each case.

2016“In determining whether a particular entity is subject to the PRA, courts engage in a practical analysis.” Worthington v. WestNET, 182 Wn.2d 500, 508 , 341 P.3d 995 (2015). ¶14 Thus, our analysis under Telford must be grounded in the unique factual circumstances present in each case.

12016–2016
Bressi v. Ford green
ca9 · 2009
1 sentence

2011Bressi, 575 F.3d at 897 .

12011–2011
Fay v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. green
wash · 1990
1 sentence

1992Fay, 115 Wn.2d at 198 .

11992–1992
Perreault v. Circle Club, Inc. neutral
mass · 1950
2 sentences

1955While, as conceded in that opinion, there is a division of authority on the question, I think that this court in the present case should take advantage of the opportunity now afforded to overrule the Metropolitan Park case and to adopt what appears to me to be the majority and the more practical rule as shown by the following recent decisions: Perreault v. Circle Club (1950), 326 Mass. 458 , 95 N. E. (2d) 204, where the court, although following the minority rule, said: “In the absence of contract increasing the liability of a bailee, he is not liable for loss or damage occurring without his f

1955While, as conceded in that opinion, there is a division of authority on the question, I think that this court in the present case should take advantage of the opportunity now afforded to overrule the Metropolitan Park case and to adopt what appears to me to be the majority and the more practical rule as shown by the following recent decisions: Perreault v. Circle Club (1950), 326 Mass. 458 , 95 N.E. *847 (2d) 204, where the court, although following the minority rule, said: "In the absence of contract increasing the liability of a bailee, he is not liable for loss or damage occurring without h

11955–1955
State ex rel. Chamberlin v. Daniel green
wash · 1897
2 sentences

1955Chamberlin v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 115 , 49 Pac. 243 , the court quoted with approval from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 239, as follows: “ ‘The practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause or word means.

1955Chamberlin v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 115 , 49 Pac. 243 , the court quoted with approval from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 239, as follows: “ ‘The practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause or word means.

11955–1955
Perlberg v. Smith neutral
· 1905
1 sentence

1915As said in Perlberg v. Smith, supra: “Care must be taken' in these cases not to extend the meaning of the word ‘unfair’ to cover that which may be unethical but is not illegal.

11915–1915
Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Co. green
minn · 1886
2 sentences

1915When language is used concerning a person or his affairs which, from its nature, necessarily must, or presumably will, as its natural and proximate consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss, its publication prima facie constitutes a cause of action, and prima facie constitutes a wrong, without any allegation or evidence of damage other than that which is implied or presumed from the fact of publication; that this is all that is meant by the term ‘actionable per se.’ Therefore the real practical test, by which to determine whether special damage must be alleged and proved in order to make out a

1915When language is used concerning a person or his affairs which, from its nature, necessarily must, or presumably will, as its natural and proximate consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss, its publication prima facie constitutes a cause of action, and prima facie constitutes a wrong, without any allegation or evidence of damage other than that which is implied or presumed from the fact of publication; that this is all that is meant by the term ‘actionable per se.’ Therefore the real practical test, by which to determine whether special damage must be alleged and proved in order to make out a

11915–1915

Where else courts name it

TX 82 (1853–2025) CT 79 (1914–2023) NY 67 (1861–2026) PA 40 (1922–2022) CA 28 (1939–2026) MO 27 (1958–2023) MI 20 (1905–2025) IL 14 (1907–2014) NJ 14 (1927–2015) AZ 14 (1970–2017) IN 10 (1909–2003) WA 9 (1915–2024) MN 9 (1887–2008) NM 9 (1943–2026) VA 8 (1998–2026) MA 8 (1903–2012) MD 8 (1913–2018) OR 7 (1885–2020) AL 6 (1907–2007) MS 6 (1977–2001) IA 6 (1912–2004) UT 6 (1943–2018) NC 5 (1905–2006) AR 5 (1892–1993) GA 5 (1934–2016) OK 5 (1919–1984) FL 5 (1957–1992) KS 4 (1915–1979) ME 4 (1965–2022) LA 4 (1950–2025) SC 4 (1921–2021) WI 3 (1976–2018) VT 3 (1930–2002) KY 3 (1962–2005) CO 3 (1871–1996) WV 3 (1888–1990) MT 3 (1985–1994) OH 3 (1946–2013) ID 2 (1934–1974) NE 2 (2019–2019) DE 2 (2019–2023) ND 2 (1939–1990) WY 2 (1900–1987) DC 2 (2017–2017) RI 2 (1981–2006) AK 2 (1978–1990)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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