practical rule in New Jersey

2015Id. at 543 .

2014At the risk of complicating what a principled application of Cofield compels, we believe the same result is warranted by a practical analysis of the problem when played out further in the (continued) (N.C. 1966); Smith, supra, 532 P.2d at 11-12 ; Bernier, supra, 491 A.2d at 1005-06 ; State v. Kassahun, 900 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

2014At the risk of complicating what a principled application of Cofield compels, we believe the same result is warranted by a practical analysis of the problem when played out further in the (continued) (N.C. 1966); Smith, supra, 532 P.2d at 11-12 ; Bernier, supra, 491 A.2d at 1005-06 ; State v. Kassahun, 900 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

2014At the risk of complicating what a principled application of Cofield compels, we believe the same result is warranted by a practical analysis of the problem when played out further in the (continued) (N.C. 1966); Smith, supra, 532 P.2d at 11-12 ; Bernier, supra, 491 A.2d at 1005-06 ; State v. Kassahun, 900 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

2014At the risk of complicating what a principled application of Cofield compels, we believe the same result is warranted by a practical analysis of the problem when played out further in the (continued) (N.C. 1966); Smith, supra, 532 P.2d at 11-12 ; Bernier, supra, 491 A.2d at 1005-06 ; State v. Kassahun, 900 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).

2007Generally, property qualifies for equitable distribution "when it is `attributable to the expenditure of effort by either spouse' during marriage," Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 609 , 660 A. 2d 485 (1995)(quoting Painter, supra, 65 N.J. at 214 , 320 A. 2d 484 ), and "for purposes of the equitable distribution of marital assets, a marriage is deemed to end on the day a valid complaint for divorce is filed that commences a proceeding culminating in a final judgment of divorce." Portner, supra, 93 N.J. at 225 , 460 A. 2d 115 ; see also Heller-Loren v. Apuzzio, 371 N.J.Super. 518, 530 , 853 A.

2007Generally, property qualifies for equitable distribution "when it is `attributable to the expenditure of effort by either spouse' during marriage," Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 609 , 660 A. 2d 485 (1995)(quoting Painter, supra, 65 N.J. at 214 , 320 A. 2d 484 ), and "for purposes of the equitable distribution of marital assets, a marriage is deemed to end on the day a valid complaint for divorce is filed that commences a proceeding culminating in a final judgment of divorce." Portner, supra, 93 N.J. at 225 , 460 A. 2d 115 ; see also Heller-Loren v. Apuzzio, 371 N.J.Super. 518, 530 , 853 A.

2007We adopted the Painter rule to avoid the necessity of the court and the parties spending inordinate amounts of time and money in seeking the ever-elusive date when their marriage truly ended. [ Portner, supra, 93 N.J. at 220-23 , 460 A. 2d 115 .] These cases persuade us that the Painter rule remains the most practical rule to ascertain when a marriage has ended for the purposes of determining those assets acquired during the marriage and therefore, subject to equitable distribution.

2007We adopted the Painter rule to avoid the necessity of the court and the parties spending inordinate amounts of time and money in seeking the ever-elusive date when their marriage truly ended. [ Portner, supra, 93 N.J. at 220-23 , 460 A. 2d 115 .] These cases persuade us that the Painter rule remains the most practical rule to ascertain when a marriage has ended for the purposes of determining those assets acquired during the marriage and therefore, subject to equitable distribution.

2005Assessing the reasonableness of a sentence was “a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts.” Id. at -, 125 S.Ct. at 765 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 .

2005Assessing the reasonableness of a sentence was “a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts.” Id. at -, 125 S.Ct. at 765 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 .

2002Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the court's analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance. *1012 [ Id. at 227-28, 108 S.Ct. at 544 , 98 L.Ed. 2d at 555-56 .] Under this practical test, "Mere as in other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the function it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." Id. at 227 , 108 S.Ct. at 544 , 98 L.Ed. 2d at 565 .

2002Although this case involved a criminal charge against a judge, the reach of the court's analysis was not in any obvious way confined by that circumstance. *1012 [ Id. at 227-28, 108 S.Ct. at 544 , 98 L.Ed. 2d at 555-56 .] Under this practical test, "Mere as in other contexts, immunity is justified and defined by the function it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." Id. at 227 , 108 S.Ct. at 544 , 98 L.Ed. 2d at 565 .

1995Market value is taken as the criterion of compensation, based on the proposition that it is the true measure of actual value — the only practical test. (emphasis added) [ Id. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-61 , quoting, 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d Ed.Rev. 1989) § 12A.07[1].] We are convinced that in New Jersey "actual value" in the sense of true value is the object sought irrespective of whether a willing buyer and seller acting without compulsion would have had knowledge of the condition on the date of valuation.

1995Market value is taken as the criterion of compensation, based on the proposition that it is the true measure of actual value — the only practical test. (emphasis added) [ Id. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-61 , quoting, 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d Ed.Rev. 1989) § 12A.07[1].] We are convinced that in New Jersey "actual value" in the sense of true value is the object sought irrespective of whether a willing buyer and seller acting without compulsion would have had knowledge of the condition on the date of valuation.

1987As Justice Jacobs observed in State v. Macri, supra, “Before the judge is in a position to make his determination for issuance, he must properly be made aware of the underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the law was being violated.” 39 N.J. at 257.

1987As Justice Jacobs observed in State v. Macri, supra , "Before the judge is in a position to make his determination for issuance, he must properly be made aware of the underlying facts or circumstances which would warrant a prudent man in believing that the law was being violated." 39 N.J. at 257.

1927Eq. 51 , Vice-Chancellor Stevens said (at p. 55 ): "I think the practical rule to be deduced from these cases is that a donor having barely sufficient property to sustain himself for the rest of his life shall not irrevocably and without advice give away so much of it as to leave himself an object of charity." In the case of Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J.