practical rule in Minnesota

2008Id.

1949Gillett v. Florida Univ. of Dermatology, Inc. 144 Fla. 236 , 197 So. 852 .

1949Gillett v. Florida Univ. of Dermatology, Inc. 144 Fla. 236 , 197 So. 852 .

1939Co. 128 Minn. 35á, 359, 151 N. W. 128, 130 , said: “We sustain the contention of defendant that the amount of the settlement must be taken as a basis from which to compute the attorneys’ fees.” And this seems to be the only practical rule to apply if we are to-hold, as has been heretofore held, that the client’s right to settle his *506 cause upon such terms as to him seems best is absolute.

1939Southworth v. Rosendahl, 133 Minn. 447 , 158 N. W. 717 , 3 A. L.

1939Southworth v. Rosendahl, 133 Minn. 447 , 158 N. W. 717 , 3 A. L.

1936The rule to which we adhere is best stated by quoting from Justice Mitchell in State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 255 , 45 N. W. 447 , 448: “After consideration of the question, and an examination of the authorities, our conclusion is that the best practical rule is that laid down in some of the English cases, and adopted and followed by Chief Justice Cockburn, in Reg. v. Boyes, * * * ‘that to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reaso

1936The rule to which we adhere is best stated by quoting from Justice Mitchell in State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 255 , 45 N. W. 447 , 448: “After consideration of the question, and an examination of the authorities, our conclusion is that the best practical rule is that laid down in some of the English cases, and adopted and followed by Chief Justice Cockburn, in Reg. v. Boyes, * * * ‘that to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reaso

1920If the wife and mother owns the property, we are of the opinion, notwithstanding a remark made arguendo in Friburk v. Standard Oil Co. 66 Minn. 277 , 68 N. W. 1090 , that she should be allowed the same right of recovery as the husband would have had had he been the owner.

1920If the wife and mother owns the property, we are of the opinion, notwithstanding a remark made arguendo in Friburk v. Standard Oil Co. 66 Minn. 277 , 68 N. W. 1090 , that she should be allowed the same right of recovery as the husband would have had had he been the owner.

1905West v. Hennessey, 58 Minn. 133 , 59 N. W. 984 ; Village of Wayzata v. Great Northern Ry.

1905West v. Hennessey, 58 Minn. 133 , 59 N. W. 984 ; Village of Wayzata v. Great Northern Ry.

1902Hopkins v. City of Duluth, 81 Minn. 189 , 83 N. W. 536 .

1902Hopkins v. City of Duluth, 81 Minn. 189 , 83 N. W. 536 .

1889In Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. 307, 315 , the judge delivering the opinion says: “Old debts she [the original corporation] must pay without any claim for contribution, and the new subdivision has no claim to any portion of the public property, except what falls within her boundaries, and to all that the old corporation has no claim.” The same limitation is repeated in Mt.

1889Thus in Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford, 16 Conn. 149, 171 , after stating the rule as above, the court adds: “At least as it regards property which has no fixed location in the new town, as lands, buildings, etc.” And in School-Dist. v. Tapley, 1 Allen, 49 , the court, referring to the dictum in School-Dist. v. Richardson, supra, remarks: “It is at least questionable whether the better practical rule in all cases would not be to regard this species of property [school-houses] in towns as strictly local in its character and uses, and as vesting in the district in which, upon any new divis

1887Phelps v. City of Mankato, 23 Minn. 276 ; Kelly v. Southern Minn. Ry.