practical standard in Illinois

2014Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1055-56 . 7 ¶ 27 With this as a backdrop, the Harris Court scolded the Florida Supreme Court for creating a "strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick off." Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 . ¶ 28 The Harris Court also discussed the problems inherent in relying on a dog’s field performance to determine the dog’s accuracy.

2014Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1055-56 . 7 ¶ 26 With this as a backdrop, the Harris Court scolded the Florida Supreme Court for creating a "strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick off." Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 . ¶ 27 The Harris Court also discussed the problems inherent in relying on a dog’s field performance to determine the dog’s accuracy.

2014Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1055-56 . 7 ¶ 26 With this as a backdrop, the Harris Court scolded the Florida Supreme Court for creating a "strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick off." Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 . ¶ 27 The Harris Court also discussed the problems inherent in relying on a dog’s field performance to determine the dog’s accuracy.

2014Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1055-56 . 7 ¶ 26 With this as a backdrop, the Harris Court scolded the Florida Supreme Court for creating a "strict evidentiary checklist, whose every item the State must tick off." Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 . ¶ 27 The Harris Court also discussed the problems inherent in relying on a dog’s field performance to determine the dog’s accuracy.

1960Because it turns what is supposedly a practical test, "one designed to assist the court in determining whether or not the confession was voluntary," ( People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610 ), into an inflexible rule, and because it virtually nullifies the exception which excuses the presence of witnesses when *535 it is not possible or feasible for them to testify, I cannot join that opinion.

1960Because it turns what is supposedly a practical test, “one designed to assist the court in determining whether or not the confession was voluntary,” (People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610 ), into an inflexible rule, and because it virtually nullifies the exception which excuses the presence of witnesses when it is not possible or feasible for them to testify, I cannot join that opinion.

1981(People v. Ward (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 379, 384 , 381 N.E.2d 256 .) The inquiry must be set in a practical framework and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings. ( 72 Ill. 2d 379, 384 .) It is clear from the jury’s verdict that it was unable to make an affirmative finding either way on the factual question of the defendant’s knowledge.

1981(People v. Ward (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 379, 384 , 381 N.E.2d 256 .) The inquiry must be set in a practical framework and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings. ( 72 Ill. 2d 379, 384 .) It is clear from the jury’s verdict that it was unable to make an affirmative finding either way on the factual question of the defendant’s knowledge.

1995Co. (4th Cir. 1994), 13 F.3d 807 , 812.) The seventh circuit in turn agreed with Reed and Goedel, declaring because it is normal for nondefective automatic couplers to become misaligned as part of ordinary railroad operations, and because no automatic means of aligning drawbars exists, it is not reasonable to hold such misalignment amounts to a violation of the Act. ''[T]he Congress of 1893 certainly could not have meant to require equipment that is still unavailable 100 years later.” (Lisek, 30 F.3d at 831 .) Most recently, the sixth circuit agreed, its analysis may be viewed as reversing its

1995Co. (4th Cir. 1994), 13 F.3d 807 , 812.) The seventh circuit in turn agreed with Reed and Goedel, declaring because it is normal for nondefective automatic couplers to become misaligned as part of ordinary railroad operations, and because no automatic means of aligning drawbars exists, it is not reasonable to hold such misalignment amounts to a violation of the Act. ''[T]he Congress of 1893 certainly could not have meant to require equipment that is still unavailable 100 years later.” (Lisek, 30 F.3d at 831 .) Most recently, the sixth circuit agreed, its analysis may be viewed as reversing its

1990App. 3d at 882 , 531 N.E.2d at 958 .) In determining whether the issues in the prior and subsequent cases are the same, a court should realistically and rationally consider the record “within a practical framework and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill.

1990App. 3d at 882 , 531 N.E.2d at 958 .) In determining whether the issues in the prior and subsequent cases are the same, a court should realistically and rationally consider the record “within a practical framework and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” People v. Shlensky (1983), 118 Ill.

1975As was said in Bruske v. Arnold, 44 Ill.2d 132, 139 (quoting Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 118 ): “‘[T]he ultimate question on review is not whether a trial was scrupulously free from error, but whether there was error which operated to the prejudice of the appealing party or unduly affected the outcome below.’ ” This is the practical test we are inclined to apply here.

1922Co., 241 U. S. 229 .) So that even if it were the duty of appellant, under the law of the State or because of a practical rule of the company, to ring, a bell when the engine was coming out through the tunnel, and even if the appellant failed to give such warning, there can be no recovery • in this case, because an ordinarily careful person, under the circumstances, would have observed and appreciated the danger.

1907We are in full accord with the practical test as to the soundness of instructions announced in Funk v. Babbitt, 156 Ill., 408 , where the court say: “The test, then, is not what the ingenuity of counsel can, at leisure, work out the instructions to mean, but how and in what sense, under the evidence before them, and the circumstances of the trial, would ordinary men and jurors understand the instructions.” Measured by this test the instructions given, fulfilled every legal requirement.