practical inquiry in New York

2025"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior [*2]determination" ( id. ; see Cullen v Moschetta , 207 AD3d 699, 700 ). "[T]he question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination, involves a practical inquiry into the realities of litigation" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lennon v 56th & Park[NY] Own

2025"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior [*2]determination" ( id. ; see Cullen v Moschetta , 207 AD3d 699, 700). "[T]he question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination, involves a practical inquiry into the realities of litigation" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lennon v 56th & Park[NY] Owne

2025In this context, the movants' reference to the Trustee's alleged malfeasance and imprudent investments was generalized and tangential to its constructive fraud argument and therefore the prudence of the bond investments was not fully and 12 [* 12] actually litigated by movants (see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003] ["whether to apply collateral estoppel depends upon general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of litigation"]).

2025In this context, the movants' reference to the Trustee's alleged malfeasance and imprudent investments was generalized and tangential to its constructive fraud argument and therefore the prudence of the bond investments was not fully and 12 [* 12] actually litigated by movants (see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003] ["whether to apply collateral estoppel depends upon general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of litigation"]).

2016Co., 76 NY2d 659, 664 [1990]). “[W]hether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends upon ‘general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation’ ” (Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003], quoting Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261, 268-269 [1988]).

2014School Dist. [appeal No. 2], 90 AD3d 1686 , 1689 [2011]; Matter of Russo v Irwin, 49 AD3d 1039, 1041 [2008]), and the decision whether it is proper to do so “depends upon ‘general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation’ ” (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 41 , quoting Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261, 268 [1988]).

2024By contrast, CPLR 3211(g) provides for no evidentiary hearing. [FN6] In applying the "substantial basis" standard, it may be helpful to use the practical test that we applied in Castle Village : "whether the allegations and evidence presented would require submission to a jury as a question of fact" ( Castle Village, 58 AD3d at 183 , citing 300 Gramatan Ave. , 45 NY2d at 181 ).

2024By contrast, CPLR 3211(g) provides for no evidentiary hearing. [FN6] In applying the "substantial basis" standard, it may be helpful to use the practical test that we applied in Castle Village : "whether the allegations and evidence presented would require submission to a jury as a question of fact" ( Castle Village, 58 AD3d at 183 , citing 300 Gramatan Ave. , 45 NY2d at 181 ).

2014School Dist. [appeal No. 2], 90 AD3d 1686 , 1689 [2011]; Matter of Russo v Irwin, 49 AD3d 1039, 1041 [2008]), and the decision whether it is proper to do so “depends upon ‘general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation’ ” (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 41 , quoting Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261, 268 [1988]).

2014School Dist. [appeal No. 2], 90 AD3d 1686 , 1689 [2011]; Matter of Russo v Irwin, 49 AD3d 1039, 1041 [2008]), and the decision whether it is proper to do so “depends upon ‘general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation’ ” (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 41 , quoting Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261, 268 [1988]).

2024Procedurally, the "substantial evidence" standard has been equated with the ordinary summary judgment standard, in that each seeks to determine whether there are triable issues of material fact ( compare Brill v City of New York , 2 NY3d 648, 651 [2004] [summary judgment standard] with 300 Gramatan , 45 NY2d at 181 [substantial evidence]; see e.g.

2024Procedurally, the "substantial evidence" standard has been equated with the ordinary summary judgment standard, in that each seeks to determine whether there are triable issues of material fact ( compare Brill v City of New York , 2 NY3d 648, 651 [2004] [summary judgment standard] with 300 Gramatan , 45 NY2d at 181 [substantial evidence]; see e.g.

1994Thus, the Court of Appeals has stated that "the question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination, involves a practical inquiry into 'the realities of litigation’ ” (supra, at 292, quoting Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 72 ).

1992There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling” (Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 71 ; see, Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291 ). "[CJollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine that can never be rigidly or mechanically applied * * * The question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to contest a prior determination * * * involves a practical inquiry into 'the rea

2006This Court, in circumstances analogous to those at bar, held that “[w]here there are adverse claims to the status of tenant in occupancy, resolution of the issue should turn on a practical analysis of the relationship of the competing parties to the demised property, not necessarily on whose name happens to appear on the lease” (McSpadden v Dawson, 117 AD2d 453, 457 [1986]; see also Baron v Sherwood, 124 AD2d 527, 528 [1986]).

1990In fact, courts have agreed that the matter should not be dependent on whose name appears on the lease, but "should turn on a practical analysis of the relationship of the competing parties” (McSpadden v Dawson, supra, at 457).

2002In Halyalkar v Board of Regents (supra at 268-269), the Court wrote: “Collateral estoppel is a doctrine based on general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation * * *; it should never be rigidly or mechanically applied.” In Staatsburg Water Co. v Staatsburg Fire Dist. (supra at 153), the Court reiterated, “[W]e have consistently emphasized that these principles are not to be mechanically applied as a mere checklist.

1992There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling” (Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx, 24 NY2d 65, 71 ; see, Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285, 291 ). "[CJollateral estoppel is a flexible doctrine that can never be rigidly or mechanically applied * * * The question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to contest a prior determination * * * involves a practical inquiry into 'the rea

2026"Collateral estoppel is described as a flexible doctrine, and a determination of whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding requires a practical inquiry into the realities of [the prior] litigation" ( Lennon v 56th & Park [NY] Owner, LLC , 199 AD3d 64, 69 [2d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2026"Collateral estoppel is described as a flexible doctrine, and a determination of whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding requires a practical inquiry into the realities of [the prior] litigation" ( Lennon v 56th & Park [NY] Owner, LLC , 199 AD3d 64, 69 [2d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2017Collateral estoppel is a “flexible doctrine” and should not be “rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at its core, an equitable doctrine reflecting general concepts of fairness” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2017Collateral estoppel is a “flexible doctrine” and should not be “rigidly or mechanically applied since it is, at its core, an equitable doctrine reflecting general concepts of fairness” (Simpson v Alter, 78 AD3d 813, 814 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2017Moreover, the issue of whether collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular case “turns on general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation” (Melendez v Mc-Crowell, 139 AD3d 1018, 1020 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003]).

2017Moreover, the issue of whether collateral estoppel should be applied in a particular case “turns on general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation” (Melendez v Mc-Crowell, 139 AD3d 1018, 1020 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003]).

2014Co., 106 AD3d 1222 , 1223 [2013]; Schultz Constr., Inc. v Franbilt, Inc., 14 AD3d 895, 896 [2005]). “[W]hether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends on general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation” (Matter of Russo v Irwin, 49 AD3d 1039, 1041 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2014Co., 106 AD3d 1222 , 1223 [2013]; Schultz Constr., Inc. v Franbilt, Inc., 14 AD3d 895, 896 [2005]). “[W]hether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends on general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation” (Matter of Russo v Irwin, 49 AD3d 1039, 1041 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2013We have also recognized that collateral estoppel, a flexible doctrine, “ ‘is applied more flexibly’ ” in the context of the determinations of administrative agencies (Jeffreys, 1 NY3d at 40 , quoting Allied Chem. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 NY2d 271, 276 [1988]).

1992And, "the expectation of the parties is important in determining the fairness of applying issue preclusion in a particular case” (Allied Chem. v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 72 NY2d 271, 277 ; see, Matter of American Ins.

2003External consistency is “essentially a practical inquiry” (Goldberg, 488 US at 264 ) for determining “whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed” (id. at 262).

2002It is “essentially a practical inquiry” in which factors such as “administrative and technological barriers” are relevant (Goldberg v Sweet, supra at 264-265).

2026This doctrine is also grounded in considerations of fairness, judicial economy, and consistency ( see generally Paramount Pictures Corp. v Allianz Risk Transfer AG , 31 NY3d 64, 73 [2018]).

2026This doctrine is also grounded in considerations of fairness, judicial economy, and consistency ( see generally Paramount Pictures Corp. v Allianz Risk Transfer AG , 31 NY3d 64, 73 [2018]).

2025"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior [*2]determination" ( id. ; see Cullen v Moschetta , 207 AD3d 699, 700 ). "[T]he question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination, involves a practical inquiry into the realities of litigation" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lennon v 56th & Park[NY] Own

2025"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue must have had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior [*2]determination" ( id. ; see Cullen v Moschetta , 207 AD3d 699, 700). "[T]he question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination, involves a practical inquiry into the realities of litigation" ( Gilberg v Barbieri , 53 NY2d 285, 292 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lennon v 56th & Park[NY] Owne

2025The trial court, assessing the evidence and witnesses before it, is better situated to determine the relevance of the allegedly spoliated evidence, and the culpability of the allegedly spoliating party (see also Quinn v City University ofNew York, 43 AD3d 679,680 [1st Dept 2007]).

2023"External consistency is essentially a practical inquiry for determining whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed" ( Matter of Zelinsky v Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y. , 1 NY3d at 91 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2016Co., 76 NY2d 659, 664 [1990]). “[W]hether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular case depends upon ‘general notions of fairness involving a practical inquiry into the realities of the litigation’ ” (Jeffreys v Griffin, 1 NY3d 34, 41 [2003], quoting Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d 261, 268-269 [1988]).

2009The judge’s common sense reaction to the evidence (Siegel, NY Prac § 406, at 687 [4th ed]), informed by the judge’s professional judgment (see id. at 688; Annunziata v Colasanti, 126 AD2d 75, 80 [1987], citing Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 135 [1985]), is the practical test employed to determine whether a verdict rested on a fair interpretation of the evidence.

2009Notably, a court’s discretion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence “ ‘is at its broadest when it appears that the unsuccessful litigant’s evidentiary position was particularly strong compared to that of the victor’ ” (Annunziata, 126 AD2d at 80 , quoting Nicastro, 113 AD2d at 136 ).

2009The judge’s common sense reaction to the evidence (Siegel, NY Prac § 406, at 687 [4th ed]), informed by the judge’s professional judgment (see id. at 688; Annunziata v Colasanti, 126 AD2d 75, 80 [1987], citing Nicastro v Park, 113 AD2d 129, 135 [1985]), is the practical test employed to determine whether a verdict rested on a fair interpretation of the evidence.

2009Notably, a court’s discretion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence “ ‘is at its broadest when it appears that the unsuccessful litigant’s evidentiary position was particularly strong compared to that of the victor’ ” (Annunziata, 126 AD2d at 80 , quoting Nicastro, 113 AD2d at 136 ).