timing requirement in Michigan

2019I am aware of no authorities suggesting that the “solemn occasion” language provides independent authority that we would otherwise lack to issue an opinion, and I conclude that treating it as an element that must be satisfied distinct from the timing requirement is more consistent with the constitutional text and our statement in Advisory Opinion on 1975 PA 227 . 5 See Ortner, Fayz & DeQuick, Annual Survey of Michigan Law: June 1, 1989–May 31, 1990, Civil Procedure, 37 Wayne L Rev 373, 380 n 29 (1991) (“The authority of the supreme court to render advisory opinions is indirectly conferred by t

2019I am aware of no authorities suggesting that the “solemn occasion” language provides independent authority that we would otherwise lack to issue an opinion, and I conclude that treating it as an element that must be satisfied distinct from the timing requirement is more consistent with the constitutional text and our statement in Advisory Opinion on 1975 PA 227 . 5 See Ortner, Fayz & DeQuick, Annual Survey of Michigan Law: June 1, 1989–May 31, 1990, Civil Procedure, 37 Wayne L Rev 373, 380 n 29 (1991) (“The authority of the supreme court to render advisory opinions is indirectly conferred by t

1999The Asher Court stated, “We would not conclude that a timing error in the execution of a valid search warrant offends the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement.” Id. at 624 . 3 However, the Court felt compelled by Administrative Order No. 1990-6 to follow Polidori and suppress the evidence. n We first consider whether police officers’ violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights requires exclusion of the evidence.

1999In Asher , the police, in executing a search warrant, violated the knock-and-announce statute by entering the residence within five seconds of knocking and announcing. *58 The Asher Court stated, "We would not conclude that a timing error in the execution of a valid search warrant offends the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement." Id. at 624 , 513 N.W.2d 144 . [3] However, the Court felt compelled by Administrative Order No.1990-6 to follow Polidori and suppress the evidence.

2025Instead, it appropriately considered plaintiff’s reliance interests and the timing of the rule change to conclude that application of the former rule would “ ‘work injustice.’ ” Id. at 345 . 8 As we stated in Babcock: At its core, an abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled outcome. . . .

2025When the trial court selects one of these principled outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it is proper for the reviewing court to defer to the trial court’s judgment. [Babcock, 469 Mich at 269 .] The trial court’s decision was clearly within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, and we decline to disturb it.

2020This fundamental distinction runs through all the cases. [Id., slip op at 4, quoting Buczkowski v Buczkowski, 351 Mich 216, 222 ; 88 NW2d 416 (1958)] Ultimately, this Court concluded: . . . the timing error at issue was not a structural error occasioned by a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

2020This fundamental distinction runs through all the cases. [Id., slip op at 4, quoting Buczkowski v Buczkowski, 351 Mich 216, 222 ; 88 NW2d 416 (1958)] Ultimately, this Court concluded: . . . the timing error at issue was not a structural error occasioned by a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

2015In Titan Ins v North Pointe Ins Co, 270 Mich App 339, 343-343 ; 715 NW2d 324 (2006), this Court explained that when a no-fault insurer has paid PIP benefits and then seeks reimbursement from a higher-priority insurer, the paying insurer is subrogated to the claimant’s cause of action.

2015In Titan Ins v North Pointe Ins Co, 270 Mich App 339, 343-343 ; 715 NW2d 324 (2006), this Court explained that when a no-fault insurer has paid PIP benefits and then seeks reimbursement from a higher-priority insurer, the paying insurer is subrogated to the claimant’s cause of action.

2013While the timing requirement at issue “was designed to prevent cases from remaining pending for extended periods without the propriety of a class action being raised,” Hill v City of Warren, 276 Mich App 299, 306 ; 740 NW2d 706 (2007) (quotation marks omitted), citing GCR 1963, 208.2(A), the predecessor rule to MCR 3.501(B)(1), a plaintiff may amend its complaint only once as a matter of course and, even then, under significant timing restrictions.

2013While the timing requirement at issue “was designed to prevent cases from remaining pending for extended periods without the propriety of a class action being raised,” Hill v City of Warren, 276 Mich App 299, 306 ; 740 NW2d 706 (2007) (quotation marks omitted), citing GCR 1963, 208.2(A), the predecessor rule to MCR 3.501(B)(1), a plaintiff may amend its complaint only once as a matter of course and, even then, under significant timing restrictions.

2008Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 66 , 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002), "nowhere does the statute provide that a defendant must object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed." [1] Given that § 2912b sets forth several specific timing requirements pertaining to notices of intent, but does not set forth a timing requirement with regard to when the defendant must object to any deficiencies in the notice of intent, and given this Court's decision in Roberts , I question whether a plaintiff can seek a declaratory judgment regarding the sufficiency of notices of intent, thereby requiring t

2008Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 66 , 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002), "nowhere does the statute provide that a defendant must object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed." [1] Given that § 2912b sets forth several specific timing requirements pertaining to notices of intent, but does not set forth a timing requirement with regard to when the defendant must object to any deficiencies in the notice of intent, and given this Court's decision in Roberts , I question whether a plaintiff can seek a declaratory judgment regarding the sufficiency of notices of intent, thereby requiring t

2004Because of the timing of the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, the trial court did not hear defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 6 The parties assert that the applicable standard of review is that described in Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226 ; 559 NW2d 342 (1996), and recently reiterated in Mantei v Michigan Pub School Employees Retirement Sys, 256 Mich App 64, 71-72 ; 663 NW2d 486 (2003): On direct review of an agency decision, a trial court must determine whether the administrative action was authorized by law and whether the agency decision was supported by

2004Because of the timing of the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, the trial court did not hear defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 6 The parties assert that the applicable standard of review is that described in Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226 ; 559 NW2d 342 (1996), and recently reiterated in Mantei v Michigan Pub School Employees Retirement Sys, 256 Mich App 64, 71-72 ; 663 NW2d 486 (2003): On direct review of an agency decision, a trial court must determine whether the administrative action was authorized by law and whether the agency decision was supported by

2004Because of the timing of the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, the trial court did not hear defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 6 The parties assert that the applicable standard of review is that described in Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226 ; 559 NW2d 342 (1996), and recently reiterated in Mantei v Michigan Pub School Employees Retirement Sys, 256 Mich App 64, 71-72 ; 663 NW2d 486 (2003): On direct review of an agency decision, a trial court must determine whether the administrative action was authorized by law and whether the agency decision was supported by

2004Because of the timing of the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees, the trial court did not hear defendant’s motion for summary disposition. 6 The parties assert that the applicable standard of review is that described in Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226 ; 559 NW2d 342 (1996), and recently reiterated in Mantei v Michigan Pub School Employees Retirement Sys, 256 Mich App 64, 71-72 ; 663 NW2d 486 (2003): On direct review of an agency decision, a trial court must determine whether the administrative action was authorized by law and whether the agency decision was supported by

1999In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court, in Wilson v Arkansas, 514 US 927 ; 115 S Ct 1914 ; 131 L Ed 2d 976 (1995), decEned an opportunity to determine whether suppression was required pursuant to a violation of the knock:and-announce principle (the state, analogizing to the “independent source” doctrine and “inevitable discovery” rule, had *57 argued that any evidence seized was causally disconnected from the constitutional violation), because the “issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on which [the Court] granted certiorari . . . .” Id. at

1999In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court, in Wilson v Arkansas, 514 US 927 ; 115 S Ct 1914 ; 131 L Ed 2d 976 (1995), decEned an opportunity to determine whether suppression was required pursuant to a violation of the knock:and-announce principle (the state, analogizing to the “independent source” doctrine and “inevitable discovery” rule, had *57 argued that any evidence seized was causally disconnected from the constitutional violation), because the “issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on which [the Court] granted certiorari . . . .” Id. at