timing requirement in Utah

2017Rettig asserts that the statute’s timing requirement forecloses his right to a direct appeal. ¶15 This court recently confronted this issue in Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35 , 379 P.3d 1278 .

2017Rettig asserts that the statute’s timing requirement forecloses his right to a direct appeal. ¶15 This court recently confronted this issue in Gailey v. State, 2016 UT 35 , 379 P.3d 1278 .

2017And the timing requirement is “jurisdictional in nature” because an “appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of appeal is untimely.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 22 , 342 P.3d 789 . 12 Cite as: 2017 UT 83 Opinion of the Court withdraw prior to sentencing.

2017And the timing requirement is “jurisdictional in nature” because an “appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of appeal is untimely.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 22 , 342 P.3d 789 . 12 Cite as: 2017 UT 83 Opinion of the Court withdraw prior to sentencing.

2017And the timing requirement is “jurisdictional in nature” because an “appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of appeal is untimely.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 22 , 342 P.3d 789 . 12 Cite as: 2017 UT 83 Opinion of the Court withdraw prior to sentencing.

2017And the timing requirement is “jurisdictional in nature” because an “appellate court simply has no power to hear the case if a notice of appeal is untimely.” State v. Collins, 2014 UT 61, ¶ 22 , 342 P.3d 789 . 12 Cite as: 2017 UT 83 Opinion of the Court withdraw prior to sentencing.

2026And like Kropf, Thalab argues that 20240351-CA 11 2026 UT App 43 State v. Thalab subsection (11)’s use of the word “if” indicates that a permanent criminal stalking injunction is discretionary. ¶24 On its face, Kropf is thus clearly applicable to these questions.

2023We acknowledge 20220645-CA 13 2023 UT App 126 In re A.S.G.-R. that Mother did take certain actions that the Plan required, such as completing the psychological evaluation and participating in parenting classes and individual therapy, and we therefore agree with Mother’s assertion that she complied with many—if not necessarily all 6—of the Plan’s individual requirements. ¶34 But even taking Mother’s assertion—that she completed all of the Plan’s individual subsidiary tasks—at face value, that does not necessarily compel the conclusion that Mother substantially complied with the Plan, because in

2020Id. § 77-17-13(4)(b).7 While not at issue testimony only if the decision exceeds “the limits of reasonability.” State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 12 , 367 P.3d 981 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 As the Expert Notice Statute establishes (1) a timing requirement for providing notice of an expert witness and (2) corresponding disclosure rules, it arguably treads into the domain of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2020Id. § 77-17-13(4)(b).7 While not at issue testimony only if the decision exceeds “the limits of reasonability.” State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 12 , 367 P.3d 981 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 As the Expert Notice Statute establishes (1) a timing requirement for providing notice of an expert witness and (2) corresponding disclosure rules, it arguably treads into the domain of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2019"Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way." McBride v. Utah State Bar , 2010 UT 60 , ¶ 16, 242 P.3d 769 (quotation simplified).

2019"Procedural due process requires, at a minimum, timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way." McBride v. Utah State Bar , 2010 UT 60 , ¶ 16, 242 P.3d 769 (quotation simplified).

2016Accordingly, the timing of the instruction does not persuade us to depart from the usual presumption that the jurors “were conscientious in performing ... their duty, and that they followed the instructions of the court.” See id. ¶58 Fourth, the jury acquitted Cruz of the charges in connection to which Child nodded her head.

2015Id. at 609-11 , 130 S.Ct. 2533 .

2015Id. at 609–11.

2013The incidents at issue in this case, which took place within the course of three hours or so, may not satisfy the "closely related in time" requirement in light of the pause in events between the sexual assaults and the decision to leave the apartment and walk to the gas station. 8 Compare id. (holding that solicitation of murder and subsequent murder were part of the same criminal episode despite the passage of several weeks between the two events), with State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Utah 1977) ("In this case there was a distinct difference in time, (that necessary to travel some 65

2013The incidents at issue in this case, which took place within the course of three hours or so, may not satisfy the "closely related in time" requirement in light of the pause in events between the sexual assaults and the decision to leave the apartment and walk to the gas station. 8 Compare id. (holding that solicitation of murder and subsequent murder were part of the same criminal episode despite the passage of several weeks between the two events), with State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Utah 1977) ("In this case there was a distinct difference in time, (that necessary to travel some 65

2012This obligation to timely press for resolution is so incumbent on the moving party, we have warned, that "[flailure to do so, or acquiescing in the court's inaction, will ... constitute a waiver of the original objection." Id. (footnote omitted). 118 In light of this timing requirement and the "absolute obligation" of trial counsel to demand resolution of a Batson challenge before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed, we conclude that Harris waived this challenge by failing to properly and timely ask for its resolution.

2006Cf. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ¶ 19 , 48 P.3d 918 .

2006Cf. Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ¶ 19 , 48 P.3d 918 .

2004Because attempt is a crime of specific intent, see State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 846-47 (Utah 1992) (determining that, in Utah, attempt is a crime of specific intent), overruled on other grounds by State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 , 82 P.3d 1106 , the State may properly introduce relevant prior act evidence to demonstrate Rees's intent in the instant case. [5] Because the prior act occurred less than six months before this incident, I believe it satisfies the timing requirement set forth in Hernandez.

2000Dicta in Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my opinion, persuasive. ¶ 27 Additionally, the majority quotes selectively from State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that we may assume the trial court considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion.

2000Dicta in Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my opinion, persuasive. ¶ 27Additionally, the majority quotes selectively from State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that we may assume the trial court considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion.