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15 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Emerygreen2 sentences2011In Emery , the Court held that allowing the state to present evidence of a defendant’s prior and persistent offender status on remand would violate the timing requirement of section 558.021.2. 95 S.W.3d at 101 . 2010"To remand and allow the state now to present evidence of Emery's alleged prior and persistent offender status would violate the timing requirement of section 558.021.2." Id. at 101 . | 2 | 6 |
State v. Teergreen2 sentences2011Reemphasizing the timing requirement, in Teer , this Court held that the timing requirement found in the plain language of section 558.021.2 creates a mandate requiring the state to plead and prove the status prior to submission of the case to the jury. 275 S.W.3d at 261-62 . 2010Section 558.021.2; State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Mo. banc 2009) (holding the timing requirement to be mandatory). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Severegreen2 sentences2024See State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 98 (Mo. banc 2003) and State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640 (Mo. banc 2010). 13 court for entry of a judgment reflecting convictions for the class A misdemeanor of assault in the fourth degree as to each of those counts. 2011Most recently, in Severe , this Court held that allowing the state to present new evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions would give the state “two bites of the apple” and that, under the timing requirement of the statute, the state is foreclosed from offering any additional evidence at re-sentencing. 307 S.W.3d at 644-45 . | 1 | 2 |
Engine Masters, Inc. v. Kirn's, Inc.green1 sentence2023See id.; Engine Masters, Inc. v. Kirn’s, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 644, 645-46 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Chao Vang v. Cher'ron Barneygreen1 sentence2023Vang v. Barney, 480 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). the timing requirement of the rule is grounds for denial of the motion. | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Stategreen1 sentence2021State v. Chambers, 437 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (finding that the lack of limiting language by the legislature regarding a timing requirement in the drug enhancement statutes to plainly mean that felony drug convictions previous to the trial court’s status determination could be considered by the trial court in its status determination). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Adoption of CMBRgreen1 sentence2017See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793 , 809 (Mo. banc 2011) (“Here, the statutory errors are evident, obvious, and clear from the record, so the issue is whether they resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cullengreen1 sentence2010In refusing to allow the State an opportunity to present further evidence of the prior convictions on remand, the Supreme Court also relied on the fact that the genesis of the problem was “ ‘prosecutorial laxity ” in failing “to prove prior convictions ‘in conformity with applicable statutory requirements.’ ” Id. at 101 (quoting State v. Cullen, 39 S.W.3d 899, 906 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wynngreen1 sentence1989State v. Wynn, 666 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Mo.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Casey Langhans v. State of Missouri
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2014Because the record supports that Bradley’s counsel consented to the July 6, 2011 hearing date, we presume Bradley’s argument is that counsel could not waive the timing requirement on Bradley’s behalf; rather, it was a right personal to Bradley that only he could waive. 10 *555 “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). 11 “‘[W]hether the defendant must partid; pate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be part 2014Because the record supports that Bradley’s counsel consented to the July 6, 2011 hearing date, we presume Bradley’s argument is that counsel could not waive the timing requirement on Bradley’s behalf; rather, it was a right personal to Bradley that only he could waive. 10 *555 “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). 11 “‘[W]hether the defendant must partid; pate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be part | 1 | 2014–2014 |
New York v. Hill
green
2 sentences2014Because the record supports that Bradley’s counsel consented to the July 6, 2011 hearing date, we presume Bradley’s argument is that counsel could not waive the timing requirement on Bradley’s behalf; rather, it was a right personal to Bradley that only he could waive. 10 *555 “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). 11 “‘[W]hether the defendant must partid; pate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be part 2014Because the record supports that Bradley’s counsel consented to the July 6, 2011 hearing date, we presume Bradley’s argument is that counsel could not waive the timing requirement on Bradley’s behalf; rather, it was a right personal to Bradley that only he could waive. 10 *555 “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). 11 “‘[W]hether the defendant must partid; pate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be part | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Craig
green
1 sentence2011The state argues that the “two fundamentally different timing requirements [of jury-tried and court-tried cases] should not be interpreted identically.” 6 For guidance as to whether the rule of Emery, Teer, and Severe that the statutory timing requirement for the presentation of evidence precludes evidence on remand applies equally to court-tried cases, State v. Craig is instructive. 287 S.W.3d 676 (Mo. banc 2009). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Bifulco v. United States
green
1 sentence2010Id. [3] The fact that Cobb does not address the timing requirement of the statute has no bearing on Ms. Severe's case because the state did comply with the statute's timing requirement as the law at that time dictated. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Purkett v. Elem
green
2 sentences1995A subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Purkett v. Elem, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam), provides further instruction on the timing of the inquiry into the “legitimacy” of a prosecutor’s justification for a peremptory strike. 1995A subsequent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Purkett v. Elem, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam), provides further instruction on the timing of the inquiry into the “legitimacy” of a prosecutor’s justification for a peremptory strike. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.