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8 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Beal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Similarly, Maher’s failure to timely serve appellees was not the result of a clerical error, but was based either on his ignorance of Rule 4(i), see Beal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 151 Ariz. 514, 518 , 729 P.2d 318, 322 (App.1986) (finding trial court was within its discretion in determining a reasonable party would affirmatively act upon receiving a notice from the court, even if they did not completely understand it), or a strategic attempt to delay service. ¶ 23 The trial court might have concluded that, whatever Maher’s reason, his ability to draft and file a motion to 2005Similarly, Maher’s failure to timely serve appellees was not the result of a clerical error, but was based either on his ignorance of Rule 4(i), see Beal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 151 Ariz. 514, 518 , 729 P.2d 318, 322 (App.1986) (finding trial court was within its discretion in determining a reasonable party would affirmatively act upon receiving a notice from the court, even if they did not completely understand it), or a strategic attempt to delay service. ¶ 23 The trial court might have concluded that, whatever Maher’s reason, his ability to draft and file a motion to | 2 | 2 |
City of Phoenix v. Donofriogreen1 sentence2025See City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133 (1965) (“[C]ourts will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the statute itself.” (citation omitted)). ¶12 The State also urges us to specify which party bears the burden of proof under A.R.S. § 13-3423(B). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murraygreen1 sentence2024State v. Murray, 184 Ariz. 9, 35 (1995). ¶20 Nash asserts that the denial of a mistrial was error because of “the pervasiveness of the jury misconduct, the timing of the violation, the jurors’ lack of candor, and the number of constitutional rights affected.” For the following reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ¶21 First, two jurors reported discussions about the witnesses and their roles within MBS. | 1 | 1 |
Black v. Blackgreen1 sentence2023See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martingreen1 sentence2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jarostchuk v. Aricol Communications, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005In Jaro-stchuk, Division One of this court held that a secretary’s failure to understand a timing rule did not amount to excusable neglect because the “error was neither inadvertent nor clerical; it was intentional action on a matter requiring some legal competence.” 189 Ariz. at 349 , 942 P.2d at 1181 . 2005In Jaro-stchuk, Division One of this court held that a secretary’s failure to understand a timing rule did not amount to excusable neglect because the “error was neither inadvertent nor clerical; it was intentional action on a matter requiring some legal competence.” 189 Ariz. at 349 , 942 P.2d at 1181 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Flemming
green
1 sentence2023Thus, the Rule itself provides an exception to the timing requirement if there are “reasons for the delay.” See Flemming, 184 Ariz. at 115 . ¶10 Next, Bojorquez makes little argument that the “reasons for the delay” should warrant the dismissal of the revocation petition. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2008The absence of such a timing requirement means that “[a] ‘prior felony conviction’ may in fact be a [conviction for a] felony offense that was committed subsequently.” Id. ¶ 11 The language chosen by the legislature for subdivisions (b) and (c), which differs significantly from that in subdivision (a), bolsters our conclusion. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.