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18 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 2001–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Szymuszkiewiczgreen2 sentences2011Contra United States v. Szymuszkiewicz , 622 F.3d 701, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2010)(indicating that the Federal Wiretap Act does not have a timing requirement). 2011Contra United States v. Szymuszkiewicz , 622 F.3d 701, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2010)(indicating that the Federal Wiretap Act does not have a timing requirement). | 4 | 4 |
Presley v. P & S Grain Co., Inc.green2 sentences2015In Presley v. P & S Grain Co., the Illinois *499 A. APPLICABLE LAW court of appeals held this timing requirement to be If scientific, technical, or other specialized directory rather than mandatory. 289 Ill.App.3d 453 , knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the 225 Ill.Dec. 398 , 683 N.E.2d 901, 910 (1997). 2015In Presley v. P & S Grain Co., the Illinois *499 A. APPLICABLE LAW court of appeals held this timing requirement to be If scientific, technical, or other specialized directory rather than mandatory. 289 Ill.App.3d 453 , knowledge will assist the trier offact to understand the 225 Ill.Dec. 398 , 683 N.E.2d 901, 910 (1997). | 2 | 3 |
Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkinsgreen2 sentences2015Second, the dissent's interpretation presumes the case upon which the dissent relies, the Florida Supreme that any claim submitted while crops are still in the ground Court interpreted a prior version's timing requirement to be will satisfy section 64.006(a)'s language. 47 S.W.3d at 511 . jurisdictional. 426 So.2d at 961. 2003Co. , 47 S.W.3d at 498 (holding court had jurisdiction over claims under the Seed Arbitration Act because, while the Act’s timing requirement was not mandatory, submission to the Act was mandatory, absent waiver by the seller) . | 2 | 3 |
Nix v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 85-86 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014); see also, Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute a fundamental error exception to the timing rule). | 1 | 1 |
Perez, Eduardogreen1 sentence2014Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 85-86 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014); see also, Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute a fundamental error exception to the timing rule). | 1 | 1 |
City of DeSoto v. Whitegreen1 sentence2013See City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex.2009) (discussing explicit jurisdictional language with respect to Local Government Code section 143.057(a)); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Tufele v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Monreal , 99 S.W.3d at 618, 620 (explaining relevant issue in distinction between valid appeal waiver made with plea bargain before sentencing and valid appeal waiver made without plea bargain after sentencing is the timing of the waiver and whether defendant was in a position to know what the punishment would be and what errors would occur after the plea); Tufele v. State , 130 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (holding appellant could not have waived his right to appeal error occurring after entry of his guilty plea at the time he entered his plea). | 1 | 1 |
Monreal v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Monreal , 99 S.W.3d at 618, 620 (explaining relevant issue in distinction between valid appeal waiver made with plea bargain before sentencing and valid appeal waiver made without plea bargain after sentencing is the timing of the waiver and whether defendant was in a position to know what the punishment would be and what errors would occur after the plea); Tufele v. State , 130 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (holding appellant could not have waived his right to appeal error occurring after entry of his guilty plea at the time he entered his plea). | 1 | 1 |
State v. $435,000.00green1 sentence2001See Hines, 843 S.W.2d at 469; $4-35,000, 842 S.W.2d at 644. | 1 | 1 |
Hines v. Hashgreen1 sentence2001See Hines, 843 S.W.2d at 469; $4-35,000, 842 S.W.2d at 644. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Guerra
green
2 sentences2016Similarly, in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Guerra, 970 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied), the Austin Court of Appeals held that the Department of Public Safety is not precluded from holding a license suspension hearing even if it fails to comply with the Transportation Code’s requirement that the hearing “shall be held” within 40 days after the driver receives notice of the suspension. 2015Similarly, in Texas Department of Public Safety v. Guerra, 970 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied), the Austin Court of Appeals held that the Department of Public Safety is not precluded from holding a license suspension hearing even if it fails to comply with the Transportation Code’s requirement that the hearing “shall be held” within 40 days after the driver receives notice of the suspension. | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Danish Mahmood Shaikh, Licensee
green
2 sentences2016The Shaikh court reasoned that this was so because “the statute does not contain any explicit language indicating that failure to comply with the timing requirement deprives either the justice court or the county court at law of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 188 . 2015The Shaikh court reasoned that this was so because “the statute does not contain any explicit language indicating that failure to comply with the timing requirement deprives either the justice court or the county court at law of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 188 . | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Burton v. Ferrill
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 199 . 2008Id. at 199 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Marquez v. State
green
1 sentence2015However, the Medley court specifically noted that, because the appellant in that case based his claim on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it did not consider “how the statutory authorization for a defendant to withdraw a waiver of the right to counsel ‘at any time’ would affect the timing requirement of the request to revoke the waiver.” Id. at 24 n.4 (citing Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook
green
2 sentences2011TIMING REQUIREMENT Marsh also contends that the court of appeals imposed a new timing requirement, where the employer's interest in restraining the employee cannot exist before the employer's consideration is given. 287 S.W.3d at 382 . 2011TIMING REQUIREMENT Marsh also contends that the court of appeals imposed a new timing requirement, where the employer’s interest in restraining the employee cannot exist before the employer’s consideration is given. 287 S.W.3d at 382 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Hitchcock
green
2 sentences2001This prior version required a claim be filed “within ten days after the defect or violation becomes apparent.” See Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 426 So.2d at 960 . 2001In Ferry-Morse Seed Co., the case upon which the dissent relies, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted a prior version’s timing requirement to be jurisdictional. 426 So.2d at 961 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.