timing rule in District of Columbia

2020Appeals, 163 A.3d 799, 802 (D.C. 2017) (internal brackets omitted). “[W]hether a timing rule should be tolled turns on” a variety of factors, such as the benefitting party’s vigilance, the presence of “unexplained or undue delay[,]” whether “tolling would work an injustice to the other party,” and “[t]he importance of ultimate finality in legal proceedings[.]” Id.

2020Appeals, 163 A.3d 799, 802 (D.C. 2017) (internal brackets omitted). “[W]hether a timing rule should be tolled turns on” a variety of factors, such as the benefitting party’s vigilance, the presence of “unexplained or undue delay[,]” whether “tolling would work an injustice to the other party,” and “[t]he importance of ultimate finality in legal proceedings[.]” Id.

2017As we further explained, “[w]e have said that ‘equity aids the vigilant,’ and have indicated that whether a timing rule should be tolled turns on whether there was unexplained or undue delay and whether tolling would work an injustice to the other party,” Id. (citing Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 403-04 (D.C. 1991)).

2015Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 403-04 (D.C.1991).

2017As we further explained, “[w]e have said that ‘equity aids the vigilant,’ and have indicated that whether a timing rule should be tolled turns on whether there was unexplained or undue delay and whether tolling would work an injustice to the other party,” Id. (citing Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392, 403-04 (D.C. 1991)).

2017Moreover, “whether a timing rule should be tolled turns on whether there was únexplained or Undue delay and whether tolling would work an injustice to the othér party.” Id. at 1104 ; see also Brewer v. District of Columbia Office of Emp.

2023Cir. 2021) (citing Dolan and holding that although the relevant statute used language suggesting the deadline for agency action was mandatory, the agency’s failure to satisfy a timing requirement did not require vacating its rule); United States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 700-02 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Dolan and reasoning that precluding forfeiture because of the district court’s failure to meet a 4 As one district court put it, “[i]n Dolan, . . . the issue was not whether one of the parties had waived a claim but rather what consequences resulted from the court’s untimely scheduling of a mand

2014See id. at 497 (“That concern is not present where, as here, it was the jury that raised the question of a lesser included offense in a note to the court.”).

2001See Flores, supra, 547 A.2d at 1003 .

2001See Flores, supra, 547 A.2d at 1003 .

1999See, e.g., Abramson Assocs. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 596 A.2d 549, 553 (D.C.1991); Lyles, supra, 572 A.2d at 84 . [2] Contrary to the majority, I think that the examiner's factual findings, which the Director accepted, adequately show the proximity of the timing of the claim to the claimant's termination.

1994See Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1231 (D.C.1983) (such instructional error harmless where it can be said “with fair assurance that the verdict was not substantially swayed by the error”). 3 C.

1994See Gordon, supra, 466 A.2d at 1231.

1980In addition, we noted that although it is not necessarily error to give the Winters charge, under these circumstances "the timing of the instruction could have well implied that a verdict was being demanded before the juror would be excused to attend to her personal business." Id. at 803.

1980In addition, we noted that although it is not necessarily error to give the Winters charge, under these circumstances “the timing of the instruction could have well implied that a verdict was being demanded before the juror would be excused to attend to her personal business.” Id. at 803 .