time of the termination hearing in Iowa

2026See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean at the time of the termination hearing).

2026See Iowa Code § 232.116 (1)(h)(4); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time” in section 232.116(1)(h)(4) to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

2025See id. § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (holding that “at the present time” means at the time of the termination hearing).

2025See Iowa Code § 232.116 (1)(h)(4) (“There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.”); In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (holding that “at the present time” means at the time of the termination hearing).

2025See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting the term “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”); In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (en banc) (stating that a child cannot be returned to a parent’s custody as provided in section 232.102 if doing so would expose the child to any harm amounting to a new CINA adjudication).

2024See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting the term “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”); In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (stating that a child cannot be returned to a parent’s custody as provided in section 232.102 if doing so would expose the child to any harm amounting to a new CINA adjudication).

2024See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (finding a parent’s efforts before termination were “too late” in light of eighteen unsuccessful months of services); In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305 , 313 (Iowa 2021) (“A long history of substance abuse, repeated relapses, and demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety outside a supervised setting demonstrates the children could not have been returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing.”).

2022With a child age three years or younger, but for other circumstances, that patience is afforded a six-month limitation and after that point, “termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.” Id. at 494–95. 5 While both parents have admirable goals concerning how their futures might look, because of choices made, each parent was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing with only speculation about a release date.

2025In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (“Since concerns remained for the father’s substance use, the child could not have been returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing.”), abrogated on other grounds by In re L.A., ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2025 WL 855764 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025); In re R.M.-V., 5 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (holding that mother who used methamphetamine less than one month before the termination hearing failed to demonstrate she was on a path to sobriety and thus could not provide the child with a stable home); In re A.B., 815 N.W.2

2025The father only challenges the last element: whether the child could “be returned to [his] custody” at the time of the termination hearing.3 Id. § 232.116(1)(f)(4); accord A.B., 956 N.W.2d at 168 (interpreting “at the present time” in section 232.116(1) to mean at the time of the termination hearing).

2025And we must give “primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116 (2); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016). 10 The parents’ best-interests arguments overlook the serious safety concerns that prevented returning the sons to their custody at the time of the termination hearing.

2024See Iowa Code §§ 232.116 (1)(f)(4), (h)(4); M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 223 (interpreting “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

2025So even if the mother had correctly identified a statutory ground relied on by the district court, we conclude that the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. 5 term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116 (2)).

2024See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). 6 present time”); D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting the statutory language “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

2022Due to ongoing concerns about the mother’s mental health and substance abuse, we agree the child cannot be safely placed in 20 See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (interpreting the statutory language “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”); In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992) (“[A] child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parent under section 232.102 if by doing so the child would be exposed to any harm amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication.”). 10 her care, and the State proved a ground to terminate her parental rights under s

2019The placement shall be terminated and the child returned to the child’s home if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child will not suffer harm in the manner specified in section 232.2, subsection 6. 10 This part of section 232.102 has been referenced in relation to section 232.116(1)’s use of the phrase “as provided in section 232.102.” See In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988) (“The proof must only show that any of the alleged definitional grounds of a child in need of assistance in section 232.2(6) exist at the time of the termination hearing.”); In re M.M., 4

2025M.M. challenges only the common final element of those grounds, requiring clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to parental custody at the time of the termination hearing as provided in 6 section 232.102.4 See Iowa Code § 232.116 (1)(f)(4), (h)(4); In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding “at the present time” means the date of the termination hearing).

2024She maintains that K.R. could be returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing.6 See Iowa Code § 232.116 (1)(h)(4) (requiring clear and convincing proof “that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102”); see also In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (holding “at the present time” means the date of the termination hearing).

2022Because the children had been out of the home for over twelve months at the time of the termination hearing, “we view the proceedings with a sense of urgency.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).

2019The placement shall be terminated and the child returned to the child’s home if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child will not suffer harm in the manner specified in section 232.2, subsection 6. 10 This part of section 232.102 has been referenced in relation to section 232.116(1)’s use of the phrase “as provided in section 232.102.” See In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988) (“The proof must only show that any of the alleged definitional grounds of a child in need of assistance in section 232.2(6) exist at the time of the termination hearing.”); In re M.M., 4

2024See In re A.M.S., 6 419 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988) (holding that the court may terminate parental rights if the criterion in section 232.116(1) is met at the time of the termination hearing); In re J.A., No. 13-0889, 2013 WL 5758054 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2013) (noting that “the child’s age must be determined upon the date of completion of the termination hearings”).

2019The placement shall be terminated and the child returned to the child’s home if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child will not suffer harm in the manner specified in section 232.2, subsection 6. 10 This part of section 232.102 has been referenced in relation to section 232.116(1)’s use of the phrase “as provided in section 232.102.” See In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988) (“The proof must only show that any of the alleged definitional grounds of a child in need of assistance in section 232.2(6) exist at the time of the termination hearing.”); In re M.M., 4

2021See In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“Where the parent has been unable to rise above the addiction and experience sustained sobriety in a noncustodial setting, and establish the essential support system to maintain sobriety, there is little hope of success in parenting.”). 12 We next consider whether termination is in the best interests of the children under section 232.116(2).

2019In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).

2024In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa 2014). 5 Cesar raises one issue on appeal: he challenges the juvenile court’s conclusion that J.G. could not be returned to his custody at the time of the termination hearing.3 He argues there wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that his home was not safe or that he could not properly supervise J.G.4 We agree with the district court—there was clear and convincing evidence that Cesar could not provide a safe home for J.G. at the time of the termination hearing.

2022Although the father had some periods of short-lived sobriety, demonstrated by negative drug tests, at the time of 4 Iowa Code § 232.116 (1)(h)(1)–(4). 5 See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (stating “at the present time” means at the time of the termination hearing). 6 See In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Iowa 2014) (“[A] juvenile court could reasonably determine that a parent’s active addiction to methamphetamine is ‘imminently likely’ to result in harmful effects to the physical, mental, or social wellbeing of the children in the parent’s care.”); In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Io

2023See id. (“In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.”); see also In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (“While the State has the obligation to provide reasonable reunification services, the [parent] has the obligation to demand other, different or additional services prior to the termination hearing.”).

2020See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). 5 As to termination under section 232.116(1)(h), the mother only challenges the State’s establishment of the final element of that provision—that the children could not be returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing.

2019See In re N.N., 692 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) (examining ages “at the time of the termination hearing”).

2017For the purposes of section 232.116, “we measure the child’s age at the time of the termination hearing, not at the time the termination order was entered.” See In re R.W., No. 15-2024, 2016 WL 899269 , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016); see also In re N.N., 692 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Iowa Ct. App. 2004) (finding Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) applies to “children who are past their third birthday but who have not yet reached age four” at the time of the termination hearing).

2021“It is past time to terminate her relationship with the children.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987).

2019The father was not in a position to become a caretaker for the children at the time of the termination hearing in May 2019, and it is not in the children’s best interests to further wait for him to achieve the stability they need. “[P]atience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for their children.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987); In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

2019See In re Z.G., No. 16-2187, 2017 WL 1086227 , at *4 n.5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017) (collecting cases in which termination of parental rights was affirmed because a parent admitted the child or children could not be returned to the parent’s care at the time of the termination hearing).

2018See Z.G., 2017 WL 1086227 , at *4 n.5 (collecting cases in which termination of parental rights was affirmed because a parent admitted the child or children could not be returned to the parent’s care at the time of the termination hearing).

2018See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (noting a parent’s past conduct is instructive in determining the parent’s future behavior); In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997) (stating that when considering what the future holds if a child is returned to the parent, we must look to the parent’s past behavior because it may be indicative of the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future); see also M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 224 (indicating a parent must do more than simply go through the motions and check things off on her to do list). 6 Upon our de novo review, we find

2017The best 1 Even if the father preserved error with respect to the statutory grounds for termination, we affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(a), (d), (e), (f), and (i). 5 interests of the children “requires considering what the future holds for the child[ren] if returned to the parents.” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).

2026See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 2006) (interpreting “returned to the custody” as whether the child could safely return to the parent’s care); In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467 , 474 (Iowa 2018) (interpreting “at the present time” to mean the point of the termination hearing).

2025See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Iowa 2006) (interpreting “returned to the custody” as whether the child could 8 safely return to the parent’s care); A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 474 (interpreting “at the present time” to mean the point of the termination hearing).

2026Not only is guardianship “not a legally preferable alternative to termination,” In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017), the exception to termination under section 232.116(3)(a) is only available if “[a] relative has legal custody of the child[ren].” (Emphasis added.) At the time of the termination hearing, the children were in the department’s legal custody and placed with a relative.

2023We note, “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). 7 therefore decline to apply the exception to termination found in section 232.116(3)(a).

2024“A child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parent . . . if by doing so the child would be exposed to any harm amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication or without remaining a child in need of assistance.” In 8 re S.C., No.15-0262, 2015 WL 2089743 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015) (citing In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)).

2020In re K.L.C., 372 N.W.2d 223, 227 (Iowa 1985) (finding termination may only take place when the child cannot be returned to the parental home because definitional grounds of a “child in need of assistance” still exist); see also In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Iowa 1992); In re A.M.S., 419 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1988) (discussing same language applicable here); In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (discussing section 232.116(1)(g)(4), now renumbered 232.116(1)(h)(4)).

2023He asserts that he was working diligently towards sobriety. 8 “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015).

2022In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 442 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e will not review a reasonable efforts claim unless it is raised prior to the termination hearing.”). 4 While the mother had made some progress at the time of the termination hearing, it was—as the juvenile court put it—“ninth inning progress.” See In re A.D., No. 15-1508, 2016 WL 902953 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016) (“Iowa courts look skeptically at ‘last-minute’ attempts to address longstanding issues, finding them inadequate to preclude termination of parental rights.”).

2022See In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (affirming termination of parental rights because child could not be returned to the custody of his incarcerated father); In re A.C., No. 04– 0408, 2004 WL 1076077 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2004) (noting that despite father’s upcoming parole hearing, “[t]he children clearly could not be returned to his custody and supervision at the time of the termination hearing or within the reasonably foreseeable future”).

2019See In re S.J., 3 620 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000) (noting immediate reunification between parent and child is impossible when the parent remains incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing).

2021See In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (“We will not gamble with a child's future by asking him to continuously wait for a stable biological parent, particularly at such a tender age.”).

2019The father was not in a position to become a caretaker for the children at the time of the termination hearing in May 2019, and it is not in the children’s best interests to further wait for him to achieve the stability they need. “[P]atience with parents can soon translate into intolerable hardship for their children.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987); In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

2025Finally, the father claims the department “failed to provide [him] with reasonable efforts to assist him with reunification.” See In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (requiring the State to “show reasonable efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent” (citation omitted)).

2020By the time of the termination hearing, the department’s reasonable-efforts obligation was limited to “documentation of the steps taken to make and finalize 8 an adoption or other permanent placement.” L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 528–29.

2026The mother does not challenge the error, conceding K.D.’s removal exceeds either statutory requirement. “[W]e decline to place form over substance and waste judicial resources on what was clearly a clerical error.” In re H.C., No. 16-1961, 2017 WL 512798, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2017); see In re A.A., No. 21-1972, 2022 WL 946503 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (“The erroneous reference to paragraph (f ), a presumed typographical error, therefore has no legal significance.” (cleaned up)). 7 I.

2023See In re A.A., No. 21-1972, 2022 WL 946503 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (“The erroneous reference to paragraph (f), a presumed typographical error, therefore ‘has no legal significance.’” (citation omitted)); see also In re H.C., No. 16-1961, 2017 WL 512798, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2017) (“[W]e decline to place form over substance and waste judicial resources on what was clearly a clerical error.”). 3 P. 6 .201(1)(d) (“The petition on appeal shall substantially comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401.”); .1401–Form 5 (requiring separate issue headings and other requirements for each i

2026See In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994) (finding efforts “of very recent origin” to be an unpersuasive “eleventh hour attempt to prevent termination”).

2025See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305 , 313 (Iowa 2021) (“A long history of substance abuse, repeated 4 relapses, and demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety outside a supervised setting demonstrates the [child] could not have been returned to [the mother’s] care at the time of the termination hearing.”); In re D.M., 516 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1994) (finding efforts “of very recent origin” insufficient to prevent termination).

2024See Iowa Code § 232.116 (1)(f)(4); In re K.D., No. 16-1778, 2017 WL 108586, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017) (“‘At the present time’ refers to the time of the termination hearing.”).

2024“At the present time” means “the time of the termination hearing.” In re K.D., No. 16-1778, 2017 WL 108586, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017).

2023To terminate parental rights for abandonment under section 600A.8(3)(b), the petitioning party must show the child is at least six months old at the time of the termination hearing and the parent for whom termination is sought has failed to maintain “substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child.” In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 129 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012).

2023“Substantial and continuous or repeated contact” is demonstrated by at least one of the following: (1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to do so and when not prevented from doing so by the person having lawful custody of the child. (2) Regular communication with the child or with the person having the care or custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child or when prevented from visiting the child by the person having lawful custody of the child. (3) Openly living with the child for a period of six months within the one-ye

2023Section 232.116(3)(b) would not apply to N.J. and N.P.-R., who were ages nine and two, respectively. 9 circumstances of each case and the best interests of the children.” In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). “[O]nce the State has proven a ground for termination, the parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) . . . .” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467 , 476 (Iowa 2018).

2020In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019).