time of the termination hearing in California

1992Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.” (Id. at p. 1065.) 11 William, however, contends the essence of Amelia S. is found in the following discussion: “[T]he mere fact that it is possible the minor might be adopted since prospective adoptive parents are interested does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of the minor’s adaptability.” Clear and convincing evidence “must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt; it must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reas

1992Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.” (Id. at p. 1065.) 11 William, however, contends the essence of Amelia S. is found in the following discussion: “[T]he mere fact that it is possible the minor might be adopted since prospective adoptive parents are interested does not constitute clear and convincing evidence of the minor’s adaptability.” Clear and convincing evidence “must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt; it must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reas

1992(In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 375-382 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 787 , 795 P.2d 1244 ].) We conclude that the trial court received direct evidence of the children’s wishes at the time of the termination hearing, and that it was fully aware of their desires with regard to termination and adoption.

1992(In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 375-382 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 787 , 795 P.2d 1244 ].) We conclude that the trial court received direct evidence of the children’s wishes at the time of the termination hearing, and that it was fully aware of their desires with regard to termination and adoption.

1991It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citations.]” (I n re David C. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1208 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 115 ].) Of course, it is not necessary pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) that the child, at the time of the termination hearing, already be in a potential adoptive home.

1991It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. [Citations.]” (I n re David C. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1208 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 115 ].) Of course, it is not necessary pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) that the child, at the time of the termination hearing, already be in a potential adoptive home.

2005Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ], fn. omitted.) There was clear and convincing evidence Gregory would be adopted within a reasonable time, despite the fact his maternal grandmother and maternal aunt had not completed the necessary prerequisites to adoption as of the time of the permanency hearing.

2005Rather, what is required is clear and convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will be realized within a reasonable time.’ [Citation.]” (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 101 ], fn. omitted.) There was clear and convincing evidence Gregory would be adopted within a reasonable time, despite the fact his maternal grandmother and maternal aunt had not completed the necessary prerequisites to adoption as of the time of the permanency hearing.

2015Only when information before the juvenile court is sufficient to show that the child is a member of a tribe, or is eligible for membership and is the child of a member, does [California Rules of Court,] rule [5.482(d)(2)] require compliance with all of the provisions of the ICWA.” (In re L.B. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1427 [internal cites omitted, superseded by rule on other grounds].) The requirement to provide active efforts applies only to an Indian child.