time of the termination hearing in Virginia

2012Although at the time of the termination hearing Beard was married and testified Radosinovich was no longer in her life, she permitted Radosinovich to remain or to re-enter the lives of her children after a report of sexual abuse and, after she received sexual abuse counseling, she permitted him in the residence despite a court order barring him, and she permitted him to be alone with the children. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56 , 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)

2012Although at the time of the termination hearing Beard was married and testified Radosinovich was no longer in her life, she permitted Radosinovich to remain or to re-enter the lives of her children after a report of sexual abuse and, after she received sexual abuse counseling, she permitted him in the residence despite a court order barring him, and she permitted him to be alone with the children. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56 , 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)

2012Although at the time of the termination hearing Beard was married and testified Radosinovich was no longer in her life, she permitted Radosinovich to remain or to re-enter the lives of her children after a report of sexual abuse and, after she received sexual abuse counseling, she permitted him in the residence despite a court order barring him, and she permitted him to be alone with the children. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56 , 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)

2012Although at the time of the termination hearing Beard was married and testified Radosinovich was no longer in her life, she permitted Radosinovich to remain or to re-enter the lives of her children after a report of sexual abuse and, after she received sexual abuse counseling, she permitted him in the residence despite a court order barring him, and she permitted him to be alone with the children. “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56 , 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990)

2005Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 338 , 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992), we have held that the trial judge “must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Id. at 338-39 , 417 S.E.2d at 4 (citation omitted).

2005Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 338 , 417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992), we have held that the trial judge “must determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Id. at 338-39 , 417 S.E.2d at 4 (citation omitted).

2011Servs., 44 Va. App. 247, 259 , 604 S.E.2d 737, 742 (2004) (“The best interests of the child are to be determined at the time of the termination hearing.”).

2011Servs., 44 Va. App. 247, 259 , 604 S.E.2d 737, 742 (2004) (“The best interests of the child are to be determined at the time of the termination hearing.”).

2008See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 , 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 2 So viewed, the evidence proved that at the time of the termination hearing in the trial court, T.G. was seven and one-half years old, T.M. was four and one-half years old, and L.M. was two and one-half years old. 3 In September 2005, at the time of L.M.’s birth, he and mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.

2008See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 , 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). 2 So viewed, the evidence proved that at the time of the termination hearing in the trial court, T.G. was seven and one-half years old, T.M. was four and one-half years old, and L.M. was two and one-half years old. 3 In September 2005, at the time of L.M.’s birth, he and mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.

2007We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883 , 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Department of Public Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280 , 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)).

2007We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883 , 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Department of Public Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280 , 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)).

2007We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883 , 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Department of Public Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280 , 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)).

2007We recognize that “‘[t]he termination of [residual] parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883 , 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Department of Public Welfare of the City of Richmond, 231 Va. 277, 280 , 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986)).

2003"While age of the parent or parents is doubtless an appropriate consideration in assessing 'good cause' in the context of Code § 16.1-283(C), it is not a circumstance which prevails over the best interests of the child." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 312 , 456 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1995).

2003"While age of the parent or parents is doubtless an appropriate consideration in assessing 'good cause' in the context of Code § 16.1-283(C), it is not a circumstance which prevails over the best interests of the child." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 312 , 456 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1995).