time of the termination hearing in Michigan

2022“Other considerations include the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 64 ; 874 NW2d 205 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 43 (citation

2022“Other considerations include the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 64 ; 874 NW2d 205 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 43 (citation

2018This Court explained in In re Olive/Metts: Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453 ; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Morris, 491 Mich 81 ; 815 NW2d 62 (2012); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52-53 ; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an “explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests,” Ma

2018This Court explained in In re Olive/Metts: Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453 ; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Morris, 491 Mich 81 ; 815 NW2d 62 (2012); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52-53 ; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an “explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests,” Ma

2024By the time of the termination hearing, respondent-father had violated his parole by committing another violent offense and was reincarcerated. “[A] parent’s failure to comply with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for the child.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214 ; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).

2024By the time of the termination hearing, respondent-father had violated his parole by committing another violent offense and was reincarcerated. “[A] parent’s failure to comply with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of a parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for the child.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214 ; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).

2022The trial court may also consider “a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), and a parent’s substance abuse problems, In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89 ; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). “[T]he fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s be

2022The trial court may also consider “a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014), and a parent’s substance abuse problems, In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 89 ; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). “[T]he fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s be

2018This Court explained in In re Olive/Metts: Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453 ; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Morris, 491 Mich 81 ; 815 NW2d 62 (2012); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52-53 ; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an “explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests,” Ma

2018This Court explained in In re Olive/Metts: Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453 ; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Morris, 491 Mich 81 ; 815 NW2d 62 (2012); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52-53 ; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an “explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests,” Ma

2018“Generally, when a child is removed from the parent’s custody, the petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal by adopting a service plan.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462 ; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

2018“Generally, when a child is removed from the parent’s custody, the petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal by adopting a service plan.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462 ; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

2018“Generally, when a child is removed from the parent’s custody, the petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal by adopting a service plan.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462 ; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

2018“Generally, when a child is removed from the parent’s custody, the petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal by adopting a service plan.” In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 462 ; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).

2018This Court explained in In re Olive/Metts: Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453 ; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Morris, 491 Mich 81 ; 815 NW2d 62 (2012); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52-53 ; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an “explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests,” Ma

2012Although the trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, In re IEM, 233 Mich App 438, 453 ; 592 NW2d 751 (1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Morris, 491 Mich 81 ; 815 NW2d 62 (2012); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52-53 ; 480 NW2d 293 (1991), the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an “explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests,” Mason, 486 Mich at 164 .

2017Given the young ages of the two boys, they likely needed “permanency, stability, and finality,” id., rather than being concerned about their own well-being in the aftermath of respondent’s assault of JMC.

2017Given the young ages of the two boys, they likely needed “permanency, stability, and finality,” id., rather than being concerned about their own well-being in the aftermath of respondent’s assault of JMC.

2017Oppositely, the child has never lived with respondent and never participated in 4 Because “[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32 , we need not separately consider whether the trial court properly terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). -7- overnight or unsupervised visits with him.

2017Oppositely, the child has never lived with respondent and never participated in 4 Because “[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32 , we need not separately consider whether the trial court properly terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). -7- overnight or unsupervised visits with him.

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

1999In such a setting, the client's "consent" would hardly solve the problem. [5] In this regard, the Comment to MRPC 1.11 states: Paragraph (c) does not disqualify other lawyers in the agency with which the lawyer in question has become associated. [6] Recall that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mr. Osborne's situation appeared to have stabilized—the hearing concerned only the parental rights of Ms. Osborne. [7] As noted, Mr. Wistrom has stated that, if he had "recalled having been involved with the representation of Dyphine Osborne, [he] would have immediately sought to be disqualified

2026Under MCL 712A.19a(8)(a),5 “the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination 3 A guardianship “allows the child to keep a relationship with the parent when placement with the parent is not possible.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 705 ; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).

2026Under MCL 712A.19a(8)(a),5 “the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination 3 A guardianship “allows the child to keep a relationship with the parent when placement with the parent is not possible.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 705 ; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).

2026Respondent’s “minimal progress” in addressing the remaining requirements of the service plan further supports that respondent will not be able to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication in a “reasonable time.” In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 49 ; 919 NW2d 427 (2018).

2026Respondent’s “minimal progress” in addressing the remaining requirements of the service plan further supports that respondent will not be able to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication in a “reasonable time.” In re Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 49 ; 919 NW2d 427 (2018).

2024In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434 .

2023Under all the circumstances, we do not have a firm and definite conviction, Mason, 486 Mich at 152 , that the trial court made a mistake by finding that a statutory basis for termination existed.1 “If a trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence, it is required to terminate parental rights if it finds from a preponderance of evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 637 ; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted);

2023Under all the circumstances, we do not have a firm and definite conviction, Mason, 486 Mich at 152 , that the trial court made a mistake by finding that a statutory basis for termination existed.1 “If a trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence, it is required to terminate parental rights if it finds from a preponderance of evidence on the whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 637 ; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted);

2023This Court then stated that it had reviewed the record and concluded “that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the primary condition leading to adjudication . . . continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.” Id.