time of the termination hearing in Pennsylvania

2022Id.; see, e.g., R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 512 (termination under section 2511(a)(8) was appropriate where the mother was not in a position to parent her children at the time of the termination hearing).

2020See id.; In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 512 (Pa.Super. 2006) (concluding that termination under subsection 2511(a)(8) was appropriate where the mother was not in a position to parent her children at the time of the termination hearing).

2017I.J., 972 A.2d at 11 ; see, e.g., R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 512 (termination under (a)(8) was appropriate where Mother was not in a position to parent her children at the time of the termination hearing).

2015See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b); In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 11 ; see, e.g., In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 512 (termination - 12 - J-S23015-15 under (a)(8) was appropriate where Mother was not in a position to parent her children at the time of the termination hearing).

2025See id. -9- J-A09027-25 In re H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233 , 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that “the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence” (citation omitted and some formatting altered)).

2019See In re T.S., supra. Nevertheless, that claim merits no relief concerning the two Children, T.Q.T.W. and T.Z.W.T., as they were too young to articulate a preferred outcome at the time of the termination hearing.

2022“If a parent fails to cooperate or appears incapable of benefiting from the reasonable efforts supplied over a realistic period of time, CYS has fulfilled its mandate and upon proof of satisfaction of the reasonable good faith effort, the termination petition may be granted.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

2020“If a parent fails to cooperate or appears incapable of benefiting from the reasonable efforts supplied over a realistic period of time, [the Agency] has fulfilled its mandate and[,] upon proof of satisfaction of the reasonable good faith effort, the termination petition may be granted.” In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa Super. 2003) (quotation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

2025See In re Z.P., supra. See also In re B.L.W., supra. Relevant to Section 2511(b), the Orphans’ Court observed: Finally, [giving] primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional need and welfare of the child, we found by clear and convincing evidence that termination best served the needs and welfare of [Child]. [Child] was under three years old at the time of the termination hearing.

2020The orphans’ court noted that Mother reengaged in drug and alcohol counseling at another provider in July of 2019; however, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother “was in danger of being unsuccessfully discharged again for poor attendance, declining drug screenings, and positive drug screenings.” Id.

2019Dr. Rosen did not conduct a bonding evaluation of Child and Father, but noted that, given their lack of contact, “it would be remarkable if there was a bond[.]” Id. at 20; see In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”). -7- J-S25004-19 In contrast, Child had been living with his foster family for thirty-eight months at the time of the termination hearing.

2019See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008) (observing that the relationship between K.Z.S. and his mother “must be fairly attenuated,” given that K.Z.S. had been in foster care most of his young life, and that he had only limited contact with his mother during that time).

2018See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether children are in pre-adoptive home and whether they have bond with foster parents).

2018See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 270 (“The Supreme Court cautioned against using the goal of reunification “to prolong instability for children when it becomes clear that parents will be - 16 – J-S52037-18 unable to provide their children’s basic needs in the near future.”).

2009See In re M.G., supra. ¶ 9 Moreover, the testimonial evidence reveals that, by the time of the termination hearing, the children had been placed together with the same foster family for a period of twenty-one months.

2009See In re M.G., supra . ¶ 9 Moreover, the testimonial evidence reveals that, by the time of the termination hearing, the children had been placed together with the same foster family for a period of twenty-one months.

2025Father is not a party to this appeal. 4 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa. (Footnote Continued Next Page) J-A04019-25 The trial court provided a thorough review of the facts in this matter: Briefly, Mother is the natural mother of [Child]. [Child’s] natural father is [Father]. [Father] has never played a role in [Child’s] life, and [Father’s] parental rights were terminated via a separate decree entered in this matter concurrently with the decree [in the instant case.] The Huntingdon County

2024The report was substantiated. ____________________________________________ 2 See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders briefing requirements to termination of parental rights appeals involving indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel). 3 Father is not a party to the present appeal.At the time of the termination hearing, Mother and Father did not live together and Father testified that he barely sees Mother.

2025Approximately three years later, at the time of the termination hearing, the orphans’ court found that Father had “not ____________________________________________ 4 We have explained that Section 2511(a)(8) “explicitly requires an evaluation of the ‘needs and welfare of the child’ prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the ‘developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.’” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2021This Court has concluded that termination is proper under subsection (a)(8) where “at the time of the termination hearing, [the parent’s] drug[-]related issues continued to impact [the child] and [the parent’s] ability to care for [the child].” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999 , 1006–07 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).12 Specifically, “[a] child cannot be returned to a home in which drug activity is occurring,” especially when drug activity is among the conditions that led to the initial removal, regardless of whether a parent continued to engage in personal drug use.13 Id.; In re Adoption of M.A.R., 59

2025In the Interest of C., 36 A.3d 601, 609-610 , B.C., 609-610, 2012 Pa. Pa Super.

2015See In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 610 (Pa.Super. 2012) (affirming termination where father’s mental and emotional issues, which require anger management and sexual offender treatment, remained unaddressed at the time of the termination hearing).

2026Id.; see also id. (noting Mother secured a housing voucher by the time of the termination hearing).

2025See In re A.J.C., 955 EDA 2019, 2019 WL 5095782 , at *8 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision) (holding when a petitioner files an amended petition in a termination of parental rights case “the original petition is superseded and rendered a virtual nullity”) (citing Brooks v. B & R Touring Co., 939 A.2d 398, 402 (Pa.Super. 2007)); see also Interest of J.R.C., ___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL 548386 , at *5 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2025) (non-precedential decision) (observing that § 2511(b) applies to the date of service of an amended termination of parental rights petition). - 11 - J-S05013-25 at the time of

2025See id.

2025Because we affirm the termination of parental rights, the appeals from goal change orders are moot.1 See Int. of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa.Super. 2021).

2025See id. (stating “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to - 13 - J-S09029-25 assume parenting responsibilities”) (citation omitted).

2025Interest of M.M., 302 A.3d 189, 197 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned up). -3- J-A15011-25 All four children were adjudicated dependent and placed into foster homes.3 When they entered care, the children were not up to date medically or dentally but have since had those lapses addressed.

2025See id. -9- J-A09027-25 In re H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233 , 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that “the trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence” (citation omitted and some formatting altered)).

2025See In re Z.P., supra. See also In re B.L.W., supra. Relevant to Section 2511(b), the Orphans’ Court observed: Finally, [giving] primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional need and welfare of the child, we found by clear and convincing evidence that termination best served the needs and welfare of [Child]. [Child] was under three years old at the time of the termination hearing.

2025Id. at 569, 571 .

2023To the extent Father argues that termination was improper because of the Agency’s lack of communication or failure to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Child, Section 2511(a)(2) does not require “a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to termination of parental rights.” In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 2014); see id. at 672- 73 (holding that the provision of reasonable efforts to reunify parents and children is not a requirement for termination).

2023To the extent Father argues that termination was improper because of the Agency’s lack of communication or failure to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with Child, Section 2511(a)(2) does not require “a court to consider the reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to termination of parental rights.” In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 2014); see id. at 672- 73 (holding that the provision of reasonable efforts to reunify parents and children is not a requirement for termination).

2022See Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 449 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“a child develops a meaningful bond with a caretaker when the caretaker provides stability, safety, and security regularly and consistently to the child over an extended period of time.”).

2022See In re A.K., 936 A.2d at 533 .

2022“Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2021N.T., 9/2/20, at 24, 29-32; see also In re K.C.F., 928 A.2d 1046, 1053-54 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 936 A.2d 41 (Pa. 2007) (“[T]he termination statute does not require children to be placed in a pre- adoptive home as a precondition to termination of parental rights.”). - 16 - J-A07011-21 Judgment Entered.