time of the termination hearing in North Carolina

2026The neglect must exist “at the time of the termination hearing.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 , 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708 , 713- 15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231-32 (1984)).

2026The neglect must exist “at the time of the termination hearing.” In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 , 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708 , 713- 15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231-32 (1984)).

2026See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 , 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (“Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the termination hearing or, if the child has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.”).

2026See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 , 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (“Termination of parental rights based upon this statutory ground requires a showing of neglect at the time of the termination hearing or, if the child has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.”).

2026In any event, “[t]he absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights.” In re D.H., 232 N.C.

2026The “absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights.” In re D.H., 232 N.C.

2025Because the trial court failed to make any findings regarding respondent-father’s conduct demonstrating neglect by abandonment “at the time of the termination hearing,” In re Young, 346 N.C. at 248 , its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) is unsupported.

2017"The trial court must ... consider any evidence of changed conditions" since the prior adjudication of neglect and "make an independent determination of whether neglect authorizing termination of the respondent's parental rights existed at the time of the termination hearing." Id . at 715-16, 319 S.E.2d at 232-33 (emphasis added); accord In re Young , 346 N.C. 244 , 248, 485 S.E.2d 612 , 615 (1997) ("Termination of parental rights for neglect may not be based solely on past conditions which no longer exist." (citation omitted)).

2018App. 214 , 220, 641 S.E.2d 725 , 729 (2007) ("Neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing[.]"), with N.C.

2015Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), "[n]eglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing." In re C.W., 182 N.C.App. 214 , 220, 641 S.E.2d 725 , 729 (2007).

2022Although respondent-mother argues that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that her methods of parenting Rachel had changed because the trial court had conditioned the reinstatement of her visitation with Rachel in February 2021 upon the making of a recommendation that such visits be resumed by Rachel’s therapist and because DHS had failed to find a new therapist for Rachel by the time of the termination hearing and cites the decision of the Court of Appeals in In re Shermer, 156 N.C.

2022Although respondent-mother argues that she did not have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that her methods of parenting Rachel had changed because the trial court had conditioned the reinstatement of her visitation with Rachel in February 2021 upon the making of a recommendation that such visits be resumed by Rachel’s therapist and because DHS had failed to find a new therapist for Rachel by the time of the termination hearing and cites the decision of the Court of Appeals in In re Shermer, 156 N.C.

2020Thus, as was the case in In re M.A.W., we hold that “[t]he trial court properly found that past neglect was established by [YFS] and that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect[,]” 370 N.C. at 156 , 804 S.E.2d at 518 , given that the trial court’s findings provide ample justification for its conclusion that respondent-father was unable to properly care for Sarah at the time of the termination hearing, see In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715 , 319 S.E.2d at 232 (explaining that the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances in addition to evidence of the prior adjudication

2020Thus, as was the case in In re M.A.W., we hold that “[t]he trial court properly found that past neglect was established by [YFS] and that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect[,]” 370 N.C. at 156 , 804 S.E.2d at 518 , given that the trial court’s findings provide ample justification for its conclusion that respondent-father was unable to properly care for Sarah at the time of the termination hearing, see In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715 , 319 S.E.2d at 232 (explaining that the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances in addition to evidence of the prior adjudication

2021When it cannot be shown that the parent is neglecting his or her child at the time of the termination hearing because “the child has been separated from the parent for a long period of time, there must be a showing of past neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88 , 95 (2020) (quoting In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843 (2016))5; see also In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80. ¶ 31 As an initial matter, we note that this Court has held that [a] trial court is entitled to terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child for neglect based upon abandonment pursuant to N

2021For that reason, “[i]n order to terminate a parent’s rights on the ground of neglect by abandonment, the trial court must make IN RE D.T.H. 2021-NCSC-106 Opinion of the Court findings that the parent has engaged in conduct ‘which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child’ as of the time of the termination hearing.” Id. (quoting In re C.K.C., 263 N.C.

2020Thus, as was the case in In re M.A.W., we hold that “[t]he trial court properly found that past neglect was established by [YFS] and that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect[,]” 370 N.C. at 156 , 804 S.E.2d at 518 , given that the trial court’s findings provide ample justification for its conclusion that respondent-father was unable to properly care for Sarah at the time of the termination hearing, see In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715 , 319 S.E.2d at 232 (explaining that the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances in addition to evidence of the prior adjudication

2020Thus, as was the case in In re M.A.W., we hold that “[t]he trial court properly found that past neglect was established by [YFS] and that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect[,]” 370 N.C. at 156 , 804 S.E.2d at 518 , given that the trial court’s findings provide ample justification for its conclusion that respondent-father was unable to properly care for Sarah at the time of the termination hearing, see In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715 , 319 S.E.2d at 232 (explaining that the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances in addition to evidence of the prior adjudication

2019We agree with the Court of Appeals that, “in order to terminate a parent’s rights on the ground of neglect by abandonment, the trial court must make findings that the parent has engaged in conduct ‘which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child’ as of the time of the termination hearing.” In re C.K.C., 822 S.E.2d 741, 745 (N.C.

2019We agree with the Court of Appeals that, “in order to terminate a parent’s rights on the ground of neglect by abandonment, the trial court must make findings that the parent has engaged in conduct ‘which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child’ as of the time of the termination hearing.” In re C.K.C., 822 S.E.2d 741, 745 (N.C.

2021Although the trial court is entitled to terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child in the event that neglect is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing, see, e.g., In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592 , 599–600 (2020) (stating that “this Court has recognized that the neglect ground can support termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their child by abandonment”), the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V. 2021-NCSC-130 Opinion of the Court fact that “a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the termination hearing” would make

2021Although the trial court is entitled to terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child in the event that neglect is currently occurring at the time of the termination hearing, see, e.g., In re K.C.T., 375 N.C. 592 , 599–600 (2020) (stating that “this Court has recognized that the neglect ground can support termination . . . if a parent is presently neglecting their child by abandonment”), the IN RE A.E., J.V., E.V., A.V. 2021-NCSC-130 Opinion of the Court fact that “a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the termination hearing” would make

2021See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407 . ¶ 26 The above unchallenged findings of fact detail the historical facts of the case and demonstrate that, at the time of the termination hearing, respondent had failed to complete the requirements of his case plan designed to address the issues that IN RE J.E., F.E., AND D.E. 2021-NCSC-47 Opinion of the Court previously resulted in the adjudication of the children as neglected juveniles.

2021See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407 . ¶ 26 The above unchallenged findings of fact detail the historical facts of the case and demonstrate that, at the time of the termination hearing, respondent had failed to complete the requirements of his case plan designed to address the issues that IN RE J.E., F.E., AND D.E. 2021-NCSC-47 Opinion of the Court previously resulted in the adjudication of the children as neglected juveniles.

2015Moreover, we have held that "the absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights." See In re D.H., --- N.C.App. ----, ----, 753 S.E.2d 732 , 736, (2014) (citing In re Norris, 65 N.C.App. 269 , 275, 310 S.E.2d 25 , 29 (1983) ("It suffices to say that such a finding [of adoptability] is not required in order to terminate parental rights."), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744 , 315 S.E.2d 703 (1984) ).

2015Moreover, we have held that "the absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights." See In re D.H., --- N.C.App. ----, ----, 753 S.E.2d 732 , 736, (2014) (citing In re Norris, 65 N.C.App. 269 , 275, 310 S.E.2d 25 , 29 (1983) ("It suffices to say that such a finding [of adoptability] is not required in order to terminate parental rights."), cert. denied, 310 N.C. 744 , 315 S.E.2d 703 (1984) ).

2018"Neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing, or if the parent has been separated from the child for an extended period of time, the petitioner must show that the parent has neglected the child in the past and that the parent is likely to neglect the child in the future." In re C.W. & J.W. , 182 N.C.

2018Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) requires a showing of neglect at the time of the termination hearing , rather than during the six months that immediately preceded the petitioner's filing of the petition. 2 Compare In re C.W. , 182 N.C.

2020In that matter, the Court of Appeals determined “the trial court’s findings and conclusions do not adequately account for respondent- mother’s circumstances at the time of the termination hearing.” Id. at 38 , 799 S.E.2d at 452 .

2020In that matter, the Court of Appeals determined “the trial court’s findings and conclusions do not adequately account for respondent- mother’s circumstances at the time of the termination hearing.” Id. at 38 , 799 S.E.2d at 452 .

2018See, e.g. , In re Yocum , 158 N.C.

2007In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 714-15 , 319 S.E.2d 227, 231-32 (1984) ("We hold that evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child— including an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights" but "[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect."). *730 A parent's incarceration may be relevant to whether his child is neglected; however, "`[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termi

2017App. at 10 , 618 S.E.2d at 247 ("Incarceration, standing alone, is [not] a sword ... in a termination of parental rights decision." (internal quotation marks omitted)), Father nonetheless failed to make reasonable progress on the conditions leading to removal.

2007In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 714-15 , 319 S.E.2d 227, 231-32 (1984) ("We hold that evidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child— including an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights" but "[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect."). *730 A parent's incarceration may be relevant to whether his child is neglected; however, "`[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termi

2026Such “neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing.” In re B.S.O., 234 N.C.

2024Such “neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing.” In re B.S.O., 234 N.C.

2022Likewise, a trial court may consider “whether the parent has made any meaningful progress in eliminating the conditions that led to the removal of the children.” In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645 , 654 (2020) (quoting In re J.H.K., 215 N.C.

2022Likewise, a trial court may consider “whether the parent has made any meaningful progress in eliminating the conditions that led to the removal of the children.” In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645 , 654 (2020) (quoting In re J.H.K., 215 N.C.

2022App. 525, 531-32 , 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009) (citation omitted).

2022App. 525, 531-32 , 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009) (citation omitted).

2021P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647 , 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). ¶ 16 Here, conclusion of law 3 states as follows: [R]espondent father has willfully left the [children] in foster care or placement outside the home for a period of more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the [children] as prescribed by [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(a)(2). ¶ 17 Reviewing this issue de novo, we hold the trial court’s findings of fact support a conclusion that respondent-father had

2021P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647 , 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). ¶ 16 Here, conclusion of law 3 states as follows: [R]espondent father has willfully left the [children] in foster care or placement outside the home for a period of more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the [c]ourt that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the [children] as prescribed by [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(a)(2). ¶ 17 Reviewing this issue de novo, we hold the trial court’s findings of fact support a conclusion that respondent-father had

2021Even if respondent’s bond with Nancy was strong and positive, “the bond between parent and child is just one of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019). ¶ 23 Ultimately, the trial court was presented with relevant and reliable evidence regarding the bond between respondent and Nancy as it existed at the time of the termination hearing, and it properly made findings based on that evidence.

2021Even if respondent’s bond with Nancy was strong and positive, “the bond between parent and child is just one of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019). ¶ 23 Ultimately, the trial court was presented with relevant and reliable evidence regarding the bond between respondent and Nancy as it existed at the time of the termination hearing, and it properly made findings based on that evidence.

2021See In re I.G.C., 373 N.C. 201 , 206 (2019) (affirming a trial court’s determination that a parent’s parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B- 1111(a)(2) on the grounds that the trial court’s findings demonstrated that “respondent-mother waited too long to begin working on her case plan and that, as a result, she had not made reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the time of the termination hearing”); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 405 (1982) (affirming a trial court’s determination that a parent’s parental rights we

2021See In re I.G.C., 373 N.C. 201 , 206 (2019) (affirming a trial court’s determination that a parent’s parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B- 1111(a)(2) on the grounds that the trial court’s findings demonstrated that “respondent-mother waited too long to begin working on her case plan and that, as a result, she had not made reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the time of the termination hearing”); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 405 (1982) (affirming a trial court’s determination that a parent’s parental rights we

2019In re O.C. , 171 N.C.

2019See In re O.C. & O.B. , 171 N.C.