time of the termination hearing in Georgia

2012W., 296 Ga. App. 189, 192-193 (1) (a) ( 674 SE2d 338 ) (2009). 21 The mother’s circumstances at the time of the termination hearing were significantly different from the circumstances which caused M.

2012See In the Interest of P.D.W., 296 Ga.App. 189, 193 (1)(a), 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (current deprivation found for same reasons as alleged in most recent petition: mother not in treatment for drug issues, did not have stable housing, and paid no child support); see also In the Interest of T.B., 267 Ga.App. 484, 486-487 (1), 600 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (father's failure to support child, even in absence of order directing father to pay specific amount *517 is compelling evidence he is not an able parent). (b) The father contends that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence to show that the ca

2012W., 296 Ga. App. 189, 192-193 (1) (a) ( 674 SE2d 338 ) (2009). 21 The mother’s circumstances at the time of the termination hearing were significantly different from the circumstances which caused M.

2012See In the Interest of P.D.W., 296 Ga.App. 189, 193 (1)(a), 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (current deprivation found for same reasons as alleged in most recent petition: mother not in treatment for drug issues, did not have stable housing, and paid no child support); see also In the Interest of T.B., 267 Ga.App. 484, 486-487 (1), 600 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (father's failure to support child, even in absence of order directing father to pay specific amount *517 is compelling evidence he is not an able parent). (b) The father contends that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence to show that the ca

2012E., 309 Ga. App. 51, 58 (1) (d) ( 711 SE2d 5 ) (2011) (whole court) (“[0]ur law requires a juvenile court to consider not only the relationship between the parent and child at the time of the termination hearing, but also what might happen if the child were returned to the parent given the likelihood that the deprivation under which the child has been suffering would continue after a reunion with that parent.”).

2012E., 309 Ga. App. 51, 58 (1) (d) ( 711 SE2d 5 ) (2011) (whole court) (“[0]ur law requires a juvenile court to consider not only the relationship between the parent and child at the time of the termination hearing, but also what might happen if the child were returned to the parent given the likelihood that the deprivation under which the child has been suffering would continue after a reunion with that parent.”).

2011See OCGA § 15-11-2(8) (defining "deprived child" to mean, inter alia, child who is without proper parental care or control); In the Interest of R.C.M., 284 Ga.App. 791, 798 (III)(1), 645 S.E.2d 363 (2007) (children became deprived when their father, who was their sole legal guardian and provider, became incarcerated); In the Interest of J.L.M., 204 Ga.App. 46, 48 (1), 418 S.E.2d 415 (1992) (children whose parent was incarcerated were deprived under OCGA § 15-11-2(8), despite being in the temporary custody of loving guardians). (b) Lack of parental care or control as the cause of the deprivatio

2011See OCGA § 15-11-2(8) (defining "deprived child" to mean, inter alia, child who is without proper parental care or control); In the Interest of R.C.M., 284 Ga.App. 791, 798 (III)(1), 645 S.E.2d 363 (2007) (children became deprived when their father, who was their sole legal guardian and provider, became incarcerated); In the Interest of J.L.M., 204 Ga.App. 46, 48 (1), 418 S.E.2d 415 (1992) (children whose parent was incarcerated were deprived under OCGA § 15-11-2(8), despite being in the temporary custody of loving guardians). (b) Lack of parental care or control as the cause of the deprivatio

2012See In the Interest of K.A.S., 279 Ga.App. 643, 650-651 (1)(b), (c), 632 S.E.2d 433 (2006) (evidence including that mother "failed to complete two of the most important goals of her case plan, to obtain and maintain a stable, legal income and housing," was sufficient to show that the deprivation was due to lack of parental care and control and that the causes of the deprivation were likely to continue); In the Interest of M.N.R., 282 Ga. App. 46, 47-48 , 637 S.E.2d 777 (2006) (even assuming that a mother had stopped using drugs by the time of the termination hearing, evidence including her adm

2012N. R., 282 Ga. App. 46, 47-48 ( 637 SE2d 777 ) (2006) (even assuming that a mother had stopped using drugs by the time of the termination hearing, evidence including her admission that she had not completed a drug treatment program she enrolled in six months before the hearing and had relapsed after completing an earlier program was sufficient to affirm the juvenile court’s judgment that the deprivation was likely to continue). (b) We next consider whether evidence supports the finding that the continued deprivation of the boys is likely to cause them serious harm.

2016J., 226 Ga. App. 303, 308 (2) (b) ( 486 SE2d 899 ) (1997) (reversing termination where none of the witnesses testified that the child’s relationship with the father was harmful and evidence showed that the father and child had a positive relationship, to the extent permitted by the father’s incarceration).

2016J., 226 Ga. App. 303, 308 (2) (b) ( 486 SE2d 899 ) (1997) (reversing termination where none of the witnesses testified that the child’s relationship with the father was harmful and evidence showed that the father and child had a positive relationship, to the extent permitted by the father’s incarceration).

2016See id.

2016See id.

2015F. G., 281 Ga. App. 22, 26, 27 (1) ( 635 SE2d 338 ) (2006) (although the mother had completed most of her case plan goals and wished to be part of her child’s life, the evidence showed that she lacked the mental capacity to care for the child without “around-the-clock assistance from others,” something DFCS was not obligated to provide; given the mother’s mental capacity, her inability to care for her child by herself, and the fact that the child’s foster parents wished to adopt him, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights ser

2015F. G., 281 Ga. App. 22, 26-27 (1) ( 635 SE2d 338 ) (2006) (although the mother had completed most of her case plan goals and wished to be part of her child’s life, the evidence showed that she lacked the mental capacity to care for the child without “around-the-clock assistance from others,” something DFCS was not obligated to provide; given the mother’s mental capacity, her inability to care for her child by herself, and the fact that the child’s foster parents wished to adopt him, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights serv

2012See, e.g., In the Interest of K.C.W., 297 Ga. App. 714, 718 (2) (a) ( 678 SE2d 343 ) (2009); In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga. App. 737, 740 (1) (a) ( 650 SE2d 397 ) (2007).

2009See In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga.App. at 741 (1)(c), 650 S.E.2d 397 ; In the Interest of K.W., 283 Ga.App. at 401 (1)(c), 641 S.E.2d 598 ; In the Interest of J.W.M., 273 Ga.App. 20, 22-23 (1)(c), 614 S.E.2d 163 (2005).

2012(Citations and footnotes omitted.) In the Interest of Z.H.T., 302 Ga.App. 424, 429 (1)(a), 691 S.E.2d 292 (2010).

2011Current deprivation "may be established by showing that the conditions upon which an earlier finding of deprivation was based still exist at the time of the termination hearing." In the Interest of Z.H.T., 302 Ga.App. 424, 429 (1)(a), 691 S.E.2d 292 (2010). [14] Because I agree with all that is said in Division 1 of the majority's opinion, the reasoning and holding contained therein is to be treated as binding precedent of this Court and is not to be considered as merely physical precedent. [15] See Thorne v. Padgett, 259 Ga. 650, 651 , 386 S.E.2d 155 (1989).

2010See In the Interest of A. G., 253 Ga. App. 88, 90-91 (1) (c) ( 558 SE2d 62 ) (2001) (trial court determines whether a parent’s conduct indicates hope of rehabilitation). (d) Serious Harm to Child.

2010See In the Interest of A. G., 253 Ga. App. 88, 90-91 (1) (c) ( 558 SE2d 62 ) (2001) (trial court determines whether a parent’s conduct indicates hope of rehabilitation). (d) Serious Harm to Child.

2012NOTES [1] For the sake of clarity, we refer to the boys in this opinion as the "older boy" and the "younger boy." The older boy was born in January 2007, and the younger boy was born in October 2009. [2] The parental rights of the father also were terminated, but that is not an issue in this appeal. [3] See In the Interest of M.S.S., 308 Ga.App. 614 , 708 S.E.2d 570 (2011). [4] At the hearing, the mother estimated that she would remain incarcerated until the middle of 2011, and after that, she would serve another seven years on probation, during which time she presumably would be subject to ra

2011S. S., 308 Ga. App. 614, 626 ( 708 SE2d 570 ) (2011) (Dillard, J., concurring specially) (rejecting “the majority’s assertion that a natural parent’s rights can be terminated merely because the mother failed to satisfy certain elements of the State’s reunification plan (e.g., securing stable employment and housing), or because she was not financially or emotionally capable of parenting her child at the time of the termination hearing”).

2014F., 318 Ga. App. 135, 145-146 (1) ( 733 SE2d 432 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 Although the parents argue that they have made improvements to their lives since the 2006 deprivation finding, some of the circumstances that led to the deprivation finding still existed or had resumed at the time of the termination hearing.

2014F., 318 Ga. App. 135, 145-146 (1) ( 733 SE2d 432 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 Although the parents argue that they have made improvements to their lives since the 2006 deprivation finding, some of the circumstances that led to the deprivation finding still existed or had resumed at the time of the termination hearing.

2016S., 329 Ga. App. 226, 230-31 (1) (b) (i) ( 764 SE2d 559 ) (2014) (physical precedent only) (insufficient evidence of harm if rights of father, incarcerated on accountability-court contempt sanctions of 48 days at the time of the termination hearing, were terminated); In the Interest of K.

2016S., 329 Ga. App. 226, 230-31 (1) (b) (i) ( 764 SE2d 559 ) (2014) (physical precedent only) (insufficient evidence of harm if rights of father, incarcerated on accountability-court contempt sanctions of 48 days at the time of the termination hearing, were terminated); In the Interest of K.

2012See, e.g., In the Interest of K.C.W., 297 Ga. App. 714, 718 (2) (a) ( 678 SE2d 343 ) (2009); In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga. App. 737, 740 (1) (a) ( 650 SE2d 397 ) (2007).

2009See In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga.App. at 741 (1)(c), 650 S.E.2d 397 ; In the Interest of K.W., 283 Ga.App. at 401 (1)(c), 641 S.E.2d 598 ; In the Interest of J.W.M., 273 Ga.App. 20, 22-23 (1)(c), 614 S.E.2d 163 (2005).

2015While the superior court correctly found that the first offender pleas did not constitute convictions at the time of the termination hearing, see Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 70 (4) ( 694 SE2d 316 ) (2010), they still constituted guilty pleas to the offenses of theft by *219 taking that required successful completion of Pait’s probated sentences.

2015While the superior court correctly found that the first offender pleas did not constitute convictions at the time of the termination hearing, see Humphreys v. State, 287 Ga. 63, 70 (4) ( 694 SE2d 316 ) (2010), they still constituted guilty pleas to the offenses of theft by *219 taking that required successful completion of Pait’s probated sentences.

2015“Unlike other probated sentences the [first offender] defendant is not merely serving his sentence outside the confines of prison, but is serving a period on probation to determine whether or not the prisoner maybe rehabilitated.” State v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 316, 318 ( 210 SE2d 790 ) (1974).

2015“Unlike other probated sentences the [first offender] defendant is not merely serving his sentence outside the confines of prison, but is serving a period on probation to determine whether or not the prisoner maybe rehabilitated.” State v. Wiley, 233 Ga. 316, 318 ( 210 SE2d 790 ) (1974).

2012See In the Interest of P.D.W., 296 Ga.App. 189, 193 (1)(a), 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (current deprivation found for same reasons as alleged in most recent petition: mother not in treatment for drug issues, did not have stable housing, and paid no child support); see also In the Interest of T.B., 267 Ga.App. 484, 486-487 (1), 600 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (father's failure to support child, even in absence of order directing father to pay specific amount *517 is compelling evidence he is not an able parent). (b) The father contends that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence to show that the ca

2012This may be established by showing that the conditions upon which an earlier finding of deprivation was based still exist at the time of the termination hearing.11 10 In the Interest of S. D., 316 Ga. App. 86, 89 (2) ( 728 SE2d 749 ) (2012); In the Interest of C.

2012This may be established by showing that the conditions upon which an earlier finding of deprivation was based still exist at the time of the termination hearing.11 10 In the Interest of S. D., 316 Ga. App. 86, 89 (2) ( 728 SE2d 749 ) (2012); In the Interest of C.

2012See, e.g., In the Interest of K.C.W., 297 Ga. App. 714, 718 (2) (a) ( 678 SE2d 343 ) (2009); In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga. App. 737, 740 (1) (a) ( 650 SE2d 397 ) (2007).

2012See In the Interest of K.A.S., 279 Ga.App. 643, 650-651 (1)(b), (c), 632 S.E.2d 433 (2006) (evidence including that mother "failed to complete two of the most important goals of her case plan, to obtain and maintain a stable, legal income and housing," was sufficient to show that the deprivation was due to lack of parental care and control and that the causes of the deprivation were likely to continue); In the Interest of M.N.R., 282 Ga. App. 46, 47-48 , 637 S.E.2d 777 (2006) (even assuming that a mother had stopped using drugs by the time of the termination hearing, evidence including her adm

2012See In the Interest of K.A.S., 279 Ga.App. 643, 650-651 (1)(b), (c), 632 S.E.2d 433 (2006) (evidence including that mother "failed to complete two of the most important goals of her case plan, to obtain and maintain a stable, legal income and housing," was sufficient to show that the deprivation was due to lack of parental care and control and that the causes of the deprivation were likely to continue); In the Interest of M.N.R., 282 Ga. App. 46, 47-48 , 637 S.E.2d 777 (2006) (even assuming that a mother had stopped using drugs by the time of the termination hearing, evidence including her adm

2012See In the Interest of P.D.W., 296 Ga.App. 189, 193 (1)(a), 674 S.E.2d 338 (2009) (current deprivation found for same reasons as alleged in most recent petition: mother not in treatment for drug issues, did not have stable housing, and paid no child support); see also In the Interest of T.B., 267 Ga.App. 484, 486-487 (1), 600 S.E.2d 432 (2004) (father's failure to support child, even in absence of order directing father to pay specific amount *517 is compelling evidence he is not an able parent). (b) The father contends that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence to show that the ca

2012See, e.g., In the Interest of K.C.W., 297 Ga. App. 714, 718 (2) (a) ( 678 SE2d 343 ) (2009); In the Interest of R.N.H., 286 Ga. App. 737, 740 (1) (a) ( 650 SE2d 397 ) (2007).