time of the termination hearing in Texas

2018See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.

2008Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (Vernon 2002). 16: Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 17: C.H ., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . 18: Id. 19: Id. 20: See In re S.M.L. , 171 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)(holding clear and convincing evidence existed that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest where, among other factors, father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and had a pattern of criminal and violent conduct).

2019See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 805 (discussing the father’s criminal acts and noting there was “no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment”); In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d at 85 (finding evidence legally insufficient to support an endangerment finding and noting the father “was given probation . . . not imprisonment” and “there was no conviction at the time of the termination hearing, and thus, the length of imprisonment, if any, was speculative”).

2010We cannot conclude that the children’s best interests are served by having their relationship with Mother permanently severed based on alleged facts that a court or jury could later find to be 23 unproven.20 See In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (―[A]s to [a father’s] indictment on charges of aggravated robbery, although he was incarcerated while awaiting trial on that charge, there was no conviction at the time of the termination hearing and, thus, the length of imprisonment, if any, was speculative.‖); In re S.R.L., 243 S.W.3d 232, 236 (Tex. App

2008Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (Vernon 2002). 16: Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 17: C.H ., 89 S.W.3d at 27 . 18: Id. 19: Id. 20: See In re S.M.L. , 171 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)(holding clear and convincing evidence existed that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest where, among other factors, father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and had a pattern of criminal and violent conduct).

2008DELIVERED: July 3, 2008 20 … See In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d 472, 480 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)(holding clear and convincing evidence existed that termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest where, among other factors, father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and had a pattern of criminal and violent conduct). 10 11

2008See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 638-39 .

2008See In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d at 638-39 .

2017“When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent.” Id.

2016“When children are too young to express their desires, the fact finder may consider that the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with a parent.” Id.

2010Instead, the appellant--who, unlike Ryan, was incarcerated for his juvenile offenses at the time of the termination hearing--argued that "the conduct for which he is incarcerated occurred over three years prior to the termination hearing and was, therefore, too remote to support termination of his parental rights." In re K.M.M. , 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.--Eastland 1999, no pet.).

2010Instead, the appellant—who, unlike Ryan, was incarcerated for his juvenile offenses at the time of the termination hearing—argued that “the conduct for which he is incarcerated occurred over three years prior to the termination hearing and was, therefore, too remote to support termination of his parental rights.” In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225 , 228 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.).

2020See In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816, 818, 820 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (finding that the child, who was “almost four years old” at the time of trial, was “too young to have stated his desires”). 18 As to the second factor, Fisher stated that M.J. is “non-verbal” which “is a safety concern” because it means the child would not be able to communicate if something bad happened.

2019See In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 805 (discussing the father’s criminal acts and noting there was “no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment”); In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d at 85 (finding evidence legally insufficient to support an endangerment finding and noting the father “was given probation . . . not imprisonment” and “there was no conviction at the time of the termination hearing, and thus, the length of imprisonment, if any, was speculative”).

2019In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 647 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied).

2019“When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider whether the children have bonded with the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with the parent.” In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 369 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2015“If the imprisonment of the parent displays a voluntary, deliberate and conscious course of conduct, it qualifies as conduct that endangers the child.” Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617 (noting that offenses that occurred before the child’s birth may still be considered as part of a course of conduct that endangers the child); see In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (fact finder may infer that past conduct endangering the child’s well-being may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent).

2010We cannot conclude that the children’s best interests are served by having their relationship with Mother permanently severed based on alleged facts that a court or jury could later find to be 23 unproven.20 See In re A.S., 261 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (―[A]s to [a father’s] indictment on charges of aggravated robbery, although he was incarcerated while awaiting trial on that charge, there was no conviction at the time of the termination hearing and, thus, the length of imprisonment, if any, was speculative.‖); In re S.R.L., 243 S.W.3d 232, 236 (Tex. App

2010We note that in this case, the conduct of which Ryan was accused as a juvenile occurred over 12 years prior to the termination hearing. 33 of an improper judgment.” Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. 2007); see Tex. R.