Morgan rule in Illinois

2015See People v. Petrenko, 385 Ill.

2015See People v. Petrenko, 385 Ill.

2011Finally, the court found that the governmental interest "weigh[ed] heavily" in favor of the State, noting that "[t]he State has a strong interest in detaining `mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public,'" ( Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987))), and that "`it is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions.'" Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting In re Personal Restraint Petition of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1 , 857 P.2

2011Finally, the court found that the governmental interest "weigh[ed] heavily" in favor of the State, noting that "[t]he State has a strong interest in detaining `mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public,'" ( Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987))), and that "`it is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions.'" Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting In re Personal Restraint Petition of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1 , 857 P.2

2011See Gusciara, 346 Ill.App.3d at 1019-20 , 282 Ill.Dec. 449 , 806 N.E.2d 746 ("We hold that, with one exception to be noted, Morgan 's construction of Title VII's limitations provision applies to the interpretation of section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act."). [1] ¶ 25 RELATED CONDUCT ¶ 26 Returning to the question of whether the shoulder rub had "no relation" to the prior acts, petitioners argue that the shoulder rub was an isolated example of nonsexual physical conduct that is distinct from the series of "sexually tinged comments and photographs" that the Commission found created the hostile work en

2011See Gusciara, 346 Ill.App.3d at 1019-20 , 282 Ill.Dec. 449 , 806 N.E.2d 746 ("We hold that, with one exception to be noted, Morgan 's construction of Title VII's limitations provision applies to the interpretation of section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act."). [1] ¶ 25 RELATED CONDUCT ¶ 26 Returning to the question of whether the shoulder rub had "no relation" to the prior acts, petitioners argue that the shoulder rub was an isolated example of nonsexual physical conduct that is distinct from the series of "sexually tinged comments and photographs" that the Commission found created the hostile work en

2004Under Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7) and 315(g), a party is required to raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority in its appellate brief and in its *1161 petition for leave to appeal to avoid waiver. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(g); 188 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Patterson, 154 Ill.2d 414, 454-55 , 182 Ill.Dec. 592 , 610 N.E.2d 16 (1992).

2004Under Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7) and 315(g), a party is required to raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority in its appellate brief and in its petition for leave to appeal to avoid waiver. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(g); 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Patterson, 154 Ill. 2d 414, 454-55 (1992).

2003The appellate court noted that to allow such a conviction for felony murder to stand could "effectively eliminate the second degree murder statute" and also "eliminate the need for the *1197 State to prove an intentional or knowing killing in most murder cases." People v. Morgan, 307 Ill.App.3d 707, 712 , 240 Ill.

2003The appellate court noted that to allow such a conviction for felony murder to stand could “effectively eliminate the second degree murder statute” and also “eliminate the need for the State to prove an intentional or knowing killing in most murder cases.” People v. Morgan, 307 Ill.

1997In People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 134-35 (1994), we held that there was no distinction between the two stages of sentencing for purposes of the Morgan doctrine, because "the jury involved in any aspect of the death sentencing procedure must be fair and impartial.” Thus, on remand, defendant clearly had a right to both stages of the hearing.

1997In People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 134-35 (1994), we held that there was no distinction between the two stages of sentencing for purposes of the Morgan doctrine, because "the jury involved in any aspect of the death sentencing procedure must be fair and impartial.” Thus, on remand, defendant clearly had a right to both stages of the hearing.

1997Therefore, because this exception must be narrowly construed (Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242 ), we find that the Morgan rule does not fall within its boundaries.

1997Therefore, because this exception must be narrowly construed (Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242 ), we find that the Morgan rule does not fall within its boundaries.

2011Lockard relies on the Commission’s determination that the massage was not qualitatively different to support the proposition that the massage incident was, independently, sexual in nature, and, for timeliness purposes, was “an act contributing to the *** hostile environment.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 . ¶ 28 The Commission’s finding that the shoulder massage was related to the acts occurring outside the 180-day filing period, and thus was an act contributing to and part of Lockard’s claim of a hostile work environment based on Jones’s acts occurring outside the 180-day 1 The one exception to the

2011Lockard relies on the Commission’s determination that the massage was not qualitatively different to support the proposition that the massage incident was, independently, sexual in nature, and, for timeliness purposes, was “an act contributing to the *** hostile environment.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 . ¶ 28 The Commission’s finding that the shoulder massage was related to the acts occurring outside the 180-day filing period, and thus was an act contributing to and part of Lockard’s claim of a hostile work environment based on Jones’s acts occurring outside the 180-day 1 The one exception to the

2011Finally, the court found that the governmental interest "weigh[ed] heavily" in favor of the State, noting that "[t]he State has a strong interest in detaining `mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public,'" ( Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987))), and that "`it is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions.'" Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting In re Personal Restraint Petition of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1 , 857 P.2

2011Finally, the court found that the governmental interest "weigh[ed] heavily" in favor of the State, noting that "[t]he State has a strong interest in detaining `mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public,'" ( Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987))), and that "`it is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions.'" Morgan, 253 P.3d at 402 (quoting In re Personal Restraint Petition of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1 , 857 P.2

2011Alternatively, petitioners assert that Lockard's complaint was not timely filed because the only two acts that occurred less than 180 days before she filed the charge with the Department occurred after certain intervening action by the employer and, therefore, are not components of the actionable hostile environment that may have existed before the intervention. ¶ 20 In Jenkins, the court held that the Morgan rule applies "unless (1) the acts within the jurisdictional period have no relation to those outside the period or (2) are no longer part of the same hostile environment claim. [Citation.

2011Alternatively, petitioners assert that Lockard's complaint was not timely filed because the only two acts that occurred less than 180 days before she filed the charge with the Department occurred after certain intervening action by the employer and, therefore, are not components of the actionable hostile environment that may have existed before the intervention. ¶ 20 In Jenkins, the court held that the Morgan rule applies "unless (1) the acts within the jurisdictional period have no relation to those outside the period or (2) are no longer part of the same hostile environment claim. [Citation.

2011Lockard points this court to Williams v. City of Chicago, 325 F.Supp.2d 867, 874-75 (N.D.Ill.2004), for the proposition that only an action that actually results in a significant change in working conditions will be considered an "intervening action" for purposes of the exclusion to the Morgan rule.

2011We have held that "Illinois courts ought to construe the Act, including section 7A-102(A)(1), in harmony with the federal courts' construction of Title VII." Gusciara, 346 Ill.App.3d at 1019 , 282 Ill.Dec. 449 , 806 N.E.2d 746 (citing Graves v. Chief Legal Counsel of the Department of Human Rights, 327 Ill.App.3d 293, 297 , 261 Ill.Dec. 153 , 762 N.E.2d 722 (2002)) ("Illinois courts have looked to federal decisions involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [citation] in evaluating the merits of discrimination claims under the Act."). ¶ 39 In Williams , the court recognized that "[a]n

1974Stat. 1971, ch. 111%, par. 1033(a).) Thus we must conclude that the decision-making procedure set forth in the Act conforms to the Morgan requirement that “the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence.” Morgan v. United States, supra, at 582; see also Des Plaines Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Knight, 29 Ill.2d 244 , 194 N.E.2d 89 .

1974Stat. 1971, ch. 111%, par. 1033(a).) Thus we must conclude that the decision-making procedure set forth in the Act conforms to the Morgan requirement that “the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence.” Morgan v. United States, supra, at 582; see also Des Plaines Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Knight, 29 Ill.2d 244 , 194 N.E.2d 89 .