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6 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Glasselgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 46 ¶ 40 (2005) (concluding proposed questions “did not further the Morgan inquiry because [they] did not address the issue of whether a juror would automatically impose the death sentence regardless of the jury instructions or mitigation evidence”). 2026See State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 46 ¶ 40 (2005) (concluding proposed questions “did not further the Morgan inquiry because [they] did not address the issue of whether a juror would automatically impose the death sentence regardless of the jury instructions or mitigation evidence”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. McMurtreygreen2 sentences2026Also, “[i]t is not a legitimate function of voir dire to condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a particular view of the evidence.” State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 99 (1983). ¶93 Moreover, after explaining his reasoning for not allowing the premeditation question in general, the judge reiterated a point he previously made: “So again, if you are concerned about any follow-up that you might have, please ask to approach and I will consider your request at the time of the specific question or to a specific juror.” 10 But the defense did not later raise specific juror questio 2026Also, “[i]t is not a legitimate function of voir dire to condition the jury to the receipt of certain evidence or to a particular view of the evidence.” State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 99 (1983). ¶93 Moreover, after explaining his reasoning for not allowing the premeditation question in general, the judge reiterated a point he previously made: “So again, if you are concerned about any follow-up that you might have, please ask to approach and I will consider your request at the time of the specific question or to a specific juror.” 10 But the defense did not later raise specific juror questio | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . 2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . 2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoskinsgreen2 sentences2005Instead, Glassel’s proposed inquiry was to elicit each panelist’s understanding of the phrase “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” But, as we have noted, the phrase is “inherently subjective” and not the equivalent of a “mathematical formula.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 154, ¶ 123 , 14 P.3d 997, 1024 (2000). 2005Instead, Glassel’s proposed inquiry was to elicit each panelist’s understanding of the phrase “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” But, as we have noted, the phrase is “inherently subjective” and not the equivalent of a “mathematical formula.” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 154, ¶ 123 , 14 P.3d 997, 1024 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Prince
green
1 sentence2026State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 529 ¶ 35 (2011) (explaining stakeout questions ask jurors to speculate or precommit about how they might vote based on particular facts). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2018Cf. State v. Moore , 222 Ariz. 1 , 10 ¶ 36, 213 P.3d 150 , 159 (2009) (finding no Morgan error when defendant "was allowed to question the jurors" and "[t]he trial court did not prevent defense counsel from asking life-qualifying questions"). 2018Cf. State v. Moore , 222 Ariz. 1 , 10 ¶ 36, 213 P.3d 150 , 159 (2009) (finding no Morgan error when defendant "was allowed to question the jurors" and "[t]he trial court did not prevent defense counsel from asking life-qualifying questions"). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Don Chappell
green
2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . 2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Gillies
green
2 sentences2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . 2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Morgan
green
1 sentence2015Id. ¶ 12 Morgan’s analysis comports with this Court’s current rule, which requires only sufficient corroborating evidence “to warrant a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed.” State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282 , 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); see also Hall, 204 Ariz. at 453 ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 101 ; Chappell, 225 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 1181 ; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 506 , 662 P.2d at 1013 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Morgan v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 729-30 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 . ¶ 34 Moore argues that the trial court committed structural error by not asking jurors if they thought the death penalty should be imposed in all cases in which a person knowingly or intentionally kills another, even though counsel had specifically requested a jury questionnaire including such “life-qualifying” questions. ¶ 35 There was no Morgan error here. 2009Id. at 729-30 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 . ¶ 34 Moore argues that the trial court committed structural error by not asking jurors if they thought the death penalty should be imposed in all cases in which a person knowingly or intentionally kills another, even though counsel had specifically requested a jury questionnaire including such “life-qualifying” questions. ¶ 35 There was no Morgan error here. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.