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8 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State of Florida v. Budry Michelgreen1 sentence2022Over a year and a half later, and before resentencing occurred, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting Morgan’s rule 3.800(a) motion based on this Court’s decision in State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 4 (Fla. 2018), which receded from Atwell and held “that juvenile offenders’ sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 25 years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution [and] [t]herefore, such juvenile offenders are not entitled to resentencing.” The postconviction court granted the - 17 - State’s motion, vacated its previous order | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gainesgreen1 sentence2022In determining the finality of an order, we examine “whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause.” State v. Gaines, 770 So. 2d 1221, 1223-24 (Fla. 2000) (quoting S.L.T. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Reyna v. State, 18 So.3d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“[Njothing within the limited record before this court demonstrates that counsel, before the rejection of the State’s plea offer, informed Mr. Reyna that jail credit would offset the length of incarceration offered by the State.”); Ely v. State, 13 So.3d 167, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding where plea colloquy merely indicated defendant was advised of the maximum possible sentence but did not address defendant’s specific claim that counsel told him he would only receive probation); Nelson v. State, 996 So.2d 950 | 1 | 1 |
Ely v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Reyna v. State, 18 So.3d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“[Njothing within the limited record before this court demonstrates that counsel, before the rejection of the State’s plea offer, informed Mr. Reyna that jail credit would offset the length of incarceration offered by the State.”); Ely v. State, 13 So.3d 167, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding where plea colloquy merely indicated defendant was advised of the maximum possible sentence but did not address defendant’s specific claim that counsel told him he would only receive probation); Nelson v. State, 996 So.2d 950 | 1 | 1 |
Reyna v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Reyna v. State, 18 So.3d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“[Njothing within the limited record before this court demonstrates that counsel, before the rejection of the State’s plea offer, informed Mr. Reyna that jail credit would offset the length of incarceration offered by the State.”); Ely v. State, 13 So.3d 167, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding where plea colloquy merely indicated defendant was advised of the maximum possible sentence but did not address defendant’s specific claim that counsel told him he would only receive probation); Nelson v. State, 996 So.2d 950 | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Reyna v. State, 18 So.3d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (“[Njothing within the limited record before this court demonstrates that counsel, before the rejection of the State’s plea offer, informed Mr. Reyna that jail credit would offset the length of incarceration offered by the State.”); Ely v. State, 13 So.3d 167, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (reversing and remanding where plea colloquy merely indicated defendant was advised of the maximum possible sentence but did not address defendant’s specific claim that counsel told him he would only receive probation); Nelson v. State, 996 So.2d 950 | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See id. at 643 . 2009See id. at 643 . | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See also Jackson v. State, 987 So.2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 2009See also Jackson v. State, 987 So.2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ronald Williams v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2017This case returns to us from the Florida Supreme Court, which quashed our earlier decision1 affirming the trial court’s denial of Morgan’s motion to vacate illegal sentence, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the court’s subsequent decisions in Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2016) and Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 2016).2 Morgan v. State, 42 Fla. L. 2017Having considered those supplemental briefs, and in light of Walton and Williams, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Morgan’s motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), and remand this cause to the trial court to permit Morgan to file, within sixty days, an amended motion, for the purpose of affirmatively alleging and establishing “that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief” on the claim raised in Morgan’s original motion.3 1 Morgan v. State, 137 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 2 In Williams, the Florida Supreme Court held (and reaffirmed i | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Leronnie Lee Walton v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2017This case returns to us from the Florida Supreme Court, which quashed our earlier decision1 affirming the trial court’s denial of Morgan’s motion to vacate illegal sentence, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the court’s subsequent decisions in Walton v. State, 208 So. 3d 60 (Fla. 2016) and Williams v. State, 186 So. 3d 989 (Fla. 2016).2 Morgan v. State, 42 Fla. L. 2017Having considered those supplemental briefs, and in light of Walton and Williams, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Morgan’s motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), and remand this cause to the trial court to permit Morgan to file, within sixty days, an amended motion, for the purpose of affirmatively alleging and establishing “that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief” on the claim raised in Morgan’s original motion.3 1 Morgan v. State, 137 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 2 In Williams, the Florida Supreme Court held (and reaffirmed i | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Morgan v. State
green
1 sentence2017Having considered those supplemental briefs, and in light of Walton and Williams, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Morgan’s motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), and remand this cause to the trial court to permit Morgan to file, within sixty days, an amended motion, for the purpose of affirmatively alleging and establishing “that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief” on the claim raised in Morgan’s original motion.3 1 Morgan v. State, 137 So. 3d 1075 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 2 In Williams, the Florida Supreme Court held (and reaffirmed i | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence1997Brown, 524 So.2d at 731 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Chapin
neutral
1 sentence1987The remaining issues presented in Morgan’s motion are without merit, i.e., separate sentences for first degree felony murder and the underlying felony do not violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy, State v. Chapin, 486 So.2d 566 (Fia.1986), and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is facially deficient. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Clark
green
1 sentence1981Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 299 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Acme Electric, Inc. v. Travis, 218 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Acme Electric, Inc. v. Travis
neutral
1 sentence1981Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 299 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Acme Electric, Inc. v. Travis, 218 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.