Morgan rule in California

1975Since Morgan prohibits an examination into the question of what evidence an administrator considered in reaching a decision, these questions were improper.” ( 12 Cal.3d at p. 258 .) We note, however, that in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971) 401 U.S. 402 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 136 , 91 S.Ct. 814 ], the United States *778 Supreme Court established an exception to the Morgan rule.

1975Since Morgan prohibits an examination into the question of what evidence an administrator considered in reaching a decision, these questions were improper.” ( 12 Cal.3d at p. 258 .) We note, however, that in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971) 401 U.S. 402 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 136 , 91 S.Ct. 814 ], the United States *778 Supreme Court established an exception to the Morgan rule.

2025(See Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 262 [upholding trial court’s finding as to reasonable hours spent by counsel when awarding discovery sanctions where appellant failed to produce counterdeclaration supporting claim that hours were unreasonable].) Morgan next argues the court should not have awarded attorney fees above the actual negotiated rate Miroglio charged Busch for his work on this case ($360 per hour), as doing so was inconsistent with the compensatory purpose of discovery sanctions.

2025Agnes’s arbitration-specific test had borrowed from—and mirrored—the federal courts’ enforcement of the “‘“policy”’” under the Federal Arbitration Act to “‘“favor[] arbitration”’” (Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 575), but the United States Supreme Court, in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411, 418 (Morgan), held that this policy “does not authorize federal courts to invent special, arbitration-preferring procedural rules.” Quach reasoned that Morgan’s analysis “applies with equal force in the context of the” Act.

2024(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 582.) The Ninth Circuit, for example, has described the test for waiver of the right to arbitrate as requiring that “the party asserting waiver . . . . demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (Armstrong).) Whether the party acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate does not involve a “ ‘concrete test,’ ” but rather an examination of “ ‘the totality of the parties’ actions’ ” to determine “wh

2024(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 582.) The Ninth Circuit, for example, has described the test for waiver of the right to arbitrate as requiring that “the party asserting waiver . . . . demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (Armstrong).) Whether the party acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate does not involve a “ ‘concrete test,’ ” but rather an examination of “ ‘the totality of the parties’ actions’ ” to determine “wh

2024(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 582.) The Ninth Circuit, for example, has described the test for waiver of the right to arbitrate as requiring that “the party asserting waiver . . . . demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (Armstrong).) Whether the party acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate does not involve a “ ‘concrete test,’ ” but rather an examination of “ ‘the totality of the parties’ actions’ ” to determine “wh

2024(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 582.) The Ninth Circuit, for example, has described the test for waiver of the right to arbitrate as requiring that “the party asserting waiver . . . . demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (Armstrong).) Whether the party acted inconsistently with the right to arbitrate does not involve a “ ‘concrete test,’ ” but rather an examination of “ ‘the totality of the parties’ actions’ ” to determine “wh

2008(See Duarte & Witting, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 626, 640 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [“Government Code section 11517 continues to provide, . . . , that if a contested case is heard by a hearing officer, the hearing officer shall prepare a proposed decision for the board, and the board itself shall not decide any case without affording the parties the opportunity to present oral or written argument before the board.”].) It would also raise serious constitutional issues under the Morgan principle.

2008(See Duarte & Witting, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 626, 640 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 501 ] [“Government Code section 11517 continues to provide, . . . , that if a contested case is heard by a hearing officer, the hearing officer shall prepare a proposed decision for the board, and the board itself shall not decide any case without affording the parties the opportunity to present oral or written argument before the board.”].) It would also raise serious constitutional issues under the Morgan principle.

1995(Lichty v. Sickels (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 696, 699 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 137 ].) B Duty of Care and Assumption of the Risk Relying on Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ], the trial court granted summary judgment ruling primary assumption of the risk completely barred Morgan’s claim. *132 Morgan asserts his case to be governed by the “duty” analysis of the secondary assumption of the risk doctrine.

1995(Lichty v. Sickels (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 696, 699 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 137 ].) B Duty of Care and Assumption of the Risk Relying on Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ], the trial court granted summary judgment ruling primary assumption of the risk completely barred Morgan’s claim. *132 Morgan asserts his case to be governed by the “duty” analysis of the secondary assumption of the risk doctrine.

1995(Decker v. City of Imperial Beach (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 356 ].) “[T]he trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine whether such issues of fact exist, and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves.” (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ].) The trial judge determines whether triable issues of fact exist by reviewing the affidavits and evidence before him or her and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts.

1995(Decker v. City of Imperial Beach (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 356 ].) “[T]he trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine whether such issues of fact exist, and not to decide the merits of the issues themselves.” (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 762 P.2d 46 ].) The trial judge determines whether triable issues of fact exist by reviewing the affidavits and evidence before him or her and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts.

1986It argues the Morgan rule is inapplicable to documents, as opposed to depositions and other “live testimony. ” V County’s statutory claim contends Evidence Code section 1040 “represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], quoted in Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 123 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ], original italics.) The statute 3 “essentially establishes two different privileges—an absolute

1986It argues the Morgan rule is inapplicable to documents, as opposed to depositions and other “live testimony. ” V County’s statutory claim contends Evidence Code section 1040 “represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], quoted in Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 123 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ], original italics.) The statute 3 “essentially establishes two different privileges—an absolute

1986It argues the Morgan rule is inapplicable to documents, as opposed to depositions and other “live testimony. ” V County’s statutory claim contends Evidence Code section 1040 “represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], quoted in Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 123 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ], original italics.) The statute 3 “essentially establishes two different privileges—an absolute

1986It argues the Morgan rule is inapplicable to documents, as opposed to depositions and other “live testimony. ” V County’s statutory claim contends Evidence Code section 1040 “represents the exclusive means by which a public entity may assert a claim of governmental privilege based on the necessity for secrecy.” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 540 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ], quoted in Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 123 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 550 P.2d 161 ], original italics.) The statute 3 “essentially establishes two different privileges—an absolute

1975We have explicitly held ... that ‘it was not the function of the court to.probe the mental processes of the Secretary.’ ” ( 313 U.S. at p. 422 [ 85 L.Ed. at p. 1435 ].) In our recent decision in State of California v. Superior Court (Veta) supra, 12 Cal.3d 237 , we reaffirmed our adherence to the Morgan rule. 9 Upholding the coastal commission’s objection to interrogatories, we ruled that “To the extent . . . that the interrogatories seek to determine what material the Commission read and relied upon in reaching its determination and to the extent that they seek to probe the mental processes o

1975We have explicitly held ... that ‘it was not the function of the court to.probe the mental processes of the Secretary.’ ” ( 313 U.S. at p. 422 [ 85 L.Ed. at p. 1435 ].) In our recent decision in State of California v. Superior Court (Veta) supra, 12 Cal.3d 237 , we reaffirmed our adherence to the Morgan rule. 9 Upholding the coastal commission’s objection to interrogatories, we ruled that “To the extent . . . that the interrogatories seek to determine what material the Commission read and relied upon in reaching its determination and to the extent that they seek to probe the mental processes o

1974(Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 136, 155-156 , 91 S.Ct. 814 ]; see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-143 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 93 S.Ct. 1241 ]; see: Recent Developments, Administrative Law and Procedure, 60 Georgetown L.J. 1101, 1111; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 3, 321; Note, Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 Stan.L.Rev. 1117, 1118, fn. 8.) If Overton Park is persuasive authority in California, it undercuts the footing of Web Service Co. Action by our Supreme Court subsequent to Over-ton Park indicates,

1974(Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 136, 155-156 , 91 S.Ct. 814 ]; see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142-143 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 106, 111-112 , 93 S.Ct. 1241 ]; see: Recent Developments, Administrative Law and Procedure, 60 Georgetown L.J. 1101, 1111; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 3, 321; Note, Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 Stan.L.Rev. 1117, 1118, fn. 8.) If Overton Park is persuasive authority in California, it undercuts the footing of Web Service Co. Action by our Supreme Court subsequent to Over-ton Park indicates,

1962It has consistently been followed in the federal circuit courts (see e.g., Clark v. United States (4th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 99, 101 [1] ; Hamilton v. United States (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F.2d 421, 422 [2]; Herndon v. United States (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 412 [1, 2] ; United States v. Lynch (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 198, 199 [3] ; Doss v. United States (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 95 , affirming United States v. Doss (W.D.

1962It has consistently been followed in the federal circuit courts (see e.g., Clark v. United States (4th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 99, 101 [1] ; Hamilton v. United States (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F.2d 421, 422 [2]; Herndon v. United States (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 412 [1, 2] ; United States v. Lynch (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 198, 199 [3] ; Doss v. United States (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 95 , affirming United States v. Doss (W.D.

1962It has consistently been followed in the federal circuit courts (see e.g., Clark v. United States (4th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 99, 101 [1] ; Hamilton v. United States (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F.2d 421, 422 [2]; Herndon v. United States (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 412 [1, 2] ; United States v. Lynch (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 198, 199 [3] ; Doss v. United States (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 95 , affirming United States v. Doss (W.D.

1962It has consistently been followed in the federal circuit courts (see e.g., Clark v. United States (4th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 99, 101 [1] ; Hamilton v. United States (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F.2d 421, 422 [2]; Herndon v. United States (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 412 [1, 2] ; United States v. Lynch (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 198, 199 [3] ; Doss v. United States (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 95 , affirming United States v. Doss (W.D.

1962It has consistently been followed in the federal circuit courts (see e.g., Clark v. United States (4th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 99, 101 [1] ; Hamilton v. United States (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F.2d 421, 422 [2]; Herndon v. United States (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 412 [1, 2] ; United States v. Lynch (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 198, 199 [3] ; Doss v. United States (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 95 , affirming United States v. Doss (W.D.

1962It has consistently been followed in the federal circuit courts (see e.g., Clark v. United States (4th Cir. 1959) 267 F.2d 99, 101 [1] ; Hamilton v. United States (5th Cir. 1958) 253 F.2d 421, 422 [2]; Herndon v. United States (4th Cir. 1953) 207 F.2d 412 [1, 2] ; United States v. Lynch (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F.2d 198, 199 [3] ; Doss v. United States (5th Cir. 1946) 158 F.2d 95 , affirming United States v. Doss (W.D.