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5 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Murphygreen2 sentences2017See State v. Murphy, 99 Idaho 511, 514 [ 584 P.2d 1236, 1239 ] (1978). 2017See State v. Murphy, 99 Idaho 511, 514 [ 584 P.2d 1236, 1239 ] (1978). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mariongreen2 sentences2017In its order denying Morgan’s motion to reconsider, the district court explained, in the event the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act did not apply, “under Idaho Code § 19-3501 the pre-indictment delay would not amount to a denial of the due process of law requiring a speedy trial.’’ To support its conclusion, the distinct court used the standard for pre-accusatory delay: Before a court can find a due process violation, the Defendant must show that the delay “caused substantial prejudice to [the defendant’s] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactica 2017In its order denying Morgan’s motion to reconsider, the district court explained, in the event the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act did not apply, “under Idaho Code § 19-3501 the pre-indictment delay would not amount to a denial of the due process of law requiring a speedy trial.’’ To support its conclusion, the distinct court used the standard for pre-accusatory delay: Before a court can find a due process violation, the Defendant must show that the delay “caused substantial prejudice to [the defendant’s] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactica | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2009It should be noted that this Court recently held in Smith v. State that the SOR Act is constitutionally infirm in part because it denies offenders access to the full record relied upon by the SOCB and instead allows access only to the summary of that information. 146 Idaho at 829 , 203 P.3d at 1228 . 2009It should be noted that this Court recently held in Smith v. State that the SOR Act is constitutionally infirm in part because it denies offenders access to the full record relied upon by the SOCB and instead allows access only to the summary of that information. 146 Idaho at 829 , 203 P.3d at 1228 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Phillip James Morgan
green
2 sentences2014Absent other circumstances, driving around the block on a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory stop.” Id. at 112 , 294 P.3d at 1124 . 2014Absent other circumstances, driving around the block on a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory stop.” Id. at 112 , 294 P.3d at 1124 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Morgan v. Columbia Helicopters, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994This Court affirmed, stating that the issue to be determined in such cases is “whether the departure from the claimant’s employment became so personal that it broke the causal connection to such an extent that the resulting accident could no longer be said to ‘arise out of and in the course of the claimant’s employment.” Id. at 349 , 796 P.2d at 1022 . 1994This Court affirmed, stating that the issue to be determined in such cases is “whether the departure from the claimant’s employment became so personal that it broke the causal connection to such an extent that the resulting accident could no longer be said to ‘arise out of and in the course of the claimant’s employment.” Id. at 349 , 796 P.2d at 1022 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.