19 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2021See Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Public Service Commission, 361 Md. 196, 214 , 760 A.2d 1087 (2000). (“Had the Legislature intended that the standard for judicial review of . . . 2021See Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Public Service Commission, 361 Md. 196, 214 , 760 A.2d 1087 (2000). (“Had the Legislature intended that the standard for judicial review of . . . | 3 | 4 |
Gisriel v. Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Electionsgreen2 sentences2006Those principles were confirmed by this Court in Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 493-96 , 693 A.2d 757, 765-67 (1997). 2006Those principles were confirmed by this Court in Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Board, 345 Md. 477, 493-96 , 693 A.2d 757, 765-67 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
DENO CONSTANTINE KANARAS v. Stategreen1 sentence2005What the Court said in Nichols v. Wilson thus applies with equal, if not greater — the medical provider did not cause the injury in this case — , force *696 here: “[i]n no way can it be said that the legislature intended such a claim to be within the Act.” Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. at 161, 460 A.2d at 61. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 321 , 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978) (“we have stated on numerous occasions that in the absence of a contrary contextual indication, the use of the word ‘shall’ is presumed to have a mandatory meaning, ... and thus denotes an imperative obligation inconsistent with the exercise of discretion”); Bright v. Unsatisfied C. & J. 1995Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 321 , 384 A.2d 709, 713 (1978) (“we have stated on numerous occasions that in the absence of a contrary contextual indication, the use of the word ‘shall’ is presumed to have a mandatory meaning, ... and thus denotes an imperative obligation inconsistent with the exercise of discretion”); Bright v. Unsatisfied C. & J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nichols v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1997We also stated, however, that intentional torts were not automatically excluded from the Act’s coverage, and that “there may well be many [intentional torts] that would be so covered.” 296 Md. at 161 n. 5, 460 A.2d at 61 n. 5. 1991“In no way,” we posited, “can it be said that the Legislature intended such a claim to be within the Act even though such action took place during the rendering of health care.” Id. | 3 | 1986–1997 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2005Williams, 24 S.W.3d at 117 . 17 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. One 1980 Harley Davidson Motorcycle Vin 9G3593950
green
2 sentences2001The Court of Appeals found no ambiguity with the term “scheduled,” stating: “Had the Legislature intended that a hearing on the forfeiture petition was to be held within 30 days of conviction, it could have said so; it did not, and with good reason.” Harley Davidson, 303 Md. at 159 , 492 A.2d 896 . 2001The Court of Appeals found no ambiguity with the term “scheduled,” stating: “Had the Legislature intended that a hearing on the forfeiture petition was to be held within 30 days of conviction, it could have said so; it did not, and with good reason.” Harley Davidson, 303 Md. at 159 , 492 A.2d 896 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Government Employees Insurance v. Insurance Commissioner
green
2 sentences2000Moreover, as the appellant points out, to interpret,, § 3-202(a) as the appellees do would render the word, “dissatisfied,” which has been a part of the scheme since its inception, “meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.” GEICO, 332 Md. at 132 , 630 A.2d at 717 . 2000Moreover, as the appellant points out, to interpret,, § 3-202(a) as the appellees do would render the word, “dissatisfied,” which has been a part of the scheme since its inception, “meaningless, surplusage, superfluous, or nugatory.” GEICO, 332 Md. at 132 , 630 A.2d at 717 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State Department of Assessments & Taxation v. Greyhound Computer Corp.
green
2 sentences1988Greyhound Computer, 271 Md. at 588 , 320 A.2d 40 . 1988Greyhound Computer, 271 Md. at 588 , 320 A.2d 40 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Garrett v. State
green
2 sentences1987We hold that while the purpose behind the 25-year repeat offender provision is deterrence, Garrett, 59 Md.App. at 118 , 474 A.2d 931 , the plain language of § 643B(b) evinces that public protection is the primary goal of this section. 1987We hold that while the purpose behind the 25-year repeat offender provision is deterrence, Garrett, 59 Md.App. at 118 , 474 A.2d 931 , the plain language of § 643B(b) evinces that public protection is the primary goal of this section. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Montgomery County Fire Board v. Fisher
green
1 sentence1983Id. at 446, 454 A.2d 394 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Radio Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Commission
green
2 sentences1976An appeal was noted to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Radio Communications Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 271 Md. 82 , 314 A. 2d 118 (1974), raising the issue of what the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under Sec. 55A. 1976An appeal was noted to the Maryland Court of Appeals, Radio Communications Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 271 Md. 82 , 314 A. 2d 118 (1974), raising the issue of what the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under Sec. 55A. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Insurance Commissioner
green
2 sentences1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int 1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. v. State Department of Assessment & Taxation
green
2 sentences1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int 1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Height v. State
green
2 sentences1974Service Comm., 226 Md. 295, 301-02 , 173 A. 2d 362 (1961); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257 , 170 A. 2d 212 (1961). 1974Service Comm., 226 Md. 295, 301-02 , 173 A. 2d 362 (1961); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257 , 170 A. 2d 212 (1961). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Scoville Service, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury
green
2 sentences1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int 1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Silberman v. Jacobs & Silberman
green
2 sentences1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int 1974What the legislature intended as the standard for carriers seeking “grandfather” rights under § 55A (b) must be determined in the first instance by a careful examination of the statute itself, since the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative intention, Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptroller, 269 Md. 390, 393 , 306 A. 2d 534 (1973); Silberman v. Jacobs, 259 Md. 1 , 267 A. 2d 209 (1970); Atlantic, Gulf v. Dep’t of Assess. & T., 252 Md. 173 , 249 A. 2d 180 (1969); Equitable v. Insurance Comm’r, 251 Md. 143 , 246 A. 2d 604 (1968); and in ascertaining that int | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Germenko v. Public Service Commission
green
2 sentences1974Service Comm., 226 Md. 295, 301-02 , 173 A. 2d 362 (1961); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257 , 170 A. 2d 212 (1961). 1974Service Comm., 226 Md. 295, 301-02 , 173 A. 2d 362 (1961); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257 , 170 A. 2d 212 (1961). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Goodman v. State
green
2 sentences1948Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 7 , 11 A. 2d 635 . 1948Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 7 , 11 A. 2d 635 . | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Hill v. State
green
2 sentences1948The usual practice since the passage of that Act has been to hear it during the trial of the case, as pointed out as dictum in the case of Hill v. State, 190 Md. 698, 703 , 59 A. 2d 630, 633 , which quoted the rule laid down in Sugarman v. State, supra, but which we do not now think is mandatory after the passage of Article 27, Section 306, supra. We are of opinion that as this section uses the words “at any time”, the Legislature intended that a hearing on motion to quash the search warrant might be heard either before or during the trial. 1948The usual practice since the passage of that Act has been to hear it during the trial of the case, as pointed out as dictum in the case of Hill v. State, 190 Md. 698, 703 , 59 A. 2d 630, 633 , which quoted the rule laid down in Sugarman v. State, supra, but which we do not now think is mandatory after the passage of Article 27, Section 306, supra. We are of opinion that as this section uses the words “at any time”, the Legislature intended that a hearing on motion to quash the search warrant might be heard either before or during the trial. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.