legislature intended exception in Illinois

2006Although the facts of this case are not relevant, with respect to the statutory presumption based upon close proximity, the court found that “the legislature intended the presumption to apply to situations where observable controlled substances or distributing paraphernalia, etc., are found in near proximity to currency.” $27,440, 164 Ill.

1993App. 3d 44, 48 , 517 N.E.2d 704 , 707: “Clearly, the legislature intended the presumption to apply to situations where observable controlled substances or distributing paraphernalia, etc., are found in near proximity to currency.

2024The physician-patient privilege “is a legislative balancing between relationships that society feels should be fostered through the shield of confidentiality and the interests served by disclosure of the information.” Manos, 202 Ill. 2d at 575-76 .

2024The physician-patient privilege “is a legislative balancing between relationships that society feels should be fostered through the shield of confidentiality and the interests served by disclosure of the information.” Manos, 202 Ill. 2d at 575-76 .

2024“Instead, we must determine more generally whether the legislature intended the exception to be ‘descriptive’ of the offense, or whether the legislature intended only to withdraw, or exempt, certain acts or persons form the operation of the statute.” Id. (quoting Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 508 ). ¶ 17 Section 2(a)(1) of the FOID Act states: “[n]o person may acquire or possess any firearm, stun gun, or taser within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Illinois State Police under the provisions of this Act

2021We, therefore, take the legislature’s silence to mean courts must evaluate who shoulders the burden of proof for statutory exemptions using the standard announced in judicial decisions. ¶ 36 Considering the statutory exemption (or exception) before us now, section 12-4.4a(c) of the abuse or criminal neglect of an elderly person statute, “we must determine more generally whether the legislature intended the exception to be ‘descriptive’ of the offense or whether the legislature intended only to withdraw, or exempt, certain acts or persons from the operation of the statute.” Tolbert, 2016 IL 117

2014Without a clear expression of intent, this court should decline to read the statute to bar a third-party action that does not involve legal malpractice. ¶ 69 The majority cites to only one case that has considered the applicability of section 13-214.3 and rejected the reasoning of Ganci: 800 South Wells Commercial, LLC v. Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, 2013 IL App (1st) 123660 .

2014Without a clear expression of intent, this court should decline to read the statute to bar a third-party action that does not involve legal malpractice. ¶ 69 The majority cites to only one case that has considered the applicability of section 13-214.3 and rejected the reasoning of Ganci: 800 South Wells Commercial, LLC v. Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, 2013 IL App (1st) 123660 .

2014Thus, we concluded that “[u]nder the limited circumstances presented in section 6(d), a man who voluntarily acknowledges paternity can later challenge the voluntariness of the acknowledgement if he can show that it was procured by fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, but the Parentage Act does not allow him to challenge the conclusive presumption of paternity with contrary evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) Smith, 212 Ill. 2d at 405 . ¶ 58 Although we did not consider whether the State could bring a VAP challenge under section 6(d) in Smith, its rationale is consistent with our construc

2014Thus, we concluded that “[u]nder the limited circumstances presented in section 6(d), a man who voluntarily acknowledges paternity can later challenge the voluntariness of the acknowledgement if he can show that it was procured by fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, but the Parentage Act does not allow him to challenge the conclusive presumption of paternity with contrary evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) Smith, 212 Ill. 2d at 405 . ¶ 58 Although we did not consider whether the State could bring a VAP challenge under section 6(d) in Smith, its rationale is consistent with our construc

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ries, 242 Ill.2d at 224 , 351 Ill.Dec. 135 , 950 N.E.2d 631 .

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ries, 242 Ill.2d at 224 , 351 Ill.Dec. 135 , 950 N.E.2d 631 .

2006Our opinion in In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300 , 267 Ill.Dec. 81 , 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002), supports this conclusion.

2006Our opinion in In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300 , 267 Ill.Dec. 81 , 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002), supports this conclusion.

2003National Wrecking, 234 Ill.

2003National Wrecking, 234 Ill.App.3d at 763-64 , 176 Ill.Dec. 301 , 601 N.E.2d 999 .

1998Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998), this court determined that the special duty exception could not override immunities granted to governmental entities under the Tort Immunity Act.

1998Partnership, 181 Ill.2d 335 , 230 Ill.Dec. 11 , 692 N.E.2d 1177 (1998), this court determined that the special duty exception could not override immunities granted to governmental entities under the Tort Immunity Act.

1939At page 476 of the Crerar case we said: “That the legislature intended clause 82 as amended in 1911 to apply to various classes of business, including garage business, is evidenced by the fact that the amendments of 1919 and 1921, declared invalid for reasons set out in the case of People v. Kaul, [ 302 Ill. 317 ] provided for the regulation and control of ‘public garages, private garages and stables designed for the use of five or more vehicles, etc.’ In no case called to our attention has it been held that under clause 82 as amended in 1911 the language ‘breweries, distilleries, livery, boar

1930That the legislature intended clause 82 as amended in 1911 to apply to various classes of business, including garage business, is evidenced by the fact that the amendments of 1919 and 1921, declared invalid for reasons set out in the case of People v. Kaul, supra, provided for the regulation and control of “public garages, private garages and stables designed for the use of five or more vehicles,” etc. In no case called to our attention has it been held that under clause 82 as amended in 1911 the language “breweries, distilleries, livery, boarding or sales stables, blacksmith shops, foundries,

2025It is thus inappropriate to infer the legislature intended such an exception.” Id. at 340-41 . ¶ 74 Accordingly, applying the clear precedent of J.L., we measure respondent’s progress in services without regard to his status as an incarcerated individual.

2025Regarding the construction of the Code, our supreme court held that the legislature intended the privilege to be unqualified and absolute, barring even in camera inspection of a victim’s confidential -9- 2025 IL App (2d) 240574 communications.

2024Accordingly, we held that while the question of whether evidence of the charged offense was illegally obtained “certainly” is a “defense to the charge itself,” the legislature intended for this defense to be raised and fully considered at a suppression hearing, because such a hearing presents “a larger question for review, *** [and] requires assessment of witness credibility and evidence beyond what a detainment petition is required to do.” Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶ 61 .

2024As we explained: “Simply put, the issue before the court in a detention hearing is much narrower, and if the legislature had expressly sought to combine the two procedures, it could have done so. [Citation.] The plain language of the statute informs us that it did not.” Id. - 11 - No. 1-23-2454B ¶ 36 We therefore concluded that for purposes of a detention hearing a “fourth amendment argument is only ‘relevant’ to the court’s overall assessment of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 69.

2023Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Austin, 2019 Il 123910, ¶ 115, quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2208 (1993)).

2018"Instead, a court must determine more generally whether the legislature intended the exception to be descriptive of the offense or whether it intended only to withdraw, or except, certain persons or acts from the operation of the statute." Fiumetto , 2018 IL App (2d) 170230 , ¶ 13, 424 Ill.Dec. 642 , 109 N.E.3d 756 .

2018"Instead, a court must determine more generally whether the legislature intended the exception to be descriptive of the offense or whether it intended only to withdraw, or except, certain persons or acts from the operation of the statute." Fiumetto , 2018 IL App (2d) 170230 , ¶ 13, 424 Ill.Dec. 642 , 109 N.E.3d 756 .

2017A pending but undetermined Petition for Setting Final Fees and Costs shall not affect appealability or enforceability of any judgment or other adjudication in the original proceeding.” (Emphases added.) Id. ¶ 38 The plain language of section 508(c) clearly indicates that the legislature intended the requirement of a “written engagement agreement” to apply to “an attorney seeking fees from his or her former client.” In re Parentage of Rocca, 408 Ill.

2017A pending but undetermined Petition for Setting Final Fees and Costs shall not affect appealability or enforceability of any judgment or other adjudication in the original proceeding.” (Emphases added.) Id. ¶ 38 The plain language of section 508(c) clearly indicates that the legislature intended the requirement of a “written engagement agreement” to apply to “an attorney seeking fees from his or her former client.” In re Parentage of Rocca, 408 Ill.

2012Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d at 182 .

2012DeSmet, 219 Ill. 2d at 514 . ¶ 89 Section 2-210 is also comparable to another Act provision, section 2-106, which states: “A local public entity is not liable for an injury caused by an oral promise or misrepresentation of its employee, whether or not such promise or misrepresentation is negligent or intentional.” 745 ILCS 10/2-106 (West 2010). ¶ 90 While section 2-106 is concerned with public entities and addresses only oral, not written, misrepresentations, it is still persuasive evidence that the legislature intended for the immunity to cover both negligent and willful and wanton misreprese

2012App. 3d at 890 , 723 N.E.2d at 318 . ¶ 44 On appeal, the C.B.L. court held that the legislature intended to bar all common law actions for visitation when it enacted the visitation provisions contained in section 607 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998)).2 The court stated, “Not only does it categorize those persons who may petition for visitation, but section 607 also qualifies each with numerous requirements and circumstances which must be met before such a petition will even merit consideration.” C.B.L., 309 Ill.

2012App. 3d at 890 , 723 N.E.2d at 318 . ¶ 44 On appeal, the C.B.L. court held that the legislature intended to bar all common law actions for visitation when it enacted the visitation provisions contained in section 607 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/607 (West 1998)).2 The court stated, “Not only does it categorize those persons who may petition for visitation, but section 607 also qualifies each with numerous requirements and circumstances which must be met before such a petition will even merit consideration.” C.B.L., 309 Ill.

2011(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ries, 242 Ill.2d at 224 , 351 Ill.Dec. 135 , 950 N.E.2d 631 .