legislature intended violation in Michigan

1990Instead, we conclude that the Legislature intended that the exception apply to facts similar to the facts of Williams [Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231 ; 111 NW2d 1 (1961)] — the case which precipitated the statute in the first place.

1990Instead, we conclude that the Legislature intended that the exception apply to facts similar to the facts of Williams [Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231 ; 111 NW2d 1 (1961)] — the case which precipitated the statute in the first place.

2025Our conclusion is consistent with this Court’s longstanding recognition that “[a]bsent some clear indication that the Legislature intended to dispense with the requirement, we presume that silence suggests the Legislature’s intent not to eliminate mens rea . . . .” Tombs, 472 Mich at 456 - 457 (opinion by KELLY, J.); see also Staples v United States, 511 US 600, 606 ; 114 S Ct 1793 ; 128 L Ed 2d 608 (1994) (recognizing that strict-liability offenses are disfavored and “that some indication of congressional intent, express or implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of a cri

2020Alvan Motor Freight, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 281 Mich App 35, 39-40 ; -14- 761 NW2d 269 (2008).4 Rather, the plain language shows that the Legislature intended the requirement that the taxpayer file a statement of assessable property to apply only in cases of a direct appeal.

2020Alvan Motor Freight, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 281 Mich App 35, 39-40 ; -14- 761 NW2d 269 (2008).4 Rather, the plain language shows that the Legislature intended the requirement that the taxpayer file a statement of assessable property to apply only in cases of a direct appeal.

2019“This Court will not read into a statute anything that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 661 ; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). 1 Defendant does not argue that application of the test set forth in Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290 , 301–302; 414 NW2d 706 (1987), would require judicial imposition of a civil remedy for violation of MCL 750.410.

2019“This Court will not read into a statute anything that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 661 ; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). 1 Defendant does not argue that application of the test set forth in Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290 , 301–302; 414 NW2d 706 (1987), would require judicial imposition of a civil remedy for violation of MCL 750.410.

2019“This Court will not read into a statute anything that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 661 ; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). 1 Defendant does not argue that application of the test set forth in Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290 , 301–302; 414 NW2d 706 (1987), would require judicial imposition of a civil remedy for violation of MCL 750.410.

2019“This Court will not read into a statute anything that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself.” Kokx v Bylenga, 241 Mich App 655, 661 ; 617 NW2d 368 (2000). 1 Defendant does not argue that application of the test set forth in Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290 , 301–302; 414 NW2d 706 (1987), would require judicial imposition of a civil remedy for violation of MCL 750.410.

2006ANALYSIS A. MCL 257.625a(6)(d) The question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended that a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) should result in dismissal of the case because the officer unreasonably denied defendant’s request for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his own choosing. 3 “The primary goal in construing a statute is ‘to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.’ We begin by examining the plain language of the statute.” People v Stewart, 472 Mich 624, 631 ; 698 NW2d 340 (2002) (citations omitted).

2006ANALYSIS A. MCL 257.625a(6)(d) The question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended that a violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(d) should result in dismissal of the case because the officer unreasonably denied defendant’s request for an independent chemical test administered by a person of his own choosing. 3 “The primary goal in construing a statute is ‘to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.’ We begin by examining the plain language of the statute.” People v Stewart, 472 Mich 624, 631 ; 698 NW2d 340 (2002) (citations omitted).

2002Building on this Court's pronouncement in Ross v. Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567 , 333 N.W.2d 641 (1984), which clarified that the Legislature intended that immunity from tort liability exist only when an entity was engaged in a governmental function, the McCummings Court arrived at the most logical conclusion, i.e., that "[t]he question whether a governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function when performing the act complained of is a question best known to the agency and best asserted by it." Id. at 411 , 446 N.W.2d 114 . [7] Furthermore, the McCummings Court corre

2002Building on this Court’s pronouncement in Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567 ; 333 NW2d 641 (1984), which clarified that the Legislature intended that immunity from tort liability exist only when an entity was engaged in a governmental function, the McCummings Court arrived at the most logical conclusion, i.e., that “[t]he question whether a governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function when performing the act complained of is a question best known to the agency and best asserted by it.” Id. at 411 . 7 Furthermore, the McCummings Court correctly noted that no v

2002People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694 ; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).

2002People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694 ; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).

2002Building on this Court's pronouncement in Ross v. Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567 , 333 N.W.2d 641 (1984), which clarified that the Legislature intended that immunity from tort liability exist only when an entity was engaged in a governmental function, the McCummings Court arrived at the most logical conclusion, i.e., that "[t]he question whether a governmental agency was engaged in a governmental function when performing the act complained of is a question best known to the agency and best asserted by it." Id. at 411 , 446 N.W.2d 114 . [7] Furthermore, the McCummings Court corre

2000Perlos, supra at 328 .

1993Owendale-Gagetown, supra. If the Legislature intended the standard of review to depend on when the initial claim for benefits was filed, as defendant contends, it would have expressly stated.

1988The Legislature intended to bar "any recovery whatsoever for noneconomic loss unless the injury is serious and [to relieve] the courts of the burden of litigation where the injury is not serious." Id. at 545 .

1988The Legislature intended to bar “any recovery whatsoever for noneconomic loss unless the injury is serious and [to relieve] the courts of the burden of litigation where the injury is not serious.” Id. at 545 . m In addition to its consistency with this Court’s interpretation of legislative policy, we find direct support in case law for our construction of § 3135.

1988Similarly, Lee and Belmont, supra, cited by the Court of Appeals in this case, involved easily movable, nonfixture items which had allegedly caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.

1988Similarly, Lee and Belmont, supra, cited by the Court of Appeals in this case, involved easily movable, nonfixture items which had allegedly caused the plaintiffs' injuries.

1988The Court held the public building exception to be inapplicable stating, "We cannot believe that the Legislature intended its immunity exception to include freestanding and moveable items of furniture located within a public building such as the library chair in this case.” Gibson, supra at 105 .

1988The Court held the public building exception to be inapplicable stating, "We cannot believe that the Legislature intended its immunity exception to include freestanding and moveable items of furniture located within a public building such as the library chair in this case." Gibson, supra at 105 .

1987Emphasis added.] Moreover, as the state defendants aptly note, the Michigan Legislature's response to this Court's decision in Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151 ; 188 NW2d 593 (1971), indicates that the Legislature intended the immunity conferred by the governmental immunity act to extend to intentionally tortious, as well as negligent, activity.

1987Emphasis added.] Moreover, as the state defendants aptly note, the Michigan Legislature's response to this Court's decision in Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151 ; 188 NW2d 593 (1971), indicates that the Legislature intended the immunity conferred by the governmental immunity act to extend to intentionally tortious, as well as negligent, activity.

1987Affirmed. 1 Relying on Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716 ; 275 NW2d 268 .(1979), the panel in Vargo stated that "the exception to governmental immunity found in MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) is no longer to be governed by whether the instrumentality causing the injury was a fixture or structural part of the public building.

1987Affirmed. 1 Relying on Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716 ; 275 NW2d 268 .(1979), the panel in Vargo stated that "the exception to governmental immunity found in MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106) is no longer to be governed by whether the instrumentality causing the injury was a fixture or structural part of the public building.

1986The Legislature’s use of the phrase "because of a handicap” demonstrates that the Legislature intended an inquiry into the employer’s reasons for failing or refusing to hire, recruit, or promote a handicapped individual. [Bogue, supra, p 378 .] *213 In this case, both of the prongs defined above must be proven by the plaintiff.

1926This rule is recognized practically wherever the widow is dowable as at common law, and as now provided by statute in this State. * * * Her right, while inchoate, does not repel the use and enjoyment by others; she is not repelled by the statute of limitations.” In Steele v. Gellatly, 41 Ill. 39 , the court stated: “But, while we still hold that there is no reason why a claim to dower should not be held subject to the statutory limitation, as well as any other species of estate, if the language of the law clearly embraces it, yet we cannot suppose the legislature intended such claim should be