12 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1880–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Melsongreen1 sentence2025See State v. Melson, 2022-Ohio-2709, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); see also State v. Boswell, 2019-Ohio-2949, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); State v. Durant, 2016-Ohio-8173, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.); State v. Parrado, 2016-Ohio-1313 , ¶ 23 (11th Dist.) 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (“If the legislature intended the presumption pertaining to community control to apply to situations in which an offender was convicted of or pleaded guilty to multiple felonies of the . . . fifth degree, it could have pluralized these terms.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Durantgreen1 sentence2025See State v. Melson, 2022-Ohio-2709, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); see also State v. Boswell, 2019-Ohio-2949, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); State v. Durant, 2016-Ohio-8173, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.); State v. Parrado, 2016-Ohio-1313 , ¶ 23 (11th Dist.) 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (“If the legislature intended the presumption pertaining to community control to apply to situations in which an offender was convicted of or pleaded guilty to multiple felonies of the . . . fifth degree, it could have pluralized these terms.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boswellgreen1 sentence2025See State v. Melson, 2022-Ohio-2709, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); see also State v. Boswell, 2019-Ohio-2949, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); State v. Durant, 2016-Ohio-8173, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.); State v. Parrado, 2016-Ohio-1313 , ¶ 23 (11th Dist.) 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS (“If the legislature intended the presumption pertaining to community control to apply to situations in which an offender was convicted of or pleaded guilty to multiple felonies of the . . . fifth degree, it could have pluralized these terms.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Belchergreen1 sentence2020Clark No. 2018-CA-70, 2019-Ohio-1468, ¶ 21 (explaining that “[i]f the legislature intended for the exception in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(ii) to apply to situations like the present case, it chose the wrong language. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Pearcegreen1 sentence2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGriffgreen2 sentences1996See State v. McGriff (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 668 , 672 N.E.2d 1074 . 1996See State v. McGriff (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 668 , 672 N.E.2d 1074 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boundsgreen2 sentences1987See State v. Bounds (1953), 74 Idaho 136 , 258 P. 2d 751 ; Schade v. State (Alaska 1973), 512 P. 2d 907 ; People v. Bennett (1976), 60 Cal. App. 3d 112 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 305 . 1987See State v. Bounds (1953), 74 Idaho 136 , 258 P. 2d 751 ; Schade v. State (Alaska 1973), 512 P. 2d 907 ; People v. Bennett (1976), 60 Cal. App. 3d 112 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 305 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Akron Standard Division of Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Lindley
green
2 sentences1996Cf. Akron Standard Div. v. Lindley (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 10 , 11 OBR 9, 462 N.E.2d 419 , syllabus (verification requirement in R.C. 5739.13 for sales and use tax reassessment petitions is nonjurisdictional). 1996Cf. Akron Standard Div. v. Lindley (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 10 , 11 OBR 9, 462 N.E.2d 419 , syllabus (verification requirement in R.C. 5739.13 for sales and use tax reassessment petitions is nonjurisdictional). | 2 | 1986–1996 |
State v. Jones
green
1 sentence2017It did not do so.” Id. {¶20} Here, Bentley pleaded guilty to a separate, fourth-degree felony offense on the same date she entered her guilty plea in this case. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Draper v. United States
green
2 sentences2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su 2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Fultz
green
2 sentences2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su 2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su 2015In other contexts, courts have equated “reasonable grounds” with “probable cause.” See, e.g., Drape v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 , 79 S.Ct. 329 , 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959) (noting “the terms ‘probable cause’ as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 104 (a) of the Narcotics Control Act, 70 Stat. 570 , are substantial equivalents of the same meaning”); Rogers v. Barbera, 170 Ohio St. 241 , 246, 164 N.E.2d 162 (1960) (defining probable cause in malicious prosecution as “a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS by circumstances su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. McMahon, Wd-08-039 (12-12-2008)
neutral
1 sentence2015The court reasoned that “had the legislature intended the standard in these matters to be ‘probable cause’ it was perfectly capable of using that term.” Id. {¶10} While the McMahon result seems sound as a matter of statutory construction, we note that there is support for a contrary view. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Masters, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2007)
neutral
1 sentence2008No. WD-06-045, 2007-Ohio-7100 , ¶ 15 . {¶ 20} We believe that, had the legislature intended the standard in these matters to be "probable cause," it was perfectly capable of using that term. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Assn.
green
1 sentence1997Ohio courts have found the following to not be "political subdivisions" as defined by R.C. 2744.01 (F): a non-profit ambulance service, Poole v. Inlow (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 379 , 382 ; the Ohio High School Athletic Association, Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 529 , 536 ; a county sheriff, Saunders v. McFaul (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 46 , 52 ; and a volunteer fire department, Cincinnati Ins. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Poole v. Inlow
green
1 sentence1997Ohio courts have found the following to not be "political subdivisions" as defined by R.C. 2744.01 (F): a non-profit ambulance service, Poole v. Inlow (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 379 , 382 ; the Ohio High School Athletic Association, Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 529 , 536 ; a county sheriff, Saunders v. McFaul (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 46 , 52 ; and a volunteer fire department, Cincinnati Ins. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Saunders v. McFaul
green
1 sentence1997Ohio courts have found the following to not be "political subdivisions" as defined by R.C. 2744.01 (F): a non-profit ambulance service, Poole v. Inlow (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 379 , 382 ; the Ohio High School Athletic Association, Wissel v. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 529 , 536 ; a county sheriff, Saunders v. McFaul (1990), 71 Ohio App.3d 46 , 52 ; and a volunteer fire department, Cincinnati Ins. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
In Re Adoption of Knipper
green
2 sentences1992The only exception carved out thus far is found in the case of In re Adoption of Knipper (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 214 , 30 OBR 371, 507 N.E.2d 436 . 1992The only exception carved out thus far is found in the case of In re Adoption of Knipper (1986), 30 Ohio App.3d 214 , 30 OBR 371, 507 N.E.2d 436 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Schade v. State
green
1 sentence1987See State v. Bounds (1953), 74 Idaho 136 , 258 P. 2d 751 ; Schade v. State (Alaska 1973), 512 P. 2d 907 ; People v. Bennett (1976), 60 Cal. App. 3d 112 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 305 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Bennett
green
2 sentences1987See State v. Bounds (1953), 74 Idaho 136 , 258 P. 2d 751 ; Schade v. State (Alaska 1973), 512 P. 2d 907 ; People v. Bennett (1976), 60 Cal. App. 3d 112 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 305 . 1987See State v. Bounds (1953), 74 Idaho 136 , 258 P. 2d 751 ; Schade v. State (Alaska 1973), 512 P. 2d 907 ; People v. Bennett (1976), 60 Cal. App. 3d 112 , 131 Cal. Rptr. 305 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Adams v. Humes
neutral
1 sentence1880A fair construction of the statutes require us to say there is not one rule as to lands and another as to chattels; and that in Ohio, under the circumstances here disclosed, “the maxim, cmeat emjptor, does not apply to the case of a sale by assignees for the benefit of creditors ” (Burrill on Assignments, 3d ed. § 416 ; 2 Hovenden on Frauds, 35 ; Adams v. Humes, 9 Watts, 305 ), whatever the character of the property may be. | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.