legislature intended exception in Connecticut

2022See, e.g., Stratford Police Dept. v. Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, 343 Conn. 62 , 64–65, 272 A.3d 639 (2022) (concluding that absence of lan- guage that is used in other statutes indicates that legisla- ture intended not to include such requirement).

2020As this court has previously stated, ‘‘[a]warding . . . attorney’s fees under CUTPA is discretionary . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Gargano v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616, 622 , 525 A.2d 1343 (1987); see also Woronecki v. Trappe, 228 Conn. 574 , 580 n.7, 637 A.2d 783 (1994); Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 590 , 552 A.2d 1207 (1989).

2020As this court has previously stated, ‘‘[a]warding . . . attorney’s fees under CUTPA is discretionary . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Gargano v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616, 622 , 525 A.2d 1343 (1987); see also Woronecki v. Trappe, 228 Conn. 574 , 580 n.7, 637 A.2d 783 (1994); Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209 Conn. 579, 590 , 552 A.2d 1207 (1989).

2013Similarly, in State v. Boswell, 142 Conn. App. 21, 30-31, 33 , 62 A.3d 1158 (2013), this court arrived at the meaning of the word “offense” in § 54-142d by looking outside that particular chapter of the General Statutes to the definition of offense in § 53a-24 (a).

2013Similarly, in State v. Boswell, 142 Conn. App. 21, 30-31, 33 , 62 A.3d 1158 (2013), this court arrived at the meaning of the word “offense” in § 54-142d by looking outside that particular chapter of the General Statutes to the definition of offense in § 53a-24 (a).

2011This understanding of the legislature's use of the term prosecution is bolstered by the definition of prosecution in Black's Law Dictionary, which defines prosecution as "[a] criminal proceeding in which an accused person is tried...." Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009); see Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 200-201 , 3 A.3d 56 (2010) ("`In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate m

2011This understanding of the legislature's use of the term prosecution is bolstered by the definition of prosecution in Black's Law Dictionary, which defines prosecution as "[a] criminal proceeding in which an accused person is tried...." Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009); see Hartford/Windsor Healthcare Properties, LLC v. Hartford, 298 Conn. 191, 200-201 , 3 A.3d 56 (2010) ("`In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate m

2008See General Statutes §§ 31-275 and 31-284; see also Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542 , 637 A.2d 392 (1994) (“In order to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits a claimant must prove five distinct elements. . . .

2008See General Statutes §§ 31-275 and 31-284; see also Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 542 , 637 A.2d 392 (1994) (“In order to qualify for workers’ compensation benefits a claimant must prove five distinct elements. . . .

2008(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pittman v. Jones, 559 So. 2d 990, 993 (La.

2008(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pittman v. Jones, 559 So.2d 990, 993 (La.

2007See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 546-47 , 923 A.2d 673 (2007) (“[i]t is well settled that we decline to engraft additional requirements onto clear statutory language” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751 , 770 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent).

2007See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 546-47 , 923 A.2d 673 (2007) (“[i]t is well settled that we decline to engraft additional requirements onto clear statutory language” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751 , 770 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent).

2007See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 546-47 , 923 A.2d 673 (2007) (“[i]t is well settled that we decline to engraft additional requirements onto clear statutory language” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751 , 770 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent).

2007See Farmers Texas County Mutual v. Hertz Corp., 282 Conn. 535, 546-47 , 923 A.2d 673 (2007) (“[i]t is well settled that we decline to engraft additional requirements onto clear statutory language” [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Fedus v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 751 , 770 n.17, 900 A.2d 1 (2006) (noting that legislature knows how to enact legislation consistent with its intent).

2001See Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 321 , 576 A.2d 455 (1990) (absent proof of bad faith on part of homeowner, General Statutes § 20-429 permits no recovery by contractor who has failed to comply with its requirements); see also Fruin v. Colonnade One at Old Greenwich Ltd.

2001See Barrett Builders v. Miller, 215 Conn. 316, 321 , 576 A.2d 455 (1990) (absent proof of bad faith on part of homeowner, General Statutes § 20-429 permits no recovery by contractor who has failed to comply with its requirements); see also Fruin v. Colonnade One at Old Greenwich Ltd.

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

2000Courts have, however, interpreted the meaning of the word "operate" in various contexts to mean related to the driving or movement of the vehicle itself or a circumstance resulting from the movement of the vehicle; see e.g., Davey v. Penneridae Farms, Inc. , 180 Conn. 469 , 429 A.2d 943 (1980); Cirillo v. Sardo , 41 Conn. App. 664 , 676 A.2d 1388 , cert. denied, 239 Conn. 904 , 682 A.2d 998 (1996); performing a function related to the movement of the vehicle itself; see e.g., Dias v. Adams , 189 Conn. 354 , 456 A.2d 309 (1983); Cirillo v. Sardo , supra; and stopped incident to travel or moveme

1985While the phrase “at any time” ordinarily would be construed as placing no unreasonable limits on the time such a correction can be made; West Haven v. Aimes, 4 Conn. Sup. 391, 393-94 (1937); we note that General Statutes § 12-129 in fact places a six year restriction on refunds under § 12-60. 9 We can find no evidence that the legislature intended the clause to be qualified by the one year statute of limitations imposed by § 12-57.