legislature intended waiver in Texas

2022In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Had the legislature intended such a requirement, it could have easily provided that conservatorship be ‘as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child by the parent.”).

2020In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Had the legislature intended such a requirement, it could have easily provided that conservatorship be ‘as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child by the parent.’”); In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).

2020We decline to adopt this expansion which would extend the waiver of immunity where it was not intended. “[I]t is important to recognize that the Legislature intended the waiver in the Act to be limited, not unlimited, as shown in the history of its passage.” Bossley, 968 S.W.2d. at 341 .

2012“The Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing suits to be brought against governmental units only in certain, narrowly defined circumstances.” Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.2001); see Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998) (“the Legislature intended the waiver in the Act to be limited”).

2022In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Had the legislature intended such a requirement, it could have easily provided that conservatorship be ‘as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child by the parent.”).

2020In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Had the legislature intended such a requirement, it could have easily provided that conservatorship be ‘as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child by the parent.’”); In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).

2009See Morin v. Boecker , 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that "when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party's attorney") (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio , 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) ("[The] rules suggest that . . . notice . . . [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.")); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, "our prim

2009See Morin v. Boeck er, 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that “when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party’s attorney”) (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (“[The] rules suggest that ... notice ... [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.”)); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, “our primary objec

2009See Morin v. Boecker , 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that "when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party's attorney") (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio , 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) ("[The] rules suggest that . . . notice . . . [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.")); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, "our prim

2009See Morin v. Boeck er, 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that “when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party’s attorney”) (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (“[The] rules suggest that ... notice ... [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.”)); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, “our primary objec

2009See Morin v. Boecker , 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that "when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party's attorney") (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio , 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) ("[The] rules suggest that . . . notice . . . [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.")); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, "our prim

2009See Morin v. Boeck er, 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that “when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party’s attorney”) (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (“[The] rules suggest that ... notice ... [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.”)); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, “our primary objec

2012“The Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing suits to be brought against governmental units only in certain, narrowly defined circumstances.” Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex.2001); see Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998) (“the Legislature intended the waiver in the Act to be limited”).

2006Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.2001); see also Dallas County MHMR v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.) (recognizing that the Legislature intended the waiver in the TTCA to be limited), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 541 , 142 L.Ed.2d 450 (1998).

2010See Ademaj , 243 S.W.3d at 621 .

2010See Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d at 621 .

2010Adams v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). "`The plain language of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to bar our consideration of global, nonspecific claims of evidentiary insufficiency in a Statement of Points.'" In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 899 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (quoting In re N.L.G., No. 06-06-00066-CV, 2006 WL 3626956 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 14, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

2009Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “ ‘The plain language of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to bar our consideration of global, nonspecific claims of evidentiary insufficiency in a Statement of Points.’ ” In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 899 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (quoting In re N.L.G., No. 06-06-00066-CV, 2006 WL 3626956 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 14, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

2015In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“Had the legislature intended such a requirement, it could have easily provided that conservatorship be ‘as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child by the parent.’”).

2014However, as we have noted in previous cases, “subsection (O) does not require that the parent who failed to comply with a court order be the same person whose abuse or neglect of the child warranted the child’s removal.” In re D.R.J., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (citing In re S.N., 287 S.W.3d 183, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“Had the legislature intended such a requirement, it could have easily provided that conservatorship be ‘as a result of the child’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child by the p

2011Therefore, "we must look to the terms of the [TTCA] to determine the scope of its waiver," Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. 1996), and then must consider the particular facts of the case before us to determine whether it comes within that scope.

2001Therefore, “we must look to the terms of the Act to determine the scope of its waiver,” Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.1996), and then must consider the particular facts of the case before us to determine whether it comes within that scope.

2010Adams v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). "`The plain language of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to bar our consideration of global, nonspecific claims of evidentiary insufficiency in a Statement of Points.'" In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 899 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (quoting In re N.L.G., No. 06-06-00066-CV, 2006 WL 3626956 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 14, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

2009Adams v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 236 S.W.3d 271, 278 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). “ ‘The plain language of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to bar our consideration of global, nonspecific claims of evidentiary insufficiency in a Statement of Points.’ ” In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 899 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007), pet. denied, 260 S.W.3d 463 (Tex.2008) (per curiam) (quoting In re N.L.G., No. 06-06-00066-CV, 2006 WL 3626956 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Dec. 14, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

2009See Quick, 7 S.W.3d at 123 .

2009See Quick, 7 S.W.3d at 123 .

2006Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.2001); see also Dallas County MHMR v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.) (recognizing that the Legislature intended the waiver in the TTCA to be limited), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 541 , 142 L.Ed.2d 450 (1998).

2006Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.2001); see also Dallas County MHMR v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.) (recognizing that the Legislature intended the waiver in the TTCA to be limited), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 541 , 142 L.Ed.2d 450 (1998).

2001Compare Bossley to Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976) (Enacted in 1970, “[t]he statute calls for liberal construction to effectuate its purposes (Section 13).”), and Salcedo v. El Paso Hosp.

2000In Lowe , Chief Justice Greenhill wrote a concurrence “encouragfing] the Legislature to take another look at the Tort Claims Act, and to express more clearly its intent as to when it directs that governmental immunity is waived.” Lowe, 540 S.W.2d. at 301 (Greenhill, C.J., concurring).

2000See R.X.F., 921 S.W.2d at 893 ; see also B.R.D., 575 S.W.2d at 130 . 2 As such, we cannot infer that the legislature intended such a requirement.

2000See R.X.F., 921 S.W.2d at 893 ; see also B.R.D., 575 S.W.2d at 130 . [2] As such, we cannot infer that the legislature intended such a requirement.

2000See R.X.F., 921 S.W.2d at 893 ; see also B.R.D., 575 S.W.2d at 130 . 2 As such, we cannot infer that the legislature intended such a requirement.

2000See R.X.F., 921 S.W.2d at 893 ; see also B.R.D., 575 S.W.2d at 130 . [2] As such, we cannot infer that the legislature intended such a requirement.

2024Whether the statute imposes a specific penalty for noncompliance is a separate question, but a mandatory timing provision is not rendered otherwise by the statute’s 51 See id. at 714 (“Because the Legislature expressed no particular consequence for failing to meet that deadline and none is logically necessary, we presume that the Legislature intended the requirement to be directory rather than mandatory . . . .”); Chisholm, 287 S.W.2d at 945 (“If the statute directs, authorizes or commands an act to be done within a certain time, the absence of words restraining the doing thereof afterwards or

2024Whether the statute imposes a specific penalty for noncompliance is a separate question, but a mandatory timing provision is not rendered otherwise by the statute’s 51 See id. at 714 (“Because the Legislature expressed no particular consequence for failing to meet that deadline and none is logically necessary, we presume that the Legislature intended the requirement to be directory rather than mandatory . . . .”); Chisholm, 287 S.W.2d at 945 (“If the statute directs, authorizes or commands an act to be done within a certain time, the absence of words restraining the doing thereof afterwards or

2024Whether the statute imposes a specific penalty for noncompliance is a separate question, but a mandatory timing provision is not rendered otherwise by the statute’s 51 See id. at 714 (“Because the Legislature expressed no particular consequence for failing to meet that deadline and none is logically necessary, we presume that the Legislature intended the requirement to be directory rather than mandatory . . . .”); Chisholm, 287 S.W.2d at 945 (“If the statute directs, authorizes or commands an act to be done within a certain time, the absence of words restraining the doing thereof afterwards or

2024Whether the statute imposes a specific penalty for noncompliance is a separate question, but a mandatory timing provision is not rendered otherwise by the statute’s 51 See id. at 714 (“Because the Legislature expressed no particular consequence for failing to meet that deadline and none is logically necessary, we presume that the Legislature intended the requirement to be directory rather than mandatory . . . .”); Chisholm, 287 S.W.2d at 945 (“If the statute directs, authorizes or commands an act to be done within a certain time, the absence of words restraining the doing thereof afterwards or

2024Whether the statute imposes a specific penalty for noncompliance is a separate question, but a mandatory timing provision is not rendered otherwise by the statute’s 51 See id. at 714 (“Because the Legislature expressed no particular consequence for failing to meet that deadline and none is logically necessary, we presume that the Legislature intended the requirement to be directory rather than mandatory . . . .”); Chisholm, 287 S.W.2d at 945 (“If the statute directs, authorizes or commands an act to be done within a certain time, the absence of words restraining the doing thereof afterwards or

2011See id.

2008Id. at 406 (noting Chapter 241 “creates a meaningful cause of action against private hospitals, a claim that remains viable even if suit against the government is barred.”).