legislature intended requirement in California

2025(Id. at pp. 350–351.) Outside of tort, rather than ‘rigidly’ applying the common law test, we look to the ‘ “history and fundamental purposes” ’ of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply.” (Sahlolbei, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 235 .) Several previous decisions illustrate the point.

2017Recently the Supreme Court commented on Borello , observing: "As we explained in [ Borello ], the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. [Citation.] Outside of tort, rather than 'rigidly' applying the common law test, we look to the ' "history and fundamental purposes" ' ... of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply." ( People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230 , 235, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 396 P.3d 568 .) *1220 In any event, the trial court's apparent con

2017Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 , the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. ( Id. at pp. 350-351, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 .) Outside of tort, rather than "rigidly" applying the common law test, we look to the " 'history and fundamental purposes' " of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply. ( Ibid. [declining to apply the common law test in light of the history and purposes of the

2017Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 , the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. ( Id. at pp. 350-351, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 .) Outside of tort, rather than "rigidly" applying the common law test, we look to the " 'history and fundamental purposes' " of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply. ( Ibid. [declining to apply the common law test in light of the history and purposes of the

2022(See § 189, subd. (e).) 5 Santana also argues he is entitled to relief under section 1170.95 because his conviction predated our high Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).

2022(See § 189, subd. (e).) 5 Santana also argues he is entitled to relief under section 1170.95 because his conviction predated our high Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).

2022(See § 189, subd. (e).) 5 Santana also argues he is entitled to relief under section 1170.95 because his conviction predated our high Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).

2022(See § 189, subd. (e).) 5 Santana also argues he is entitled to relief under section 1170.95 because his conviction predated our high Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks), and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).

2021The Legislature intended this requirement to have a limiting effect on the types of conduct that come within the third and fourth categories of the statute.” (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132 (Weinberg).) “‘To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant must first make “‘a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action’ arises from [protected activity] in connection with a public 9 issue [the first prong].” [Citation.] Once the movant meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate “‘a probability of prevailing on the claim [the second prong].’” [Citation.] If the

2021The Legislature intended this requirement to have a limiting effect on the types of conduct that come within the third and fourth categories of the statute.” (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132 (Weinberg).) “‘To prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion, the movant must first make “‘a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action’ arises from [protected activity] in connection with a public 9 issue [the first prong].” [Citation.] Once the movant meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate “‘a probability of prevailing on the claim [the second prong].’” [Citation.] If the

2018It concluded that the legislative intent was to “promote judicial economy by avoiding the utilization of the formal appellate process for a minor ministerial act.” (Id. at pp. 422-423.) Based on the legislative history and on Fares, the Acosta court concluded that the Legislature intended only to bar an appeal that raised an issue related solely to the miscalculation of credits, which resulted in the “utilization of the formal appellate process for a minor ministerial act.” (Acosta, at p. 423.) “When the only issue to be raised on appeal involves a matter such as presentence credits, the Legis

2018It concluded that the legislative intent was to “promote judicial economy by avoiding the utilization of the formal appellate process for a minor ministerial act.” (Id. at pp. 422-423.) Based on the legislative history and on Fares, the Acosta court concluded that the Legislature intended only to bar an appeal that raised an issue related solely to the miscalculation of credits, which resulted in the “utilization of the formal appellate process for a minor ministerial act.” (Acosta, at p. 423.) “When the only issue to be raised on appeal involves a matter such as presentence credits, the Legis

2017Recently the Supreme Court commented on Borello , observing: "As we explained in [ Borello ], the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. [Citation.] Outside of tort, rather than 'rigidly' applying the common law test, we look to the ' "history and fundamental purposes" ' ... of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply." ( People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230 , 235, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 396 P.3d 568 .) *1220 In any event, the trial court's apparent con

2017Recently the Supreme Court commented on Borello , observing: "As we explained in [ Borello ], the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. [Citation.] Outside of tort, rather than 'rigidly' applying the common law test, we look to the ' "history and fundamental purposes" ' ... of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply." ( People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230 , 235, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 436 , 396 P.3d 568 .) *1220 In any event, the trial court's apparent con

2025(See Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 557–558 [explaining that “the [legal] inquiry is not 20 wholly removed from historical, and hence factual, realities” and therefore “[c]ourts accord great weight to the factual record that the Legislature has compiled”].) Merely declaring that “[w]orker health and safety and high- quality patient care are matters of statewide concern” (Stats. 2022, ch. 845, § 1, subd. (d)) does not demonstrate that the Legislature intended to challenge the legal precedent that meal and rest breaks and premium wages are not matters of statewide concern.

2024(See, e.g., Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903 [deeming unconstitutional a probation condition “entrusting the decision whether to mandate residential treatment to the probation officer”]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 , 6 912–913 [“courts will presume a statute is constitutional unless its unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its validity”].) We also “understand a qualifying phrase to apply only to the word or phrase that immediately precedes it and not to other words or phrases that appear earlier in a list o

2024(See People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72 , 87- 90, abrogated on other grounds as recognized in People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 417 [granting substitution of counsel did not violate prohibition against conducting proceedings after the need for a competency hearing is established].) Nothing supports 14 that the Legislature intended to bar consideration of diversion while proceedings involving criminal prosecution were suspended under section 1368.

2023(See People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276 , 297 [the Legislature did not choose to grant qualifying offenders under Penal Code section 1172.6 a new trial, but rather the Legislature chose a procedure “requiring trial judges to decide the critical factual questions based—at least in some cases—on a cold record”].) To the contrary, the legislative history of section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) “does not support the assertion that the Legislature intended to permit a [peremptory] challenge at any hearing on remand in a criminal case.” ( Peracchi, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1261–1262.) Initial

2022“To fall under section 425.16(e)(4), ‘the conduct must be in connection with an issue of public interest.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of people,’ and ‘the assertion of a broad and amorphous public interest is not sufficient.’ [Citation.] ‘In evaluating the first prong of the anti- SLAPP statute, we must focus on “the specific nature of the speech rather than the generalities that might be abstracted from it.” ’ [Citations.] To be considered an issue of public interest, the communication must ‘go beyond the parochial particu

2021In People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980 (Ramirez), our Supreme Court explained that in enacting section 246.3, “the Legislature intended no requirement that an actual person be in proximity to the grossly negligent shooting.

2019In the absence of clearer indication that such was *559 the Legislature's intent, we presume the opposite: that is, that the Legislature did not intend to limit the fundamental power of the courts to hear the **698 legal disputes that are brought to them. ( Kabran , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 342-343, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 , 386 P.3d 1159 .) 7 B.

2019In the absence of clearer indication that such was *559 the Legislature's intent, we presume the opposite: that is, that the Legislature did not intend to limit the fundamental power of the courts to hear the **698 legal disputes that are brought to them. ( Kabran , supra , 2 Cal.5th at pp. 342-343, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 361 , 386 P.3d 1159 .) 7 B.

2017Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 , the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. ( Id. at pp. 350-351, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 .) Outside of tort, rather than "rigidly" applying the common law test, we look to the " 'history and fundamental purposes' " of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply. ( Ibid. [declining to apply the common law test in light of the history and purposes of the

2017Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 , 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 , the common law test of employment is not always appropriate beyond the tort context in which it was originally developed. ( Id. at pp. 350-351, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543 , 769 P.2d 399 .) Outside of tort, rather than "rigidly" applying the common law test, we look to the " 'history and fundamental purposes' " of the statute at issue to determine whether the Legislature intended the test to apply. ( Ibid. [declining to apply the common law test in light of the history and purposes of the

2016(Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4th 507, 529-530 .) Because section 872.540 does not except the lessees under the 2007 leases, it cannot be read to except a leasehold lienor like the Bank “by extension.” LouBar’s reliance on section 872.540 is misplaced.

2015(See Addington v. Texas, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 427-431 [beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard not constitutionally required in civil commitment cases].) Second, Johnson argues that the legislature intended the presumption-of-innocence instruction to apply in the SVPA context.

2015(Ibid.) Although the first version of the bill stated that “neither the criminal nor the administrative proceeding would have any effect on the other,” the final version provided that “an ‘acqutt[al]’ of criminal charges does preclude the administrative sanction.” (Ibid.) Our high court explained that, because the Legislature considered and rejected the provision that the criminal prosecution would not bar a subsequent administrative proceeding, “[t]he expression of some things in a statute necessarily means the exclusion of other things not expressed.” (Ibid.) The principle that the “expressi