19 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Board of License Commissioners v. Haberlingreen2 sentences2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood 2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood | 2 | 2 |
B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.green2 sentences2007“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8-131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.” B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132-33 , 571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990); accord Stevens, 337 Md. at 476-77 , 654 A.2d at 879 (1995) (“Maryland Rule 8-131(d) provides that, on appeal from an order constituting a final judgment, other orders, even if interlocutory, are generally reviewable by the appellate court.”). 2007“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8-131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.” B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132-33 , 571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990); accord Stevens, 337 Md. at 476-77 , 654 A.2d at 879 (1995) (“Maryland Rule 8-131(d) provides that, on appeal from an order constituting a final judgment, other orders, even if interlocutory, are generally reviewable by the appellate court.”). | 2 | 2 |
Woodell v. Stategreen2 sentences1969See Woodell v. State, 2 Md. 1969See Woodell v. State, 2 Md. | 2 | 2 |
Lewis v. Stategreen2 sentences2010The majority opinion highlighted, as an example, a then recent decision applying the long established principle that the jury serves only as a judge of the “law of the crime.” See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. [atj 724, 404 A.2d 1073 .... 14 . 2008The majority opinion highlighted, as an example, a then recent decision applying the long established principle that the jury serves only as a judge of the "law of the crime." See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 724 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1083 (1979) (holding that instructions on the voluntariness of confessions are binding, not merely advisory, on the jury, and the jury should be instructed as such). | 1 | 2 |
Garner v. Archers Glen Partners, Inc.green2 sentences2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood 2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood | 1 | 1 |
Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc.green2 sentences2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood 2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood | 1 | 1 |
Hudson v. Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2011Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 606-07 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 468 ; see e.g., Hudson, 402 Md. at 27 , 935 A.2d at 400 (“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8—131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.”). 2011Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 606-07 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 468 ; see e.g., Hudson, 402 Md. at 27 , 935 A.2d at 400 (“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8—131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.”). | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery County v. Stevensgreen2 sentences2007“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8-131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.” B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132-33 , 571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990); accord Stevens, 337 Md. at 476-77 , 654 A.2d at 879 (1995) (“Maryland Rule 8-131(d) provides that, on appeal from an order constituting a final judgment, other orders, even if interlocutory, are generally reviewable by the appellate court.”). 2007“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8-131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.” B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 319 Md. 127, 132-33 , 571 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1990); accord Stevens, 337 Md. at 476-77 , 654 A.2d at 879 (1995) (“Maryland Rule 8-131(d) provides that, on appeal from an order constituting a final judgment, other orders, even if interlocutory, are generally reviewable by the appellate court.”). | 1 | 1 |
Garay v. Overholtzergreen2 sentences2002Judge Karwacki for the Court in Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 346 , 631 A.2d 429, 432 (1993), set forth the principle and some of the earlier authorities as follows: “It is well settled that when a person negligently injures a minor two separate causes of action arise; the minor child has a cause of action for injuries suffered by it, and the parent or parents of the minor child have a cause of action for loss of services and for medical expenses incurred by the parent for the treatment of the minor’s injuries. 2002Judge Karwacki for the Court in Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 346 , 631 A.2d 429, 432 (1993), set forth the principle and some of the earlier authorities as follows: “It is well settled that when a person negligently injures a minor two separate causes of action arise; the minor child has a cause of action for injuries suffered by it, and the parent or parents of the minor child have a cause of action for loss of services and for medical expenses incurred by the parent for the treatment of the minor’s injuries. | 1 | 1 |
State's Atty v. City of Balto.green2 sentences1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . 1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . | 1 | 1 |
Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authoritygreen2 sentences1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . 1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . | 1 | 1 |
Vogel v. Grantgreen2 sentences1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). 1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). | 1 | 1 |
Wylie v. Johnstongreen1 sentence1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). | 1 | 1 |
Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainumgreen2 sentences1989Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 82 [ 501 A.2d 817 ], quoting from State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 319 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). 1989Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 82 [ 501 A.2d 817 ], quoting from State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 319 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Latz v. Latz A/K/A Schafergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Schuller
green
2 sentences1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [ Id. at 319 , 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra ; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). 1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an. excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [Id. at 319, 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). | 3 | 1978–1989 |
Cook v. State
green
2 sentences1969It has been a long established rule in Maryland that the accused’s character cannot be attacked by the State by showing prior convictions until the accused has testified. 1 Cook v. State, 225 Md. 603 , 171 A. 2d 460 . 1969It has been a long established rule in Maryland that the accused’s character cannot be attacked by the State by showing prior convictions until the accused has testified. 1 Cook v. State, 225 Md. 603 , 171 A. 2d 460 . | 2 | 1969–1969 |
Dorsey v. Bethel A.M.E. Church
green
2 sentences2014Church, 375 Md. 59, 67 , 825 A.2d 388 , 392 n. 1 (2003). 2014Church, 375 Md. 59, 67 , 825 A.2d 388 , 392 n. 1 (2003). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood
green
2 sentences2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood 2014The record is adequate to those ends for our conclusion in this case (in which we may resolve the matter without reaching the merits of the State Agencies’ argument that the limited liability entities may not claim taxpayer standing). 57 Thus, we exercise our discretion to resolve the point. *550 For purposes of taxpayer standing doctrine, “[i]t is a long established rule that ‘where there exists a party having standing to bring an action or take an appeal, we shall not ordinarily inquire as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.”’ Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections v. Small-wood | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter
green
2 sentences2011Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 606-07 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 468 ; see e.g., Hudson, 402 Md. at 27 , 935 A.2d at 400 (“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8—131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.”). 2011Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 606-07 , 175 L.Ed.2d at 468 ; see e.g., Hudson, 402 Md. at 27 , 935 A.2d at 400 (“It is a long established principle of appellate procedure, now embodied in Rule 8—131(d), that an appeal from a final judgment ordinarily brings up for appellate review all [other] orders in the case.”). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Adams
green
1 sentence2008The majority today, however, says (Opinion at 257-58, 958 A.2d at 306 , emphasis added): "The [ Stevenson ] majority opinion highlighted, as an example, a then recent decision applying the long established principle that the jury serves only as a judge of the `law of the crime.' See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 724 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1083 (1979) (holding that instructions on the voluntariness of confessions are binding, not merely advisory, on the jury, and the jury should be instructed as such)." The Lewis opinion never mentioned the phrase "law of the crime." The only "exception" recognized by | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994In Howard v. Bishop Byrne Home, 249 Md. 233 , 238 A.2d 863 , this Court was asked once again to overthrow the long established doctrine of immunity of charitable organizations from tort liability, for the reasons that it is an anachronism, a slave of stare decisis, a source of wrongs committed without a remedy, and against the “weight” of modern authority. 1994In Howard v. Bishop Byrne Home, 249 Md. 233 , 238 A.2d 863 , this Court was asked once again to overthrow the long established doctrine of immunity of charitable organizations from tort liability, for the reasons that it is an anachronism, a slave of stare decisis, a source of wrongs committed without a remedy, and against the “weight” of modern authority. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . 1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Montgomery County v. Board of Supervisors
green
2 sentences1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . 1992See also Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641 , 650 n. 6, 594 A.2d 1115 , 1119 n. 6 (1991); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., supra, 315 Md. at 291 , 554 A.2d at 385 ; Montgomery County v. Board of Elections, 311 Md. 512 , 516 n. 3, 536 A.2d 641 , 643 n. 3 (1988); State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 602 , 337 A.2d 92, 96 (1975), and cases there cited. . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Carbaugh v. State
green
2 sentences1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). 1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Montgomery County v. Ian Corp.
green
2 sentences1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). 1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Lewis v. Lewis
green
2 sentences1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). 1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Wheeler v. State
green
2 sentences1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an. excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [Id. at 319, 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). 1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an. excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [Id. at 319, 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
O. C. Taxpayers for Equal Rights, Inc. v. Mayor of Ocean City
green
2 sentences1985Taxpayers v. Ocean City, 280 Md. 585, 601 , 375 A.2d 541 (1977), and cases there cited. 1985Taxpayers v. Ocean City, 280 Md. 585, 601 , 375 A.2d 541 (1977), and cases there cited. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight
green
2 sentences1981Carlton’s rejoinder is that the offer to sell was signed by two individuals, each of whom had an interest in the whole, and that while the death of Calvin operated as a revocation of his offer to sell and terminated his interest, his death neither (1) terminated the offer made by Cecelia, an offer over which she retained, as an individual and as from the outset, the unrestricted power to revoke; (2) increased her interest, see Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203 , 114 A.2d 28 , 51 A.L.R. 2d 1232 (1955); nor (3) destroyed her capacity to convey. 1981Carlton’s rejoinder is that the offer to sell was signed by two individuals, each of whom had an interest in the whole, and that while the death of Calvin operated as a revocation of his offer to sell and terminated his interest, his death neither (1) terminated the offer made by Cecelia, an offer over which she retained, as an individual and as from the outset, the unrestricted power to revoke; (2) increased her interest, see Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203 , 114 A.2d 28 , 51 A.L.R. 2d 1232 (1955); nor (3) destroyed her capacity to convey. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.
green
2 sentences1977In Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 565 , 22 S. Ct. 431, 441 , 46 L. 1977In Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 565 , 22 S. Ct. 431, 441 , 46 L. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.