long established rule in Tennessee

1998In Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980), the Supreme Court said: We adhere to the long established rule of Holston National Bank v. Wood , 125 Tenn. 6 , 14 0 S.W.31 (191 1), that this Court will not interfere with the allowance of attorney’s fees by the trial court unless we can see that som e injustic e has be en perp etrated. . . .

1980We adhere to the long established rule of Holston National Bank v. Wood, 125 Tenn. 6 , 140 S.W. 31 (1911), that this Court will not interfere with the allowance of attorney’s fees by the trial court unless we can see that some injustice has been perpetrated.

2006Federal Courts § 15 (2003) (citing City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 , 164–65 (1997)).

2006An appellate court can reverse for plain error only if: (a) the record . . . clearly establish[es] what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law [has] been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused [has] been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.” Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim.

2002Id.

2002In Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698 (Tenn. 2000), our Supreme Court reiterated the long established rule concerning review of a jury verdict.

2001A. CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS HIP In Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. 1995), our Supreme Court restated the long- established rule that “the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship, together with a transaction by which the dominant party obtains a benefit from the other party, gives rise to a presumption of undue influence.” 902 S.W.2d at 385 .

2001A. CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS HIP In Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384 (Tenn. 1995), our Supreme Court restated the long- established rule that “the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship, together with a transaction by which the dominant party obtains a benefit from the other party, gives rise to a presumption of undue influence.” 902 S.W.2d at 385 .

2001Certain relationships, such as those of conservator and ward, are proof, as a matter of law, of the existence of a confidential relationship. -4- Parham v. Walker, 568 S.W.2d 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).

2000Under it, he would receive half of the lumber business; under previous wills and codicils, he would have received no interest in that business.7 Mr. Brindley relies on In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d 169 (Tenn. 1987), wherein the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s finding of insufficient evidence that undue influence was exercised, and observed: It is the long established rule in this State that in reviewing a judgment based upon a jury verdict the appellate courts are not at liberty to weigh the evidence to decide where the preponderance lies, but are limited to determining whether

1998In Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980), the Supreme Court said: We adhere to the long established rule of Holston National Bank v. Wood , 125 Tenn. 6 , 14 0 S.W.31 (191 1), that this Court will not interfere with the allowance of attorney’s fees by the trial court unless we can see that som e injustic e has be en perp etrated. . . .

1997Joseph Valley Structural Steel Corp., 691 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1985): It is the long established rule in this state that in reviewing a judgment based upon a jury verdict the appellate courts are not at liberty to weigh the evidence to decide where the preponderance lies, but are limited to determining whether there is material evidence to support the verdict; the appellate court is required to take the strongest legitimate view of all of the evidence in favor of the verdict, to assume the truth of all that tends to support it, allowing all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict, and to dis

1987Discussing the long established rule that “the admissibility of photographs is a matter to be determined by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion” this Court in Cagle v. State, 507 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973), quoted at length from 29 AmJur.

1971They are discussed in a number of decisions of our Supreme Court, including Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464 , 370 S.W.2d 523 : “It is generally agreed that evidence of other crimes by defendant is not admissible merely to prove his disposition to commit such a crime as that on trial; but such evidence is admissible when it is relevant to prove some other material issue on trial; for instance, when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan for commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to

1971They are discussed in a number of decisions of our Supreme Court, including Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464 , 370 S.W.2d 523 : “It is generally agreed that evidence of other crimes by defendant is not admissible merely to prove his disposition to commit such a crime as that on trial; but such evidence is admissible when it is relevant to prove some other material issue on trial; for instance, when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan for commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to

1968We particularly like the discussion of this proposition in Downs v. Poulin, Me., 216 A.2d 29 (1966).

1965In Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531 , 14 S.W.2d 735 (1928), the Court said: “Unquestionably, the testimony of Mrs. Cavert.against her husband was incompetent, because it related to matters that grew out of the marital relation, or to transactions between herself and husband, or to infor *328 mation acquired by her as a result of' the marital relation.” ( 158 Tenn. at 542 , 14 S.W.2d at 739 .) It is necessary then to determine whether expressly connecting the plaintiff in error in the form of the question would violate the privilege of confidential communications.

1965In Cavert v. State, 158 Tenn. 531 , 14 S.W.2d 735 (1928), the Court said: “Unquestionably, the testimony of Mrs. Cavert.against her husband was incompetent, because it related to matters that grew out of the marital relation, or to transactions between herself and husband, or to infor *328 mation acquired by her as a result of' the marital relation.” ( 158 Tenn. at 542 , 14 S.W.2d at 739 .) It is necessary then to determine whether expressly connecting the plaintiff in error in the form of the question would violate the privilege of confidential communications.

1963Allen v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605 , 106 S.W.2d 858 . ’ “In Brooksbank v. Leech, supra, the Court reaffirms the long established rule that the county is liable for property taken and damages incident to construction of a state highway.

1963Allen v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605 , 106 S.W.2d 858 . ’ “In Brooksbank v. Leech, supra, the Court reaffirms the long established rule that the county is liable for property taken and damages incident to construction of a state highway.